If a new theory is right it will overturn everything we ever thought we knew about management

WEARING SOCKS on the outside of your shoes makes you less likely to slip on icy paths.

Promoting people at random makes companies more efficient.

These two hypotheses were among the winners of this year’s Ig Nobel prizes – handed out by Improbable Research, an organisation set up to promote academic work that makes you laugh, then think.

Yet these two winners do much more than that. The first is an important practical breakthrough: I have already instructed my elderly father, who lives in mortal dread of falling, to put his socks on last as soon as the cold snap starts.

But the second hypothesis is even more important as it applies all year round. It was developed by three Italians at the University of Catania who used mathematical simulations and game theory to make their point. If they are right, with one bound they have overturned everything we ever thought we knew about management.

Though the hypothesis sounds improbable, I have first-hand experience of it working well. Every week at my primary school the teacher selected a child at random to be milk monitor. If you were picked you felt honoured and rose to the occasion. If you weren’t picked, you took it in your stride and didn’t develop a profound hatred both of the teacher who rejected you or of the successful monitor.

When your turn came to hand around the cartons, you learnt that there were some good things about being in charge – the tingle of power was agreeable – and a lot of bad things – you got the blame when the milk was late or warm even though it wasn’t your fault.

Gospel Oak primary school wasn’t a pioneer in random promotion; ancient Athens got there first. It chose its magistrates and decision-makers by sortition – or drawing lots – and as far as I know (though my knowledge of classical history is feeble) that society was really rather successful.

In the 3,000 years since then the corporate world has developed a raft of complex promotion systems, all based on merit.

We compile long lists of “competencies” and draw matrices and give people scores.

We do psychometric tests, give interviews, role plays, simulations.

We have industries of HR people and headhunters to agonise about “skillsets” and “cultural fit”.

But even with the best will in the world, we often don’t know what sort of merit we are looking for or recognise it when we see it.

A further trouble is that the people making decisions don’t usually have the best will in the world.

Instead we are swayed by all sorts of things we shouldn’t be swayed by. How tall someone is, or how good looking they are. What school they went to.

We compare them to ourselves, and either hire people just like us or, under extreme duress from our chief diversity officer, we hire people because they are not like us at all.

Then, when we have awarded the job, we can’t get rid of them if they are no good because we chose them.

This may not matter much as it’s impossible to tell if they are good or not because of the time lags involved. With management, the proof of the pudding comes not in the eating but after it has worked its way through the digestive tract.

The main objection to the scheme is that there would be no reason to work hard if we all knew that promotion never came as a result. This argument is weak as promotion and hard work aren’t closely linked anyway.

The random system would boost morale by eliminating petty politics and resentment. It would save acres of time. It would mean the dreaded word diversity was never heard again. It would be the end of HR and executive search.

Indeed, the new system might even make the average person work harder. If I knew that I might suddenly become CEO tomorrow I would look sharp today as I wouldn’t want to disgrace myself.

The second objection is that you would sometimes end up with dim people in charge.

But this happens anyway, the only difference being that under the present system the dim leaders believe they are smart, which is even more dangerous.

And I’m not sure that being a bit dim is really so bad. There have been plenty of dim US presidents and it isn’t clear they have performed any worse than the bright ones.

The system would have the final advantage of eliminating corporate greed. The top man would get the right amount for doing the job. Enough to compensate for the additional work of handing out the milk and enough for taking responsibility when it gets spilt. – (Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2010)