Comprehensive UN sanctions were imposed on Iraq in August 1990. In an effort to ameliorate the humanitarian situation, the UN Security Council has, since 1996, facilitated the sale of Iraqi oil to fund the purchase of food, medical supplies and other essential goods. The resulting UN co-ordinated "oil-for-food" programme operates in renewable six-month phases, during which Iraqi oil revenues are lodged directly to a UN-controlled account.
On November 29th, the UN Security Council extended the oil-for-food programme for a further six months. This "roll over" of existing provisions represents the lowest common denominator among the 15 members of the Security Council in the absence of consensus on a revised package of so-called "smart" (or more targeted) sanctions.
The main proponents of smart sanctions are the US and Britain, while Russia, unashamedly citing economic interests, blocked the measures last July. Since then, Russia has indicated a willingness to compromise on the outstanding contentious issues.
While oil-for-food has resulted in modest improvements in the situation in Iraq, according to the UN Secretary-General, Mr Kofi Annan, it "cannot - and was never meant to - meet all of the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people". In 1999, the under-five mortality rate among Iraqi children was 128 per 1,000 live births, over 18 times the corresponding figure in Ireland.
A recent Unicef survey indicated that one in every five children in Iraq suffers from malnutrition. Acute respiratory infections, recurrent bouts of diarrhoea, and malnutrition are key factors contributing to the high child mortality rates.
This humanitarian crisis is a manifestation of the "double alienation" of children in Iraq. In the first instance, children are suffering at the hands of a brutally oppressive regime, which has demonstrated a readiness to sacrifice the population in pursuit of self-serving objectives. On the other hand, children in Iraq are being disproportionately affected by a flawed UN sanctions policy, compounded by the absence of political will at the Security Council to effectively target the regime.
Notwithstanding the UN obligation to safeguard the human rights of populations in sanctioned states, there should be no doubt that the government of Iraq bears the primary responsibility for the current humanitarian catastrophe.
During earlier phases of the oil-for-food programme the primary obstacles to improving the humanitarian situation were: (1) insufficient revenue to fund the programme; (2) the absence of locally-available cash resources - a "cash component" - to facilitate local procurement of goods, transportation costs, etc.; and (3) the blocking of certain critical supplies at the Security Council Sanctions Committee.
In contrast, throughout the year the Iraqi government has intentionally manipulated its oil output to frustrate the oil-for-food programme; has rejected the idea of a cash component except for the oil sector; and has been slow to submit contracts to the UN for the supply of urgently-needed humanitarian goods.
Contract holds at the Sanctions Committee (now valued at $4 billion), however, still constitute a serious impediment to improving the humanitarian situation.
Currently, the only goods subject to inspection at the land borders of Iraq are those entering the country under the oil-for-food programme. Conservative estimates point to a figure of $2 billion in annual revenues derived from illicit trade outside sanctions. Both Turkey and Jordan benefit significantly from such illegal trade.
The Security Council has been unwilling to risk further polarisation by forcing a confrontation with Iraq. France, the US and Britain consider the omnibus Security Council resolution of December 1999 - Resolution 1,284 - which includes provisions for the return of UN weapons inspectors, a viable basis for progress. Any resolution, however, which relies on Iraqi co-operation for its implementation is fundamentally flawed.
It is difficult to reconcile council demands for a return of weapons inspectors after a three-year absence, with the daily reality of hundreds of trucks entering and leaving the country, unhindered and uninspected.
So what is the solution? The Security Council, of which Ireland is currently an elected member, must take decisive steps to increase pressure on Iraq to engage with the UN regarding outstanding disarmament issues and the implementation of the oil-for-food programme. In the absence of external pressure, Iraq prefers to have gradually-eroding sanctions without UN weapons inspectors, rather that smart sanctions and UN inspectors.
The most critical element underpinning the regime in Baghdad is continued access to hard currency, used to distribute largesse to regime supporters. The Security Council must take steps to target the financial assets and associated revenue streams of the regime more effectively, and should therefore establish an expert panel to clamp down on sanctions busting.
In addition, the council should engage actively with neighbouring states to implement a system of porous border monitoring. Under this scheme, trade in civilian goods would not be affected, while prohibited (e.g., military use) items would be confiscated. Neighbouring states could be compensated for lost trade using the existing UN Compensation Fund.
The Iraq Sanctions Committee should also undertake a mission to francolin states to highlight the scale of illegal trade.
From a humanitarian perspective, the costs of maintaining the status quo are unacceptable.
A study conducted in 1999 estimated excess deaths among children aged under five (due to sanctions alone) over the period 1990-98 to number 227,713 - an average of 2,300 excess deaths per month.
Clearly, if the absence of political will at the Security Council to effectively target the regime and to de-link military and economic sanctions persists, the humanitarian situation will not improve in the near future.
Gerard Mchugh is an independent policy consultant focusing on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Resolution.