The Kosovo campaign evaluations by the commanders of an airborne brigade and a parachute battalion have been disclosed.
The quantity and quality of equipment are criticised, as are faulty command arrangements, failures to disseminate intelligence, "spin-doctoring" and lack of briefing on legal powers to deal with suspected war criminals.
Every army makes, or should make, detailed post-campaign evaluations of its tactics, equipment, logistics etc. It is then that real lessons emerge. Such reports tend to concentrate on shortcomings rather than successes. They are not confined to operational matters.
Indeed, after the Falklands War, the British Ministry of Defence commissioned University College, Cardiff, and King's College, London, to examine media relations. A fascinating book emerged (The Fog of War by Mercier, Mungham and Williams). It included comparative chapters on Vietnam, Israel and Grenada.
Some equipment complaints are long-standing. The soldier's rifle is a sensitive matter. The British SA80 rifle took years to finalise. Last March it was officially admitted that it may not "work properly" in extreme hot, dry conditions and may jam. It is said to have been suspended from NATO's list of accepted weapons, but thousands were used throughout the Gulf War and in Bosnia and Kosovo.
The privatisation of the Royal Ordnance factories is partly blamed for the delays in production. The rifle was tested in 1976 but came on the market only in 1985. The good US Colt M-16 was standard issue to US forces in the 1960s. The Austrian Steyer, which our troops have, became available in 1978.
Only 600 SA80s were exported in the first few years (to Mozambique) but over 330,000 were eventually made as the standard individual weapon for the British services. The SAS decided not to use it.
The communications complaints have been sharp. The Clansman field radio system is described as insecure, "old and unreliable". Battle communications were "a hindrance to operations". Clansman was to have been replaced by a new "Bowman" system, which this writer first saw in the early 1980s.
Clansman was never able to compete with the US AN/VRC12 and AN/PRC77 systems. The Bowman may not appear in full until 2004, having suffered similar vicissitudes to those of the rifle. The Americans are a generation ahead with their excellent "Syngars" equipment.
This week's Jane's Defence Weekly confirms that the British Ministry of Defence is requesting information from prospective suppliers for up to 50,000 "Personal Role Radios". These are for short-range communications between soldiers in infantry sections, and may, in fact, be based on civilian-type radiotelephones.
Equipment production difficulties are not new. A big effort was put into producing a "British Jeep", called the Gypsy, and it was often publicised in the 1950s. When the Middle East seemed likely to erupt in 1958 a British parachute battalion was sent to Jordan.
The battalion commander declined to take his Gypsy jeeps but demanded and got the excellent Land-Rovers. There was a long history of oil weeps, clutch trouble etc, and drivers hated them. A few years later the project was discontinued with a write-off of about £19 million.
There was much discussion of privatisation, taking service officers into design teams etc, but British civilian car manufacturing was also in decline. The success of Japanese car-making team techniques in Britain has led to proposals (notably in Jane's Defence Industry Report) for their use in military equipment manufacture generally.
