While the report on the single regulatory authority recommends that the Central Bank lose its regulatory and supervisory role, it also includes two alternatives.

The main alternative, contained in a minority report, was proposed by the Department of Finance and Central Bank representatives on the committee. And a possible compromise or "twin pillar" approach was proposed by the Department of the Taoiseach.

Under the Central Bank's alternative model, a separate division would be set up in the Bank. It would take over all the prudential and consumer regulation assigned to the new authority and would be led by a commissioner for consumer issues.

This commissioner would only report to the governor of the Central Bank on staffing and finance issues.

He would be appointed by the Bank's board but after an open competition.

This model would also see the establishment of a panel for consumer and industry interests. In common with the main proposal, an ombudsman would also be established. According to the proposal, this would provide "operational autonomy" for the regulatory function while preserving what is already working well.

The third approach - advocated by the Department of the Taoiseach - also involves the Central Bank retaining some role, albeit much less than the Bank's own proposal. Some observers see the possibility of a compromise with this proposal, which was in a footnote of the report.

Under this proposal, canvassed by assistant secretary Mr Dermot McCarthy, two pillars of the bank with their own boards would come into being.

One, dealing with regulation and supervision, would be under a chief executive appointed by the Minister for Finance. The chief executive would have final responsibility for all regulatory matters.

The other pillar would deal with monetary policy, the currency and the Bank's function of lender of last resort, which would be led by the governor.

The governor would continue to chair the overall board which would be drawn from both pillars, who would each nominate people to the overall board.

This proposal is understood to have been rejected by the Central Bank during the negotiations.

It is understood to have said that the structure could not work unless the existing board and governor were in a direct controlling relationship in terms of policy and structure.