For the ancient Greeks, according to poet Constantine Cavafy, the barbarians were "some kind of solution", a sideshow to deflect domestic attention from their own pressing problems.
Likewise, the Iraqi President is some kind of solution for the US.
When in trouble, Washington can always use Saddam Hussein as a pretext for mounting a sideshow in the Gulf to divert world attention from the real regional crisis - America's failure to tackle Israel's adamant refusal to honour its treaty obligations to the Palestinians, or to negotiate constructively with Syria over the Golan Heights.
At the time Washington launched its initial post-Gulf War missile strike against Baghdad, a high-ranking member of the ruling Iraqi Ba'ath Party told me that the US did not seek to overthrow Mr Saddam.
Washington, the Iraqi official said, wanted Mr Saddam "to stay in power" so sanctions and military pressure would isolate and weaken Iraq, the core of the Mashreq, the Eastern Arab world, and divide the Arabs.
According to the US Secretary of State, Mrs Madeleine Albright, the removal of Mr Saddam remains a "long-term US goal" but not the objective of the offensive, almost certainly coming soon. Of course, from time to time the US has indulged in contradictory policies. For instance, in spite of the White House and State Department policy of "keeping" the Iraqi President in play, the Central Intelligence Agency has inspired, financed and, finally in frustration, directly mounted several attempts to overthrow or assassinate Mr Saddam.
While these attempts all failed to remove him, they were far more successful in weakening his regime than "pin-prick bombings". For these attempts produced purges in the armed forces and arrests in tribal groups that were formerly staunch supporters of Mr Saddam, narrowing his bases of support in both the military and the populace, "containing" him internally as well as externally through economic sanctions and military threat. Therefore, as the "barbarian" all the West loves to hate - and beat from time to time - Mr Saddam must remain in power for the foreseeable future - or at least as long as no one has dreamt up what to do without him.
The problem with his removal is that it is impossible to predict what will happen once Mr Saddam is gone. Furthermore, the three most likely alternatives to him are unacceptable to both the US and the Gulf states.
The first alternative is his replacement by a clone general who would exercise power through the army and party militia and behave in much the same way as Mr Saddam does. Since the US has repeatedly stated that sanctions will not be lifted until he is gone from the scene, this general would promptly take credit for doing the deed and demand an end to sanctions as his reward.
In the Arab view, this would not suit the US because Mr Saddam is not the real target of sanctions but Iraq itself, because it was well on the way, before the 1991 Gulf War, to becoming a strong military, industrial and economic power in the region, particularly in the politically fragile Gulf.
The US and its Gulf allies do not want a phoenix Iraq to rise from the ashes of Mr Saddam's regime.
Mr Saddam's overthrow by democratic forces would be an even worse second alternative for Washington and its local allies.
A democratic, pluralistic government in Baghdad representing Sunni and Shia Arabs and Kurds would set a thoroughly bad example to the Sunni-dominated, monarchy-ridden Gulf and to the undemocratic pro-Western regimes elsewhere in the Middle East.
This alternative is a very unlikely prospect, however, because there is no real internal opposition capable of establishing a functioning democracy and the opposition-in-exile is too corrupt, fractious and factional to take over.
THE Arabs, particularly Iraqis, fear the third alternative most - it is chaos. For if Mr Saddam should fall, the Iraqi army could split into warring factions, precipitating another civil war.
Baghdad would lose control over the provinces. Turkey, which last week reinforced its forces in northern Iraq with another 7,000 troops, could expand its 30 km-wide "security zone" to embrace a large part of the Iraqi Kurdish "safe haven".
Arabs fear that the Turkish army would then move southwards and capture the Kirkuk oilfields, a long-term objective. Meanwhile, Tehran-supported Iraqi Shia militias, encamped on the Iranian side of the frontier, could move into a political vacuum in the south of Iraq.
This would divide Iraq into three parts: a Turkish-controlled north, a Sunni-dominated central portion round Baghdad and a Shia south allied to Tehran.
Such developments would have very serious repercussions outside Mesopotamia. Large Shia communities in the Gulf emirates and Saudi Arabia would be encouraged to revolt, threatening the world's oil supplies.
Radical clerics in Tehran could reassert themselves to recapture power from the moderate new President, Muhammad Khatami. This would encourage Muslim militants everywhere in the region to go over to the offensive. Jordan, dependent on trade with Iraq, would collapse economically. Chaos in Iraq could produce anarchy all round. The leading Arab commentator, Mr Muhammad Hassanein Heikal, believes Washington is determined to "punish Iraq no matter what" Baghdad or others do on the diplomatic front to avert the use of force.
He and other Arab analysts point out that if and when military action is resumed it will be done only on "suspicion" that Iraq is, allegedly, violating UN resolutions and with full knowledge that air strikes cannot destroy any arms of mass destruction Iraq may still possess or its potential for building more weapons.
Jordan's King Hussein warns of "inevitable disaster" while other leaders consider "irresponsible" the determination of the US and its Anglo-Saxon allies to "hit Saddam now and hit him hard".
