A year after Palestinians and Israelis failed to reach a peace settlement at Camp David, officials and commentators are revising the widely accepted version of events.
In the aftermath of the summit fiasco, the then US President, Mr Bill Clinton, and the then Israeli Premier, Mr Ehud Barak, blamed the Palestinian President, Mr Yasser Arafat, for refusing to accept the "far-reaching" and "generous" proposals tabled by the "courageous" Israeli leader.
According to the spin, these provided for the handover to the Palestinians of all of Gaza and 90-odd per cent of the West Bank, as well as the granting of key "concessions" in Jerusalem. One Israeli commentator, Aluf Benn, writing in Ha'aretz on July 27th, said the official line was that "Barak was a distinguished visionary leader while Arafat was a recalcitrant rejectionist who was leading his nation to a historical calamity". The phrase "Arafat is no longer a partner" entered the Israeli lexicon at this critical juncture. When the Palestinian uprising, the intifada, erupted at the end of September, Arafat was accused of trying to secure by insurrection what he did not win at the negotiating table. The "blame game" turned the Israeli public against the peace process and Western public opinion against Mr Arafat.
Mr Ahmad Qurea ("Abu Ala"), the Palestinians' chief negotiator and prime mover of the Oslo accords, dismisses the accusations: "The biggest lie of the last three decades is . . . that Barak offered everything and the Palestinians refused everything."
UN envoy Mr Terje RoedLarsen, who helped broker the Oslo accords, agrees. "It is a terrible myth that Arafat and only Arafat caused this catastrophic failure."
Nevertheless, the "myth" persisted until early June when a former Clinton adviser, Mr Robert Malley, launched a spate of revisionist articles in Western papers. Malley, who was present at Camp David, blamed all three participants for the summit's failure. He argued that the US was at fault for calling the summit before the two sides had sufficiently narrowed their differences on key issues. He said Barak sketched out proposals more far-reaching than previously proffered but these did not meet Palestinian requirements. And Malley criticised the Palestinians for being too passive and having no proposals of their own.
As revisionist articles multiplied, the Palestinian negotiating team mounted a novel campaign to put their case to Israelis. Articulate, throroughly briefed, English-speaking Palestinians with US passports toured Israel to speak to groups prepared to listen. A document, printed in Hebrew and English, was circulated. This spells out the reasons why the Palestinians turned down the Camp David proposals, which even now remain cloaked in mystery. A clear picture of what was on offer can be compiled by combining the Palestinian text with an article by Uri Horowitz in "Strategic Assessment", published in January 2001 by the Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv University.
While Mr Barak's plan was seen by Israelis as "generous", it did not provide for the emergence of a viable Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital. Mr Barak was ready to withdraw from all of the Gaza Strip but sought to reduce and fragment the West Bank. Israel would retain sovereignty over "Greater Jerusalem", comprising the western Jewish and eastern Arab sectors, plus outlying Arab villages and Jewish settlements. This encompasses 28 per cent of the West Bank. Israel would annex another 9 to 13.5 per cent, lease a further 10 per cent and establish six military bases, staging areas and three early-warning stations in the West Bank. In exchange for Israel's appropriation of at least 47 to 51.5 per cent of the West Bank, Mr Barak offered land in the Negev equivalent to 1 per cent. Israel would retain control of borders and key roads in the West Bank, dividing it into three cantons.
All movement would be controlled by Israel. Israel would retain control over Palestinian water sources and airspace. Thus, the proposed Palestinian entity would have no territorial contiguity, integrity or sovereignty and no capital in East Jerusalem. There the Palestinians would administer holy sites, outlying Arab suburbs and, perhaps, the Muslim and Christian quarters of the Old City. In exchange for this entity, Barak demanded that the Palestinians sign a document proclaiming an end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
While Mr Barak took the view that his proposals were Israel's last and best offer, they were not spelled out clearly. According to Palestinians who were present at Camp David, he refused to be pinned down on final territorial percentages and other key issues. Mr Malley revealed that Mr Barak reneged on specific items, provoking Mr Clinton's anger. His bridging proposals, almost certainly endorsed by Mr Barak, adopted cantonisation as well as other Israeli ideas rejected by the Palestinians.
Because of the close identification of the US and Israeli positions, the Palestinian team came to see the Camp David summit as a conspiracy to pressure Mr Arafat into accepting the unacceptable. Dr Mahdi Abdel Hadi, a leading Palestinian analyst, told The Irish Times soon after the collapse of the summit that Mr Arafat "could afford to be flexible during the interim phase" under the Oslo accords "but not when negotiating the final settlement, which would determine the destiny of the Palestinian people".
In spite of the sour atmosphere caused by the "blame game", the Palestinian and Israeli teams held more than 50 meetings in August and September, making considerable progress. Just before the Likud leader, Mr Ariel Sharon, visited the mosque compound in Jerusalem, sparking the intifada, Mr Arafat dined with Mr Barak, who phoned Mr Clinton to say their peace partnership was back on track. Contacts continued, culminating in intensive and productive negotiations at Taba in January 2001. These were suspended due to the Israeli prime ministerial poll and not resumed under Mr Sharon's premiership.
