It is hard to get a positive answer these days when you ask people a question about the EU, no matter what the question. The Dutch referendum last week was about the ratification of the EU-Ukraine association agreement. The vote was 61 per cent against, albeit on a low turnout.

But this was not really about Ukraine. Those who voted Nee – and I suspect most of those who voted Ja, too – could not care less about that country. This was an ill-defined message of insurrection against the establishment, whoever that may be.

The EU is used to referendums. In Ireland and Denmark, when the answer was No, governments tended to call a second referendum after symbolic dealmaking in Brussels back rooms.

French and Dutch No votes in 2005 on the constitutional treaty were essentially ignored; the document resurfaced two years later as the Treaty of Lisbon.

The agreement binds Ukraine closer to the EU and keeps Russia at bay, but to ratify it despite a democratic vote against, in one of the EU’s founding member states, is asking for trouble.

In particular, it would allow the Eurosceptics in the UK to make the justifiable claim that the EU has no respect for democratic decisions. The Remain campaign has already been weakened by the admission last week of prime minister David Cameron that he benefited from a fund set up in Panama by his father because it has damaged the credibility of the previously most credible of all Remain proponents in British politics.

The Dutch referendum raises important questions about the workings of the EU. The reforms Mr Cameron secured in Brussels in February go in the wrong direction. They will fragment the EU and render decision-making harder.

I would go as far to say that the upside of a British exit – from the perspective of the other member states – is that this wretched deal would be dead and buried, and never spoken about in polite company after the UK vote on June 23rd.

The Dutch referendum has shown us the reforms we really need to be talking about: how to make the EU more effective and less prone to blackmail by a Eurosceptic minority. This is not an argument about unanimity or qualified majorities but about how to deal with a minority of Eurosceptic member states. The Netherlands should repeal its law on consultative referendums, which allows referendums on motions that secure at least 300,000 signatures. If not, there is a danger Dutch voters will render the EU inoperative. If an outside power – say, Russia – wanted to undermine EU cohesion, it would simply need to give financial support to Geert Wilders, leader of the populist Freedom party, which campaigned for a No vote.

The solution to the Dutch problem – and that of the UK – would be a form of associate EU membership. This would allow centralised decision-making among core members; others would regain some independence from Brussels.

Central policy

Associated member states would be allowed to be detached from central policy areas – the euro, the Schengen free-travel zone, possibly aspects of the single market – while remaining members of the customs union. Associate member status would obviate the need for binary in-out type referendums such as the one in the UK. And it should be possible for associate members to switch back to full membership if political preferences change.

This might prove attractive to several northern member states with Eurosceptic electorates. I am not sure whether the Remain camp in the UK would be happy with it but it would be better than Britain having to quit the EU. Associate membership would be a place where Europe’s most lukewarm states could seek temporary shelter. – Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2016