Principle and pragmatism in Fethard-on-Sea, 1957

The 1957 Fethard-on-Sea boycott is one of the most interesting episodes in the history of Church-State relations this century…

The 1957 Fethard-on-Sea boycott is one of the most interesting episodes in the history of Church-State relations this century. The economic boycott of Protestants by their Catholic neighbours, portrayed in this year's film, A Love Divided, exemplified the worst excesses of clerical power in 1950s Ireland, at a time when it seemed difficult to separate the Catholic hierarchy's policy from governmental policy. Yet what is interesting about the events in Fethard, Co Wexford that summer is that the State recognised how badly the Church had got it wrong, and how it was willing to challenge the hierarchy's support of the boycott in defence of what the then Taoiseach, Eamon de Valera, described as the national reputation.

The failure of the hierarchy to condemn the boycott was due to a combination of factors. Catholic triumphalism in Ireland was at its height in the 1950s. The boycott was seen by certain outspoken members of the hierarchy, such as Michael Browne, the Bishop of Galway, as an ideal opportunity to indulge in a little muscle flexing. The reality was that the hierarchy were ignorant of, or chose to ignore, the local politics which lay behind the boycott.

As the debate in the media picked up momentum, the Fianna Fail government was soon under pressure to comment on the issue. On July 4th, 1957, Noel Browne asked the Taoiseach in the Dail whether he proposed to make a statement on the matter. In reply, de Valera said he considered the boycott "ill-conceived, ill considered and futile for the achievement of the purpose for which it seems to have been intended; that I regard it as unjust to confound the innocent with the guilty; that I repudiate any suggestion that this boycott is typical of the attitude or conduct of our people; and that I beg of all who have regard for the fair name, good repute and well-being of our nation to use their influence to bring this deplorable affair to a speedy end".

This unequivocal denunciation of the boycott showed that de Valera believed that the Catholic Church had got it badly wrong. His thinking was influenced by well-informed reports he was receiving about the situation on the ground in Fethard. His cabinet colleague, the Minister for Finance, James Ryan, was a native of the area and was keeping de Valera aware of the local politics of the boycott.

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A letter written to de Valera five days after his Dail statement summarised local attitudes. The writer was John Ryan (no relation to James Ryan) who lived in Fethard. Describing himself as "one of the Old Brigade", Ryan was an old anti-Treatyite IRA man who had suffered the condemnation of the church after the Treaty split in 1922. It was men of his political persuasion who made up the small but vocal group who helped Sean Cloney (the Catholic husband in the mixed marriage at the centre of the controversy) to oppose the boycott. Ryan believed that the boycott had been started by "people who are not of our party".

The subservience of Irish politicians of all political hues to clerical authority has been well documented in a number of cases throughout the 1950s. In Fethard it was no different. Certain elements of the local Fine Gael party were responsible for making sure the boycott was enforced. A letter from Sean Cloney to de Valera declared the consequences as being serious for Fianna Fail if the boycott was not resolved quickly. Cloney was of the opinion that in Fianna Fail "many agree with you completely, others are in a dilemma between `what the priest says' and `what Dev says', still others say in effect that your statement was ill-advised".

De Valera was conscious of the background to the boycott but his real concern lay elsewhere. Unionist politicians were making political capital out of the boycott as an example of religious intolerance in the South. The Northern Irish Prime Minister, Lord Brookeborough, pointed to the boycott as an example of what could happen "if Northern Ireland were submerged in an All-Ireland Republic".

Four days after de Valera made his statement to the Dail, a report from the Irish Ambassador in London, Con Cremin, to the Department of External Affairs highlighted why de Valera wanted a quick solution to the problem. Cremin stated that the boycott had caused dismay in Anti-Partition circles in Britain. The reason was that the Anti-Partition League had always used the "contrast between the toleration extended to the religious minority in the 26 counties and the constant discrimination practised by the majority against the minority in the six counties" as one of their strongest arguments.

When de Valera met the Archbishop of Dublin, John Charles McQuaid, to discuss the boycott, he expressed his alarm at the way the boycott would play abroad. In a draft letter to the Archbishop, he said that it was "a heartbreak that, because of the ill-considered action of a few, we can be held up before the world to be what we fundamentally are not, as if we were a people who when we have numbers on our side can be tyrannical, cruel and unjust. It is against all our national traditions, and I ask Your Lordship to intervene to see that it does not continue."

Informing McQuaid of his intentions to oppose the boycott was in keeping with the relationship that had evolved between Church and State since Independence. Much of Noel Browne's misfortune over the Mother and Child scheme was because of his reluctance to keep the Archbishop suitably informed. However, de Valera was going beyond this. He was implicitly advising the hierarchy to get its house in order and to resolve the issues involved at the heart of the controversy.

De Valera was not particularly interested in promoting ecumenical understanding, but he did realise that the boycott was damaging not only to the reputation of the State but potentially to Fianna Fail as well. He was not only prepared to override the wishes of the hierarchy but openly to challenge them. It was typical of the man who never let his Catholicism get in the way of practical politics.