UN/Analysis: France, by championing the anti-American cause for itsown interests, may have overplayed its hand, suggests Jonathan Eyal.
When the United Nations Security Council gathers tomorrow for another epic debate on the Iraq crisis, all eyes will be on France, the country which now leads international opposition to American plans in the Middle East. There is no doubt that French diplomacy has been unusually forceful and, overall, fairly successful.
But in the next few days the French may also discover that they have overplayed their hand, and that they are destined to lose the diplomatic initiative.
The emergence of France as America's chief international opponent has been a surprise to everyone, including a majority of France's own politicians. From the moment President Bush decided to focus on Iraq last year, he instinctively knew that he could expect trouble from Paris.
But the US Administration believed this would be confined to mere diplomatic noises - to be followed immediately thereafter by acquiescence with US policies. After all, this was the behaviour of the French during the first Iraq war a decade ago, when Paris started by criticising the Americans, only to end up committing French troops to the fighting, alongside the Americans.
So, when the US Administration decided to work through the UN in order to get authority for a war, the assumption in Washington was that the opposition of Russia would be more difficult to overcome, while France would provide just a temporary nuisance. Yet what the Americans failed to realise is that France found itself in a unique set of circumstances, which President Jacques Chirac was fully determined to exploit.
Chirac's control over domestic French policy is watertight. He has just won a fresh mandate as president. The parties which support him also enjoy a crushing majority in the French parliament. The opposition is almost non-existent, and most of the French government consists of Chirac's hand-picked appointees. The last leader to enjoy such an unlimited power in modern history was Charles de Gaulle, the president who founded the fifth French Republic more than four decades ago, the leader who first articulated France's anti-American stance and the man with whom Chirac likes best to be compared.
But there was another factor which, for Chirac, was just as important: Germany. France has long dictated events in Europe through an alliance with its neighbour. Nevertheless, there was one issue on which the French and the Germans historically never agreed: relations with the US. While the French had a vision of Europe as a world power counter-balancing the US, the Germans remained steadfast American supporters.
All this changed in the last few months. In a desperate effort to retain power, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany played on opposition to the war in Iraq during his country's electoral campaign. The tactic worked, but only at the price of creating a severe strain in US-German relations. As seen from Paris, this was an historic opportunity which could not be missed: a French president in the unique position of enjoying total power, coupled with a German government which, for the first time since the end of the Second World War, was prepared to criticise the US publicly, and stridently.
The fierce attitude which France has adopted over the Iraq dispute is therefore entirely explicable. So is the price which Chirac is willing to pay in order to see the policy through. France used to have large oil interests in Iraq, and a reasonable expectation of retaining some influence in the region. Chirac's current policy has put all this at risk. The French attitude has also split Europe, with Britain, Spain, Italy and the former communist countries in Eastern Europe now deeply suspicious of Paris.
The French leader also knows that, ultimately, he cannot stop the US from resorting to war. So, why is he persisting? Mainly because he believes that all the disadvantages pale into insignificance in comparison with the ultimate prize: a France which leads all those willing to stand up to American "arrogance" around the world, a France which articulates Europe's distinct opinion and enjoys a good reputation in the Arab world as well.
Partly because this French calculation was poorly understood in both Washington and London, Chirac initially did most of the running. He has hugely complicated US plans in the Middle East. The president's popularity is also sky-high not only at home, but in some other countries as well: when he recently visited Algeria, a former French colony and a Muslim country, he was loudly cheered wherever he went. Yet the suspicion is that France's good times may now be over, and that President Chirac has, paradoxically, now become a prisoner of his own success.
The entire French policy is based on the assumption that the US, and particularly its chief ally Britain, need another UN Security Council resolution before going to war. The French have always had the power of veto in the Security Council but, for a variety of reasons, have rarely exercised it. Nevertheless, President Chirac has calculated that he could count on Russia and China, the other veto powers in the Security Council, in order to foil America and Britain's designs.
The snag for Chirac is that, although China and Russia dislike the prospect of a war in Iraq, neither of them wish to have a public argument with the US. But, by making a claim to be the leader of the anti-American camp, France has provided Russia and China with the perfect diplomatic cover: China and Russia realised that they could afford to take a back seat, and let France do all the shouting.
So, unbeknown to Chirac, just when he appeared to be riding high, his options started to narrow: it is now up to France to decide whether it wishes to veto a new Security Council resolution, while Beijing and Moscow are providing just background noises. And this is the moment when the Americans and British have decided to pounce.
The current US resolution before the Security Council is meaningless. But it was cleverly crafted precisely in order to isolate France. Since it does not directly authorise the use of force, the Americans hope that the resolution may obtain nine simple votes, the required bare minimum. The Americans assume that neither China nor Russia will impose a veto. Chirac still does not wish to go all the way and veto the proceedings, mainly because this will identify France as the only big country openly opposing the war, rather than the leader of a broader anti-war coalition. So, the French president's only hope of defeating the resolution is to compete with the US over the votes of the other ordinary members in the Security Council. This is precisely where the Americans wanted the French to be for, when it comes to exercising pressure on smaller states, Washington assumes that it can win, hands down.
The real debate which begins in the Security Council tomorrow is, therefore, less about Iraq or about averting a war which remains as inevitable as always. Instead, it represents a final day of reckoning between France and the US, the last Gladiatorial battle in the diplomacy surrounding Iraq. If the Americans fail to get the required nine votes in the days to come, President Chirac will be declared the winner, although he will not avert the war and will still be subject to Washington's subsequent revenge. But, if the US-sponsored resolution passes, Chirac will be silenced, and will be left to face the wrath of many other Europeans, who will swing behind the US. Seldom before has a politician staked so much on one confrontation at the UN. And rarely has the battle in New York been so evenly poised.
Jonathan Eyal is Director of Studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London.