Russia claims to have secured a diplomatic triumph in the Balkans after President Boris Yeltsin persuaded his Yugoslav counterpart, President Slobodan Milosevic, to return to the negotiating table with the Kosovo leadership and stop his military offensive against ethnic Albanians in the province.

But the reality is that the deal which the Russians have brokered has merely postponed - rather than averted - the possibility of Western military action in the region. The Kosovo story is just beginning and the West, despite its apparent determination, still has very little idea how the crisis can be resolved.

Almost every action which Western governments have taken centres on a determination to avoid the mistakes committed in earlier Yugoslav wars. Unlike the previous crises, the EU and NATO did not spend much time debating which organisation should be in charge: aware that a common European security policy is still in its infancy, EU member-states agreed that NATO would co-ordinate military action.

There were no serious disputes between the British, French and Germans of the kind which paralysed Western reaction when Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence in 1991. Furthermore, everyone understood that both the US and Russia must be brought into the action from the start.

And, finally, there was no desire to consider just diplomatic initiatives; the use of force has been contemplated from the start in Kosovo. History, therefore, does not need to repeat itself. And yet, in curious ways, history does look like repeating itself, although with a different twist.

Kosovo was always the most predictable crisis; indeed, all Western governments initially believed that the province was where the Yugoslav war would begin. It did not, mainly because President Milosevic's first priorities when Yugoslavia collapsed were to defeat Croatia and divide Bosnia. He failed on the first objective and only partially succeeded on the second.

But throughout the wars in Bosnia and Croatia, nobody bothered President Milosevic in Kosovo; the Yugoslav dictator was allowed to do what he wanted despite the indication of a growing catastrophe.

When a peace deal for Bosnia was concluded in the US city of Dayton in 1995, a delegation of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo demanded to be heard. It was politely shown the door of the US military base where the Bosnian representatives were negotiating - and everyone looked the other way.

The truth is that, as in all other conflicts in the Balkans, the West has only become interested once violence has fully erupted, and once the solutions are no longer easy. At least in this respect, history has repeated itself already.

Nevertheless, it is clear that Western governments have done everything possible in the last few months to regain the initiative.

NATO is currently envisaging a series of military actions if the violence continues. These include the strengthening of the presence of UN soldiers on the border between Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo.

Of particular significance may be the declaration of a no-fly zone, for it could cripple Yugoslavia within a matter of days.

The Kosovo Liberation Army, the ethnic Albanian insurgent movement, already controls many villages in the province. Eager to avoid the loss of soldiers, the Yugoslav army usually stays in the main towns; troops are moved around Kosovo in helicopters, which are also used for attacks against the insurgents. If these helicopters can no longer fly, Yugoslavia will be faced with imminent defeat.

But the Yugoslav dictator also knows that the current tough words are not necessarily a prelude to tough action. Despite all the political complications, the West's previous military intervention in Bosnia was, paradoxically, much easier because the fiction was maintained that the air strikes which NATO launched in 1995 were directed against Bosnian Serbs, rather than Yugoslavia itself.

This cannot be the case in Kosovo; any action there will be directed against the Yugoslav forces. The official position is that this will go beyond the rules of international law and that a mandate from the UN Security Council will be required.

In reality, this is a political rather than a legal problem. Plenty of justification in international law already exists to act against Serbia. This includes the rules which prohibit governments to kill their own citizens, as well as the international conventions against genocide.

Nevertheless, the Russians and the Germans believe that a UN Security Council resolution will be required in the event of a military action. President Milosevic therefore offered Russia enough of a compromise this week to allow Moscow to argue that no military action is now required.

NATO has been careful not to say what it may do if a UN resolution is not forthcoming; the US administration considers the recent Moscow deal as unsatisfactory and, officially, the preparations for the use of force continue.

But, one way or another, the West is faced with the classic dilemma of the last few years: either it ignores Russian opposition and hits at Yugoslavia, or it goes along with the view of Moscow and basically nothing is done. Even here history is repeating itself.

Yet the biggest problem is that the resolute approach to a military option actually hides a complete absence of political aims. Western governments still believe that Kosovo should remain part of Yugoslavia, although the province should enjoy a greater autonomy.

This is an irrelevant policy which has no chance of working. Autonomies are only meaningful in countries which respect law and order - which is precisely what Yugoslavia is not today. The time for autonomy has long past; the Albanians want complete independence.

Nor can violence be avoided: the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo have understood that only by fighting will the West take them seriously, while the Serbs know that only through violence could they keep the province.

Almost every action NATO takes will tilt the balance against one of the parties to the conflict. Closing the borders of Kosovo by positioning Western troops in neighbouring Macedonia and Albania will actually help President Milosevic because it will stop the flow of weapons to the rebels.

And hitting the Serb forces through air strikes or no-fly zones will help the Albanians to establish control over the entire Kosovo region.

The West is seeking to avoid both outcomes by using enough force to stop the Serb offensive, but not too much so as not to encourage the ethnic Albanians. The chances that such a careful balancing act can work are practically nil. Sooner or later the West will have to come to terms with the issue which everyone seeks to avoid.

Kosovo cannot be peaceful and remain within Yugoslavia; either its independence is accepted or more Albanian blood will be shed.

Despite their impressive unanimity, Western governments remain locked in a dangerous position. When Bosnia declared its independence in 1992, the West agreed on a policy towards the republic but had no agreement on what military actions should be taken. This time, Western governments are agreed on military action but have no agreement on what the policy should be.

The outcome in both cases may be the same: not much of a policy and not much of a military action either.

Jonathan Eyal is director of studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London