Opposing views about security options were manifest among the highest military and political echelons in the months and weeks preceding Bloody Sunday, the inquiry heard in Derry yesterday.
Resuming his outline of the evidence which will be put before the inquiry, counsel to the tribunal, Mr Christopher Clarke QC, referred to a series of secret cabinet and security committee minutes, and memoranda exchanged by army commanders in 1971 and early 1972.
In one of these, Gen. Robert Ford, Commander Land Forces, suggested in December 1971 that there were three options in regard to Derry: to revert to a policy of containment of the Creggan and Bogside from their periphery; to continue "the present policy" of undertaking major operations within the Creggan and Bogside but without providing a permanent presence; or to establish permanently a full-scale military presence in the Creggan and Bogside.
Gen. Ford added in his note: "The only way to restore law and order in the Bogside is to adopt course 3 and there is no doubt that this is the best military solution". However, he said this would have political disadvantages and the decision "is entirely a political one . . . although course 3 is the correct military solution . . . the political drawbacks are so serious that it should not be implemented in the present circumstances," Gen. Ford wrote. He recommended course 1.
The Chief of the General Staff, Gen. Sir Michael Carver, in another note, also indicated that he saw no need to up-rate the army activity from its then current level. However, in a directive issued to all brigade commanders the previous October, Gen. Ford had ordered them to restore law and order throughout their areas.
They were to "defeat IRA armed attacks by resolute armed action . . ." and to "respond to all other forms of violent IRA activity with vigorous follow-up action". In relation to the 8th Infantry Brigade, his directive specified: "Be prepared to occupy and dominate the Creggan and Bogside when sufficient forces are provided."
Meanwhile, the Northern Ireland prime minister, Brian Faulkner, had been pressing for a strong military initiative, and the British prime minister, Mr Edward Heath, had acknowledged the urgent necessity to restore order, but was stressing to Mr Faulkner that evidence of political progress was needed first.
Mr Clarke outlined the evidence which would be presented to the tribunal in regard to the immediate run-up to Bloody Sunday and the military and RUC planning in regard to the march.
He quoted from a statement now given to this tribunal by a former RUC chief superintendent, Mr Frank Lagan, then head of the RUC in Derry, in which he referred to his advice to Brig MacLelland that the march should be allowed to proceed to its destination, Guildhall Square.
"I said that I thought the march ought to be allowed to proceed. Although I do not remember Brig MacLelland expressly saying that he thought that this was a good idea, he did not object or suggest another course of action."
Mr Clarke said it appeared that the brigadier had then discussed the question with Gen. Ford by telephone on January 25th, "but by close of play on Monday the 24th . . . it seems that the die may already have been cast, because Col Wilford, who took command of the 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment on July 21st, told Lord Widgery that it was on Monday 24th that he learnt that the 1st Battalion . . . would be needed for operations on 30th January."
Mr Clarke's presentation will continue today.