The decision of Ms Justice Laffoy in the case of Baby A demonstrates some crucial factors in the consideration of crisis pregnancies.

On reading the judgment of Ms Justice Laffoy, one is struck by the clear vulnerability of young women in situations such as that in which the mother of Baby A found herself. In a distressed condition, she sought advice from an agency which held itself out as offering support and counselling to women in her predicament.

Instead of receiving such essential services, she seems to have become involved in a concerted effort by a number of individuals to secure a baby for the proprietor of this agency and his wife to adopt.

The legal issues raised by this case are relatively straightforward:

Is it illegal to place a baby for adoption privately without the supervision of adoption agencies and a health board? If so, why is this the case?

Was there a conflict of interest involved for the proprietor of the counselling agency and, if so, what effect did this have on the placement of the child?

Did the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the proprietor of the agency involved vitiate the consent seemingly given by Baby A's mother?

The Adoption Act 1998, which began life as the Adoption Bill 1996, was introduced into the Dail for a number of reasons. The principal motivation was the pressure brought to bear on the Government by the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Keegan case to recognise the rights and position of the natural father of a child born outside of marriage. The Act, inter alia, seeks to rectify the position of a natural father who heretofore had no influence or voice in the decision as to whether his child should be adopted.

The opportunity was also taken in this Act to introduce other overdue measures in the adoption regime, the most relevant in this context being that related to private adoptions.

In the 1995 report of the Adoption Board concern was expressed about the placing of children for adoption by the mother in circumstances in which the prospective adopters had not necessarily undergone assessment by the social workers engaged by the adoption agencies.

One of the statutory concerns of the Adoption Board is to ensure that applicants for adoption are of good moral character and are suitable prospective parents. Without this element of close supervision and stringent assessment, the Adoption Board could be failing in its duties to the child, whose best interests it is obliged to consider as its paramount concern.

Another cause of concern to the Adoption Board over private placements was the lack of counselling and support services for the birth mother. The kinds of circumstances envisaged by the board seem to mirror those which are found in the case of Baby A's mother and are vital to ensure the free and informed consent of the mother to the giving up of her child for adoption.

Although not all private placements may be categorised in this way, as some children are adopted by relatives of the mother in much happier circumstances, the lack of independent advice for the mother as to the nature and effect of adoption must be of fundamental concern in all cases.

For the reasons outlined above, Section 7 of the Adoption Act 1998 rendered a direct placement of a child for adoption unlawful unless such placement is with a relative. This provision was known to the proprietor of the agency to whom Baby A's mother turned for help. Ms Justice Laffoy found that, in that context, he misled the young woman and, by enlisting the help of other professionals, was able to persuade her to avoid the interference of other independent counsellors and advisers.

The calculated domination of her will, the intentional isolation from others who might have advised otherwise and the deliberate giving of misinformation to such a vulnerable young woman would lead to the conclusion that this was certainly a person who would not be a suitable parent by adoption standards.

His motivation in this case seems to have been only to get custody of a baby, either Baby A or Baby B or preferably both, through whatever means came his way.

The barrier to his going a more conventional route to adoption would appear to be his age. In practice, in recent years many couples have been refused eligibility for adoption on the basis that one of the spouses was over 40, or even over 37 in one case.

To take a sympathetic view of the plight facing the proprietor of the agency, the desperate measures sometimes taken by those who long for a child are often prompted by a yearning and grieving which may make them contemplate undertaking arrangements which another person might think reprehensible.

However, this was a man who was in a position of some influence in relation to young women and girls who came to him at probably the most vulnerable time of their lives.

They were pregnant, frightened, often isolated from family and friends and seeking a solution to their predicament.

As the pregnancy continues, and no solution is in sight, these young women become desperate for the burden of decision-making to be lifted from them. The conflict of interest in which this man found himself could not have been more obvious.

Concerns raised by this case focus on the policing, if any, which can be done of advice centres of the kind offered here. How can anyone be sure that the advice given at these centres is sound, non-directive or even in compliance with the law?

The clandestine nature of the circumstances outlined in the case of Baby A gives rise to a level of discomfort that more is not done to regularise the conduct of agencies, many of whom doubtless offer very valuable services but who suffer the bad press given in cases such as this one.

In this case there was no counselling given at any time to this young woman, she was given incorrect legal advice and was persuaded by indirect influences to give custody of her child to a person who had not been assessed as to his suitability and who would not be subject to any supervision in his custody of the child.

Although they do not hold themselves as legal advisory centres, nevertheless the qualifications of such centres, and the quality of advice which they offer, ought to be subject to more strict scrutiny to protect the interests of those they seek to help.

Deirdre Madden lectures in law at UCC