Comment: Key goal for transport policy must be to cut congestion, in part by shifting from car to bus
The US columnist H.L. Mencken once famously remarked: "For every complex problem there is a solution that is simple, neat and wrong."
Of the problems besetting Irish society, only the weather ousts transport as a topic of conversation. It is a measure both of the depth of our concern about transport's problems and their apparent intractability that transport solutions are advocated with more vigour than reflection.
This rush to unreflecting judgement affects all levels of society. The National Development Plan to 2006 identified inter-city travel as its main transport priority, in spite of the fact that transport to work within cities and major towns had already emerged as a greater constraint on the economy. The usual political checks and balances failed to operate in relation to the deterioration in Dublin's traffic speeds, even though a majority of ministers on the Cabinet subcommittee on infrastructure were from Dublin or adjoining counties.
As the plan progressed, Dublin was promised a Metro, built with Madrid rather than Luas-style efficiency; however a soupçon of value engineering will probably show that dedicated busways, rather than fixed-line rail, would be a better option for an extensively built city such as Dublin.
Economists have also contributed to the transport debate. Some, like the Economic and Social Research Institute, have confined their advice to the macro level, stressing the importance of rectifying Ireland's infrastructural deficit and putting forward macroeconomic solutions as to how it might be funded. Others, such as present and past members of the Competition Authority, have consistently argued that exposing the State's public transport operators to private competition would immeasurably improve, if not wholly solve, Ireland's transport crisis. This simple, neat solution will not work.
Transport policy seeks to optimise the physical flows of individuals, goods and services from environmental, social and economic perspectives. It is important to recognise at the outset that Ireland's recent failure - compared to other EU countries - to properly resource its transport infrastructure is the major reason for congestion levels in Irish cities and towns, which are the worst in Europe.
From an environmental perspective, Ireland needs to use less fossil fuel if it is to meet its Kyoto obligations; this involves a massive shift from car to bus travel, partly through the stick of carbon taxes and partly through the carrot of a National Spatial Strategy, which can make our conurbations sufficiently densely populated to support public transport systems with high service levels.
From a social perspective, congestion disproportionately affects the capacity of poor people to interact socially, turning a city's local communities into ghettos. Finally, from an economic perspective, increasing congestion destroys a city's economic logic, by reducing the size and productivity of its available labour force.
Given this background, the concentration of Mr Patrick Massey (Comment, July 18th 2003 ) and the Competition Authority on the private ownership of transport, rather than on its resourcing and policy aspects, is perplexing.
It is not true to claim that the bus franchising model has worked in London or that the de-regulated bus model has been anything other than an "unmitigated disaster" outside London. Following the introduction of franchising into London, bus passenger numbers fell and took eight years to exceed their 1987/88 level.
Their recent improvement owes little to franchising and almost everything to the public enterprise of London Mayor Mr Ken Livingstone, who froze fares, increased investment and service levels, and implemented bus priority measures.
One must agree with Mr Massey when he notes that the London franchising model comes with a high regulatory cost and a sluggish response to passenger demand.
With regard to bus deregulation outside London, even a noted privatiser like the World Bank has acknowledged its failure, as Fintan O'Toole showed in his July 1st column.
It is not true to assert that competition from private bus operators on the Dublin-Galway route has resulted in lower Bus Éireann fares than on uncontested routes. Compared to Dublin-Galway, Bus Éireann has lower cost-per-mile fares on the Dublin-Kilkee, Letterkenny-Cork and Cork-Ballina routes; to grow, these long-distance routes need attractive fares.
It is going too far to assert that "in urban bus services. . . public monopolies are, almost always, less efficient than competitive regimes". A report, commissioned by the Transport Forum as part of the Partnership process, examined bus provision in six cities comparable to Dublin. Toronto and Zurich were the best performers. Both are state monopolies.
The key concern for Irish transport policy must be to reduce congestion, in part by securing a shift from car to bus transport. This concern must influence any second-order decision as to who actually owns and runs the buses. Looking beyond Britain, EU countries can provide more sophisticated bus systems that actually meet customer needs and deliver on wider transport objectives. They do so by combining the strength of a skeletal, integrated network with the flexibility of competitive tension within that network.
Given the recent development whereby a £2 shelf company in London owns the Eircom phone system, there is a strong strategic argument for continuing public ownership of the Irish skeletal bus network. EU insights suggest that subcontracting is a good means of achieving system flexibility, in terms of containing costs and accommodating increasing passenger numbers. The political debate on how best to design a bus transport system has just begun.
Jerome Casey is a consultant economist, specialising in infrastructure
