Some observers, particularly those who are anti-republican, will by now have declared that Saturday's decision by the Sinn Fein ardchomhairle was the only decision it could have taken.

Such a trite observation totally underestimates the degree of disillusion among republican activists at the way the implementation of the Good Friday agreement has been handled.

This week marks the fifth year of the first IRA cessation. Without recapping every twist and turn of the process prior to and since then it is clear Sinn Fein has played a positive, constructive and central role in the effort to achieve a permanent peace.

It is equally clear much more could have been achieved in that time and that the main reasons for the lack of progress have been unionist opposition to change, and the manner in which the essential process of change has been managed, particularly by the British government.

From the signing of the Good Friday agreement in April 1998 until the collapse, on July 15th this year, of the political institutions - a period of some 15 months - the peace process limped from one unionist-induced crisis to the next.

This period of time could have been used to build the confidence and trust so obviously lacking during the negotiation process. Instead, the last 17 months will be remembered as a time of recrimination and bitterness. A period of missed deadlines, broken agreements and unfilled opportunity.

Review

A review is now taking place because of the failure to establish the political institutions. The refusal of the UUP to share power with nationalists and republicans and the consequent collapse of the executive requires urgent and immediate action by the two governments. It is, in our view, also essential that the two governments expeditiously proceed with the implementation of the other elements of the agreement.

There are many areas of the agreement which have not yet been fully implemented. But there is only one that has totally broken down. This is in regard to the political institutions. This is the area that the review should address.

It is critical that the review and its conclusions do not depart from the agreement reached last year.

That agreement is specific about the conduct of any review. In the period interim to the agreement becoming operative, it allows for two distinct formats for review:

1. "Aspects of the implementation of . . . the agreement will be reviewed at meetings of those parties relevant in the particular case . . ., under the chairmanship of the British government or the two governments, as may be appropriate"; and

2. "Representatives of the two governments and all relevant parties may meet under independent chairmanship to review implementation of the agreement as a whole".

It is our opinion that this review should examine the specific area of non-implementation and ensure it is effectively dealt with by indicating how to make progress within the terms of the agreement.

If it moves beyond this specific issue, then, as prescribed in point (2) above, it must examine the implementation of the agreement as a whole. It cannot simply focus on issues whose implementation the UUP is dissatisfied with. It cannot become a cover for the renegotiation of the agreement.

British government stewardship

While the two governments initiated this review, if it is to be objective and effective it must examine also the roles played by the two governments who are themselves participants in and parties to the agreement itself.

Despite the negative approach of unionism towards the Good Friday agreement, it is our view that the primary responsibility for the failure to implement it in key areas lies ultimately with the British government.

By indulging David Trimble in his delaying strategy and by pandering to unionist rejectionism the British government has encouraged that intransigence.

The cumulative effect of British government concessions to unionist demands is that 18 months after agreement was reached and endorsed North and South, none of the institutions has been put in place.

Even the Assembly, which has been in a limbo existence since June 25th last year, is not that envisaged in the Good Friday agreement. It has no powers, no executive, no statutory committees. Crucially for republicans and nationalists it has no link to any all-Ireland institution. It cannot even meet.

On the ground there has been no progress on the equality agenda in terms of its effect on the day-to-day lives of people. The most recent employment statistics show Catholic males almost three times more likely to be unemployed than their Protestant counterparts.

The British government has yet to fulfil even the minimal requirement to publish a meaningful demilitarisation strategy.

The people of the Garvaghy Road, the Ormeau Road, and other isolated nationalist communities have yet to see evidence of their right to live free from sectarian harassment.

Repressive legislation has not been repealed but strengthened.

The RUC remains unchanged, unable and unwilling to root out the culture of collusion between its members and loyalist paramilitaries and unwilling to challenge wrongdoing within the force. This was seen most starkly in the murder of solicitor Rosemary Nelson and the most recent revelations about the murder of Pat Finucane.

On Thursday the Patten Commission will produce its report on the future of policing. This will be a huge test of the British government. Only a new police service and an end to the RUC will be satisfactory.

There is a deep commitment in the republican and nationalist community to the peace process. But there is also deep anger that the Good Friday agreement - a product of the peace process - has been blocked at every juncture by unionism with the indulgence of the British government.

We have seen a succession of missed deadlines and broken agreements. Time after time the UUP was permitted to buy more time, to sap the momentum of the process, to prevent change.