There has always been an absence of trust between the parties involved in the peace process. At every stage this has been a factor. But since March of this year, this issue of distrust has been elevated in significance and proffered as the reason why the agreement has not been implemented. I seriously differ from that view, and for very concrete reasons.

The lack of trust has been a constant. For that very reason this was addressed in the terms of the Good Friday agreement.

That is why so many checks and balances and so many safeguards were written into the agreement. They are to be found everywhere in the sections of the agreement dealing with the political institutions; voting procedures, chairs of committees, representation on committees, the composition of the executive, the interdependent and inter locking all-Ireland structures, the ministerial pledge of office, the rules governing the operation of the all-Ireland ministerial council, its associated implementation bodies and so on.

No one was asked to sign a blank cheque. To the extent that it was politically and practically possible to provide formally binding assurances to all involved, this was done. What we have, and this is as good as it is ever going to get in this phase of the peace process, is a contract between opponents, not an agreement between friends.

Moreover, the political institutions themselves were designed to be the major tool for further addressing the issue of trust.

The effect of working positively in partnership would be to minimise that gap to the greatest extent possible.

But 1 1/2 years after Good Friday '98, the political institutions, the foundation stone of most other possibilities has not been laid. The democratic imperative of the electorate, North and South, as expressed on May 22nd last year, is being ignored. We are in a political crisis. The agreement is in danger of dying of inertia.

In the interim, the gap of distrust has widened. What other possible result could arise from the above situation? Regrettably, I have to say that the UUP has been encouraged in its filibustering and minimalist strategy by the overall handling of the situation, especially by the positions articulated and promulgated by the British government.

These are to be found in side letters, speeches, statements, the pages of Hansard and draft British government legislation tabled, ironically, on July 12th.

At the beginning of the current review, Senator Mitchell said: "We are not here to renegotiate the Good Friday agreement." This is to be welcomed. For Sinn Fein the Good Friday agreement is the bottom line.

We are committed to the full implementation of the agreement in all its aspects including the provisions on decommissioning. The UUP, how ever, has successfully used the latter issue as an excuse to prevent the implementation of the agreement for the past 18 months.

When the guns are silent, the challenge is to build on this by providing a viable and peaceful alternative for achieving political change.

The reality is that for almost 18 months, attempts to address this issue have been in the context of the non-implementation of the agreement and with the UUP refusing to work in good faith to create more favourable political conditions.

The UUP approach to the issue of decommissioning has been tactical throughout. Its objective of keeping Sinn Fein out of the executive has paradoxically made the resolution of this issue much more difficult. Its position of "no guns, no government" runs totally contrary to the agreement.

Almost a year and a half has been squandered, a critical period during which there could have been more significant progress on all aspects of the Good Friday agreement, including decommissioning.

Decommissioning can only come about on a voluntary basis and that means persuading those with wea pons that they should dispose of them. This reality is acknowledged and reiterated in the International Commission's report of July 2nd, 1999. A fact which was reinforced in comments by Gen de Chastelain in Dublin on July 22nd when he said: "This is a voluntary process, they cannot be compelled to do it."

THE implementation of the overall settlement is the agreed context for addressing and resolving the issue of decommissioning. Sinn Fein has done its best to create that context. We have fulfilled all our obligations under this section of the agreement.

All of the parties to the agreement, including the UUP, have an obligation to help bring this about but this has not been the case. Any attempt to place a political sanction on the Sinn Fein electorate would be undemocratic and unacceptable.

Any attempt to exclude Sinn Fein on the basis of a collective failure by all of the parties to the agreement to achieve decommissioning is beyond the terms of the agreement and would be totally unacceptable. Any attempt to further delay the establishment of an inclusive executive on this basis is also beyond the terms of the agreement and would be equally unacceptable.

Entitlement to executive office is dependent only on electoral support and taking and honouring the pledge of office. Sinn Fein is entitled to be part of the executive. Our electorate is democratically entitled to be represented on an executive. So, too, are the electorates of all parties with a sufficient mandate.

The UUP approach denies this right to all sections of the electorate.

The review should conclude that the executive, the all-Ireland ministerial council and the British-Irish council should have already been established; that these institutions should now be established on the inclusive basis set out in the Good Friday agreement and that the transfer of powers to them should be immediate.

It is our collective duty, as political leaderships, to make politics work and, by doing so, to make conflict in this country a thing of the past.

The Mitchell review presents us with the best opportunity this century to do that. If we fail, it will be a huge failure, bigger and greater than any of the political leaders involved.

Gerry Adams MP is president of Sinn Fein.