The Nice Treaty will not end Ireland's policy of "military neutrality". It is important to have a debate on Irish neutrality, but it is unfortunate that this debate should be conducted in the context of the Nice Treaty referendum. The Nice Treaty does not contain major advances on the provisions dealing with the EU's foreign and security policy, compared with the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 and the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, both of which were endorsed by Irish voters. Maastricht's foreign policy provisions included the framing of a common EU defence policy, while Amsterdam stated that the EU's defence policy would only deal with peace-support missions.

The EU's new military committee and staff, and the creation of an EU rapid reaction force, were agreed at the Helsinki summit of December 1999, but they are not in the Nice Treaty agreed in December 2000. The changes to the foreign and security policy provisions in the Nice Treaty are designed to improve the EU's decision making procedures and effectiveness, but no major treaty changes are proposed for the policy itself, which Ireland supports and participates in.

However, separately from the Nice Treaty referendum, it is important to debate the meaning and relevance of Irish neutrality in today's world. Within that context it is worth discussing what Irish participation in the EU's Rapid Reaction Force says about Ireland's international security policy.

Irish governments have demonstrated time and again that they are not blind to international conflicts, and wish to play a part in their resolution. However, Ireland is still officially "militarily neutral", which suggests the Government is not willing to support the use of force, if necessary, to resolve conflicts outside its borders. But Ireland is a contributor to the Rapid Reaction Force, the military option in the EU's Common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The ESDP includes "peacemaking" military actions in its remit. This military commitment suggests that Ireland is not as "militarily neutral" as official policy states.

This is not surprising considering the new strategic and security environment which has developed since the end of the Cold War. A major war is now much less likely in Europe. But the international community and the UN have been trying to respond to an increasing number of lower-scale crises and conflicts, as in Bosnia and Kosovo. These crises include ethnic conflict, economic and social collapse, environmental degradation, and humanitarian relief.

In addition, the bombings in Bosnia and Kosovo are examples of how the resolution of conflicts may require peacemaking operations, as well as the traditional peacekeeping which Ireland has been doing for over 40 years. It is now also accepted practice for the UN to mandate coalitions of states, or other international organisations, to help it resolve conflicts. In response to this, the EU has decided to develop its defence policy, the ESDP, to reflect its growing responsibilities in global affairs. The ESDP is basically intended to pool EU resources so as better to respond to various types of crises primarily in Europe, but also beyond if necessary.

The Rapid Reaction Force is one part of a range of options available to EU decision-makers to respond to crises. The other options for the ESDP include "civilian" capabilities such as policemen, administrators, and development assistance.

The EU cannot always expect Uncle Sam to save the day, especially if the Americans are engaged elsewhere. It is not creating a collective defence alliance like NATO, as is indicated by the recent appointment of a neutral, a Finnish general, as head of the EU's military committee.

The ESDP is nothing more than an "international crisis management" policy, so as better to respond to the new types of international crises that have arisen in the last 10 years. It makes sense that Ireland would want to participate in such military missions in its primary geopolitical area of interest, and out of political solidarity with its fellow EU member-states.

Perhaps more importantly, the broad holistic approach of the ESDP complements traditional Irish international security policy, as it includes civilian as well as military methods. In addition, Irish troops will not participate without a UN mandate, and Dail approval.

With all these new developments is "military neutrality" still the correct definition of Irish international security policy? The evidence suggests otherwise. The Government has been willing to support the use of military force for UN peace support missions since preparing to participate in the peace-enforcement mission in Somalia in 1993. It also supported the EU resolution backing the NATO military operation in Kosovo in 1999. In these cases the Government was not "militarily neutral", nor should it have been.

But the Government consistently asserts that Irish participation in this EU force does not infringe on Ireland's neutrality policy, an indication of the political sensitivities surrounding the issue. The political endurance of neutrality has more to do now with its role as an expression of Irish independence than with a strict adherence to the principle of non-use of force for resolving international conflict.

Ireland is not alone in having such a debate about independence or neutrality. The other EU neutrals, Austria, Finland, and Sweden, who are all contributing troops to the EU force, are also having similar debates.

Traditional neutrality is a relic of the Cold War. The international context has changed, and official Irish policy must adapt and change with it. If Ireland is prepared to use military force for crisis management missions, then Ireland is no longer "militarily neutral". This change should be welcomed as it is in line with traditional Irish foreign policy aims of enhancing collective security through the UN so as to uphold international law. These traditional aims now require a variety of crisis management responses, including the use of military force if necessary.

But if Ireland is no longer "militarily neutral" then what is it? A better definition of present Irish policy is non-alignment, not neutrality. Non-alignment means the Irish government can support the use of force if necessary; but it also means that Ireland maintains the independence to make such a decision and is not bound to act due to a mutual defence agreement, such as in NATO. In fact, this is the present Irish policy in practice.

The sooner non-alignment becomes official government policy the better, so as to facilitate a foreign and defence policy debate based on facts rather than on policies that no longer exist.

Daniel Keohane is research fellow at the Centre for European Reform in London. His study, Realigning Neutrality? - Irish Defence Policy & the EU, was published by the WEU Institute for Security Studies