On the face of it, the Irish Times/MRBI poll might seem to indicate that the Nice Treaty referendum will be carried by a substantially better margin than either the Maastricht or Amsterdam treaties. If one eliminates the "don't knows", who are many, it is approximately 70 per cent for and 30 per cent against.
However, closer inspection of the evidence suggests that it may be tighter than that. Firstly, the question about voting intention in the Nice referendum specifically linked the treaty to enlargement of the Union. Now, while it is undoubtedly an essential part of the proposed treaty changes, opponents argue that enlargement is not the issue and it is possible that, in referring to it, some respondents may have said they would vote in favour because it is regarded generally as a good thing, rather than because they had made up their mind. The second factor that may dilute the Yes vote on the day is turnout. Support for the treaty is stronger among younger voters. The problem for the Yes camp is that they are substantially less likely to vote. Firm commitment to voting ("highly likely to vote") is 20 percentage points lower among the under25s compared to other age groups. Thirdly, the large block of "don't knows" could, in theory, be persuaded either way.
One can say with some confidence that turnout will be low. However, pinpointing just how low is difficult. Pre-election or pre-referendum polls always overestimate turnout. One way of estimating the likely turnout is to compare the firmness of people's intention to vote in this referendum with the corresponding measure taken in the run-up to the 1997 general election. In the current poll, 55 per cent of people say they are "very likely" to vote. This compares quite unfavourably to the 77 per cent who said so prior to the last general election. Using these figures, one could venture a crude estimate of the turnout on June 7th as follows. In 1997, that 77 per cent translated into a 66 per cent turnout. With firm commitment now down 20 percentage points, the turnout could fall to the mid or high 40s. This would correspond roughly with the turnout in the Single European Act referendum in 1987 and to the turnout in European Parliament elections when these are not accompanied by either a general election or a local election.
This is a guess rather than a prediction, but it suggests that there is a lot to be done over the next two weeks to ensure that, whatever the outcome, the decision on Nice can be seen to be solidly democratic.
From previous research we know that one of the reasons for low turnout is lack of understanding. The Irish Times/ MRBI poll shows that, at this stage of the campaign, lack of understanding of the issues is rampant. Almost two out of three citizens feel they are, at best, "only vaguely aware of the issues involved" and half of these "do not know what the treaty is about at all". Such a lack of understanding was also a problem in the Amsterdam Treaty referendum and the evidence is that it increased both abstention and the No vote.
In the light of this, it is useful to compare people's understanding of the Nice Treaty now and their understanding immediately after the Amsterdam Treaty referendum. The comparison shows that the present campaign has a lot of ground to make up to even match the unsatisfactory levels achieved then.
Specifically, low levels of understanding were running at 40 per cent at the end of the Amsterdam campaign; at this relatively early stage of this campaign, they are over 60 per cent. The poll also shows that those who feel uninformed about the issues are much less likely to vote and, predictably, much more likely to be "don't knows" on the "how will you vote?" question.
Of course referendums are not decided by detailed consideration of the specific issues. This may be particularly so when these are complex and remote. In such circumstances, people's underlying attitudes, in this case to integration, come into play. In Ireland, such attitudes are complex. As measured by the Eurobarometer (a poll conducted regularly by the European Commission), we have one of the highest levels of support for integration - 75 per cent of us think that Ireland's membership of the EU is "a good thing" and the proportion of those who view it as "a bad thing" is minuscule. Irish support for integration is 20 to 25 percentage points ahead of the European average.
However, on another measure that has been used over the last few years, attitudes are much more in line with recent EU referendum outcomes. The alternative question asks which of the following statements comes closest to the respondent's view: "Ireland should do all it can to unite fully with the European Union" or "Ireland should do all it can to protect its independence from the European Union". As Table 1 shows, there has been a noticeable shift in attitudes on this since 1996.
In 1996, a 55 per cent majority felt closer to the "unite fully" option. By 1998 (after the Amsterdam referendum), this had fallen to 46 per cent and the "don't knows" had gone from 13 to 28 per cent. In the current poll, the level of indecision has fallen back but the net effect has been to bolster the "protect independence" option, support for which now stands at 41 per cent (to 46 per cent for the "unite fully" option).
This may reflect reservations on aspects of European integration articulated in the recent past by prominent members of the Government. Alternatively or additionally, it may reflect the stand-off on budgetary policy between the Minister for Finance and the Commission earlier this year. Whatever the reason, the shift is significant, statistically and substantively.
It may also be significant politically in that the evidence from the post-referendum poll conducted by Lansdowne Market Research after the 1998 referendum showed that this attitude was a good predictor of how people voted.
However, it should be emphasised that the view that Ireland should do all it can to protect its independence from the EU does not necessarily lead to a No vote. In fact, 43 per cent of people who tend towards this view intend to vote Yes.
As of now, Ireland is the only country which will decide on the ratification of the Nice Treaty by referendum. This gives an added pan-European significance to the Irish people's decision. At this stage the evidence points to the likelihood of a Yes vote. However, it also signals that there is a lot to be done by both camps if this is to be an informed decision.
Prof Richard Sinnott is director of the Public Opinion and Political Behaviour Research Programme at the Institute for the Study of Social Change at University College Dublin