Taken in isolation, AIB may consider itself unlucky to be hit by what chief executive Michael Buckley called "an administrative cock-up". However, it is not the first time in recent decades that the State's largest financial institution has found itself hitting the headlines for the wrong reasons.

Two years ago, the bank was rocked by the Allfirst scandal, when it emerged that John Rusnak, a trader at the AIB US subsidiary, had racked up losses of $691 million (€580 million).

The affair grabbed headlines around the world, drawing comparisons with the demise of Barings Bank at the hands of 'rogue trader' Mr Nick Leeson. But the Allfirst saga was not the first time Ireland's largest financial institution has had to engage in crisis management.

In 1985, AIB was forced to go to the Government when Insurance Corporation of Ireland, a wholly- owned division, went under with liabilities estimated at up to £120 million (€150 million). Although it had reaped profits of around £80 million in the previous year, AIB warned it might not be able to withstand such a hit.

The bank had bought a 25 per cent stake in ICI in 1981. In 1983, it purchased the remainder of the company, bringing the overall purchase price to £85 million.

That year, ICI's non-marine branch in London wrote £165 million worth of business, about 20 times more than in previous periods. It was an expansion that would have grave consequences for the bank.The losses mounted, prompting a move by AIB to disengage from the business in 1985.

The bank told the Government of the deficit and the then Minister of Industry and Commerce, Mr John Bruton, took control of the business.

With fears of a banking sector collapse, an administrator was appointed to ICI. Mr Billy McCann, an accountant with Craig Gardner, operated with funds from AIB, other banks and insurance companies, and the Central Bank.

Mr McCann estimated the 1984 losses at £225 million, most of them incurred at the London office. To surmount the crisis, AIB received an interest-free loan worth £100 million from the Exchequer in 1985.

The business was renamed Icarom in 1990 and its Irish operation was sold to another company called Insurance Corporation of Ireland.

Further Government loans worth £75 million were made available in 1991 and 1992 to the Insurance Compensation Fund, which met the firm's liabilities. AIB agreed in 1992 to pay another £175 million over 20 years.

At a hearing before the Dáil Select Committee on Public Accounts in 1995, the Department of Finance estimated the cost of the saga at more than £400 million, including the £85 million lost by AIB in the acquisition.

However for many, the ICI affair pales when compared to AIB's involvement in the DIRT tax evasion scandal through the late 1980s and 1990s. The affair broke when it was revealed that AIB had thousands of "bogus non-resident accounts" set up by Irish citizens to avoid DIRT.

The bank claimed it had an agreement with the Revenue in the early 1990s to clear up these accounts along with an understanding that historical liabilities would not be pursued.

The Dáil Public Accounts Committee (PAC) launched an investigation. This culminated in an investigation by a sub-committee of the PAC which uncovered evasion through non-resident accounts across the financial system.

AIB made a £90 million (€114 million) settlement with the Revenue following a hearing. The payment was the largest tax settlement since the State's foundation.

But it was the $691 million fraud at Maryland subsidiary Allfirst which has done most to diminish AIB's international standing.

The deception was perpetrated by Rusnak, a star trader and church-going family man who notched up the losses over seven years, going to elaborate lengths to conceal his mistakes.

The scam sparked an FBI manhunt for Rusnak, who had bet wrongly that the yen would weaken against the dollar.

The scalps of a number of senior Allfirst managers were duly collected, but none were forthcoming from senior AIB executives.

Last year Rusnak was sentenced to seven-and-a-half years in prison and ordered to pay compensation of $1,000 per month for five years after his release.

The sentence was a year longer than that handed to Nick Leeson, the futures trader who brought down the venerable Barings Bank by racking up losses of $1.4 billion. Leeson was released in 1999 after serving just three-and-a-half years in a Singapore jail, his term reduced for good behaviour.