British results/ analysis: First let us be clear about one thing: Tony Blair's achievement is remarkable. The British prime minister has matched Margaret Thatcher's election-winning record and delivered a sustainable majority for a full third term of Labour government.
"This has never happened before," Dr John Reid reminded us in the early hours of yesterday morning, for once without need of the customary "spin" to define a truly historic moment in Labour politics.
And yet Mr Blair and those close to him - no doubt encouraged and periodically enraged by the old enemy within the Downing Street gates - have conspired to have this landmark achievement presented and perceived as a distinctly qualified victory, if not actually approaching something of a defeat.
Mr Blair is, of course, in part the victim of his own past success. Many of the defeated MPs who will now join the ranks of Labour's disillusioned will hardly stop to reflect that they might never have reached parliament in the first place without Blair's landslide victories in 1997 and 2001.
Nor, as they ponder the growing challenge from the Liberal Democrats on the left, the undisputed Iraq factor and the loss of personal trust in Blair, will they be in the mood to allow that an alternative leadership might have assuaged those negatives but at the cost of further alienating the Middle Britain vote so vital to those two earlier successes. So it was not unreasonable for Blairite ministers to argue through a long, nervous night that the scale of previous victories could hardly have been replicated, and that "normal politics" was bound to resume at some point.
By the time Mr Blair addressed his own supporters in Sedgefield he, too, he said, had got the message. The British people had wanted the return of a Labour government, "but with a reduced majority". Liberal Democrats' leader Charles Kennedy and Conservative leader Michael Howard had correctly divined a desire on the part of many voters to "send Mr Blair a message", give him "a bloody nose" and thus "take the smile of his face".
Yet, for all his public fretting, warning and cajoling in the final days of the campaign, we know that Mr Blair and others in Labour's high command didn't really expect it to happen like this. In The Irish Times on Wednesday I noted that prudent analysts were disregarding the opinion polls and suggesting Labour's majority could be reduced "to between 60 and 80 seats", while venturing that Mr Blair still thought to reach the magical 100 mark.
It didn't happen, as some voters proved even more viciously disposed than Mr Kennedy and Mr Howard had hoped.
"Kicked in the ballots," was how the Sun put it as Blair's majority was slashed by about 100, falling below what would have been a manageable 80 to a projected 66. Far from the comfort zone enabling him to fulfil his promise and serve a "full" third term, the question on everybody's lips yesterday was how long would Mr Blair choose, or be permitted, to stay in power.
The comfort zone, rather, was just enough for the assorted irreconcilables and Gordon Brown loyalists already impatient to have Labour reinvent itself in office and begin preparations for a possible fourth term under a new leader.
No wonder Mr Blair looked grim and unsmiling as he arrived back from Buckingham Palace where Queen Elizabeth formally invited him to form a new government. At the moment of his crowning achievement, the prime minister knew life inside No 10 would never be the same again. That shrivelled majority, following a campaign constantly derailed by the war, trust and questions about his character, could only feed the perception that things would have been still worse had the chancellor not come "riding to the rescue".
And as he prepared to reshuffle his cabinet, Mr Blair and some of those around him may have ruefully reflected that for this they had, in part at least, only themselves to blame.
It may be true, as they maintained privately in the early days of the campaign, that it was Gordon who had "refused to play" in the preparation of Labour's manifesto. The brooding Scot has certainly evidenced a capacity to outsulk even Edward Heath. And there is no doubt he felt betrayed a second time over what he believed was a promise by Mr Blair to stand down in his favour last year.
Just days before the prime minister named the election date, Labour strategists were still unsure whether Mr Brown would play a central role, or conduct his own solo campaign.
Yet No 10 can hardly have been surprised that this proud, prickly man was outraged by the appointment of his old adversary, Alan Milburn, to replace him as Labour's election strategist in chief.
Nor could they have anticipated the chancellor would be anything but incandescent over seemingly authoritative reports that Blair's first order of business on the day after the election would be to force him from the Treasury.
It always seemed ludicrously provocative to suggest that the party's manifesto would be "unremittingly New Labour", implying Blair's determination to overrule a reluctant Brown on the matter of reforming Britain's still underperforming public services.
As on issues like Europe, it is highly questionable that the differences between the two men are really that significant. And it was simply absurd to suggest that this "New Labour" priority would take precedence over Labour's economic record in the appeal for a third term.
Yet by the time this reality was acknowledged by the reappearance of prime minister and chancellor joined at the hip, economy centre-stage, the background noise was being generated by early polling evidence that "trust" was an issue and that Blair might prove more a liability than an asset.
Thus the chancellor was portrayed by many of the media, and seen by many doubtful Labour supporters, to be riding to the rescue, offering the comforting assurance that the transition was already under way, and that it was indeed possible to "buy Blair" and "get Brown."
Nor are these just impressions got up by media endlessly interested in personalities and power struggles. This perception of Brown's role became so embedded that he was cast as coming to Blair's aid even when the prime minister had no need of rescue.
Crucially, Mr Blair himself seemed to acknowledge the shifting balance of power by making concessions to Mr Brown. First he effectively guaranteed that the chancellor would not be moved from the Treasury against his will. Then he as good as named him his successor, saying (as he had not "said many times before") that Gordon would make a great prime minister.
The question now is what these self-imposed constraints - and those added by the electorate - mean for Mr Blair's ability to govern Britain and pursue the foreign policy priorities that have caused him such grief.
London Mayor Ken Livingstone will almost certainly prove correct in his prediction that there will be no further support from Labour for what he termed "American adventures".
However, if Labour's "peace party" thinks finally to have won the war, they may also reflect that the Bush White House may no longer feel in any way constrained by the need to "prop up Tony" against his internal opposition.
There are many inside the new parliamentary Labour Party prepared to rebel, too, on domestic policy. Blair's need now to deal with his party on a more consensual basis suggests little scope for radical attempts to extend the role of the private sector in the public services.
Likewise it is hard to see Blair's new government being able to deliver the promised ID cards; a move previously considered essential to the prime minister's view of a world, and questions of life and liberty, for ever altered by 9/11.
What then might be Blair's legacy, beyond the truly historic one of having delivered his party to power for three successive terms?
He will certainly want to find the next "historic breakthrough" in Northern Ireland. Even there, however, he might find Sinn Féin and the DUP calculating that his authority is ebbing away and that they might gain by delay.
Which leaves Europe, or more specifically the European constitution.
If President Chirac manages to turn French opinion, which again seems possible, Britain will have its own referendum. Win or lose, Mr Blair (and Cherie) might think that the point to depart.
Some Labour MPs would doubtless find the prospect of even another 18 months of this prime minister unbearable.
However, some wise Labour heads think a Blair decision to stay and fight that referendum would be one with which his chancellor might be well content.
As for life beyond that? Why would Blair want to stay? The magic, like the trust, is gone.
It is hard to see how it would ever be recovered.