Are Tony Blair and Gordon Brown conditioning British public opinion for early entry into the European Single Currency? Or are they at daggers drawn?

Is the Prime Minister already persuaded that he should take the most momentous decision of his premiership while at the peak of his powers? Or is the Treasury trying to bounce him?

Too much, clearly, could be made of Mr Brown's deep disappointment at being forced to make way for Mr Blair in the 1994 leadership election. The Blair/Brown relationship has been rebuilt, and would appear crucial to the success of the new Labour government.

However, there is no rule which says this government will necessarily be spared the tensions between 10 and 11 Downing Street which have been such a conspicuous and consistent part of the British political landscape. Moreover, Mr Blair is the keeper of Labour's truly big project.

There is little doubt about Chancellor Brown's Euro-enthusiasm. And Mr Blair is almost certainly a keen European at heart. But might the master of the public mood fear that an early, and botched, decision to scrap sterling could unhinge his plans for an unprecedented, second full Labour term?

This guessing game is what currently passes for debate on the merits or demerits of British participation in EMU. One day a leak - presumed from the Treasury - suggesting an early declaration that Britain will join the single currency soon after 1999; the next a withering denial.

Seemingly reliable indications that Foreign Secretary Robin Cook has dropped his scepticism - and been persuaded that Britain's standing in the EU will be damaged without, at least, an "in principle" commitment to join - are energetically dismissed. Journalists are accused of "recycling each other's garbage".

And the insistent line from the Number 10 press office is that the position hasn't much changed since the general election - that Labour is positively pro-European but that membership in the first wave is unlikely and that formidable obstacles remain thereafter.

Tory politicians and commentators appear content that "when the time is right . . . in the national interest" sounds reminiscent of Mr Major's "wait and see". They also draw encouragement from the knowledge that there has been no significant change in the climate of opinion which Mr Blair cultivated so assiduously at the election, and which helped sweep him to power.

What politicians say at election time should invariably be taken with a large pinch of salt. But the coalition which Mr Blair constructed on the road to Downing Street certainly presents itself as one of the formidable obstacles in the way of early embrace of the Single Currency.

For much of the pre-election campaign Mr Major and Mr Blair vied to establish the depth of their instinctive Euro-scepticism. Where the Tories led - for example, in their commitment to a referendum - Labour inevitably followed.

But, if anything, Mr Blair seemed to emerge as the more convincing sceptic.

The previously Tory press had long grown weary of Mr Major's struggle to balance the majority sceptical tendency in his cabinet with acute appreciation of the damage which would have accrued from the resignation of his pro-European Chancellor, Kenneth Clarke.

And the Sun newspaper - which was and remains fiercely opposed to the Single Currency - found itself richly rewarded for its decision to declare for Mr Blair on day one of the campaign proper.

In a series of articles, Mr Blair vowed to have no truck "with a European federal superstate". On St George's Day he declared: "If there are moves to create that dragon, I will slay it."

True patriotism, he charged, was about winning in Europe, about "getting stuck in, making sure we get the Europe we want". And as he cast Labour as the party of the British bulldog, others too had no difficulty decoding his apparent meaning and intent.

Baroness Thatcher reportedly gave Mr Blair her blessing with the immortal words: "He won't sell Britain out."

We shall doubtless know if and when Lady Thatcher ever comes to a contrary opinion. And the Sun still holds that Mr Blair "will only act in what he sees as Britain's best interests".

But it is significant that that paper in recent weeks has been forcing the pace of the public debate - firing warning shots at Number 10 while ostensibly targeting Gordon Brown as Chancellor Kohl's "greatest ally".

Many Tories think this the nub: that, for Number 10, it is not the economic stars which must be aligned but the Sun, the Daily Mail and the London Times - together with polling organisations which continue to record deep public opposition to British membership.

At the very least, an early decision to go for it could spell the end of the coalition which helped Mr Blair to power - with the resultant referendum providing an instrument for the revival of a Conservative Party still desperately searching for a way back into the political race.

If this is one argument for delay, there is a second, and equally powerful, one.

Clearly Mr Blair can recruit big business behind a campaign to shift opinion in favour of eventual membership. For all the subsequent denials, General Motors - like the CBI - has been obliging this week.

But some Labour strategists believe the dual task - of securing a second term and joining a successful single currency - would best be served by defining the single currency as an issue to be determined at the next general election.

The argument is simple enough: by then the success or otherwise of the currency would be clear and opposition (assuming it is successful) on the wane. Mr Hague appears committed to opposition.

LABOUR gives an "in principle" commitment, recruits big business to its cause, denies the Tories much-needed financial support in the process, goes on to win a second term, and joins the currency on the back of Tory decimation.

If that all sounds too neat, it is of course because it is. Once Mr Blair gives that "in principle" commitment, pressure would inevitably grow to press ahead in the lifetime of the present parliament.

As rehearsed above, that demands Mr Blair take a risk with the British people, possibly endangering that second term in the process. Against that, a "positive" statement at the turn of the year falling short of actual commitment will be a profound disappointment to Mr Blair's admirers in Europe.

So what will he do? In truth, nobody knows - and that almost certainly includes Mr Blair himself.

The arguments for delay will need no rehearsal inside Number 10. Mr Blair is a cautious man, who will not want to put the question until he is sure of the answer.

That said, the disposition of this government seems clear. The kites so beautifully flown, so swiftly shot down, all serve their purpose. When Mr Blair told the Labour conference that Britain would assume its EU presidency once more as "a respected leading European nation", he hardly thought to offer a re-run of Mr Major's pathetic claims to be winning the argument in Europe, shaping the Union to the British agenda.

No, the Sun's suspicions are surely correct. Mr Blair and his ministers are discreetly sniffing the wind while trying to change its direction. But not even Mr Blair can know how fast or how soon!