FRANCE'S enigmatic position on security and defence issues under President Chirac has been clarified in recent weeks, culminating in Monday's announcement by him that the series of nuclear tests has been completed. He was quick to follow it up with a firm commitment to sign the test ban treaty currently under negotiation in Geneva, and then with a clear statement to the US Congress on Thursday that France is ready to take on larger burdens in a reformed Nato.
Mr Chirac acknowledged that the test series "provoked, in France and elsewhere, disquiet and emotion. While my determination was not affected, I was not insensitive to these emotions". But he justified the tests in the following way: "I know that nuclear weaponry can cause fear, but in an ever more dangerous world, it is for us a weapon of deterrence, i.e., a weapon which serves peace. Today I have the feeling of having accomplished one of the first duties of my office by giving France, for decades to come, the means to ensure its independence and security."
On that basis, he said, France "is going to play an active and determined role in world disarmament and also in the quest for a better European defence
Mr Chirac is going to have to mend fences with a whole range of critics, who are appalled at the presumption that French and international interests coincide as conveniently as Mr Chirac assumes. They include many states in Asia convinced that, far from underwriting peace, the French tests have made it more difficult to prevent nuclear proliferation in their region.
Three examples conveniently lent credibility to their criticisms this week. China announced that it is not prepared to sign the comprehensive "zero-sum" test ban championed by Mr Chirac. Taiwan announced yesterday that it has successfully tested missile systems after reports that China will launch missile attacks on the island after next month's presidential elections. The likely victor, President Lee Teng-hui, said last July in parliament that "we should re-study the question [of building a nuclear arsenal] from a long-term point of view". Although he subsequently denied that this is what they intend to do, regional experts are convinced that the option remains open.
The nuclear dilemma also faces India, confronted with a putative alliance of China and Pakistan, as fighting flared once again on the disputed Kashmir border.
IN Europe, 10 EU member-states voted against the French tests at the
Nations, provoking some vituperative reaction from Paris, particularly against the Swedes and Austrians (not against Ireland), among the neutrals and against Italy among the aligned.
Following the rejection of France's offer of a nuclear umbrella to the EU by most of these states, Mr Chirac's plans for a better European defence will be awaited with interest. Once again, it can be argued convincingly that the assertion of absolute sovereignty involved in the tests sits very awkwardly with a shared approach to security; the tests have bolstered opposition in principle to a European nuclear deterrent based on the French and British weapons.
The French plans will presumably be presented within' the framework of the forthcoming EU Inter-Governmental Conference to be inaugurated in Milan next month, which Mr Chirac has now agreed to attend.
France has been decidedly in the inter-governmental camp in the discussion on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, veering more in the British than the German direction. It has championed the idea of a high profile secretary general in charge of the CFSP, responsible to the European Council and the Council of Ministers rather than to the supranational Commission.
This is in keeping with a longstanding French policy of moulding European institutions in such a way as to maximise French influence. Dominique Moisi, of the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales in Paris, characterises the policy as follows: "France wants a strong Europe, but with weak institutions that will not undermine its claim to continue to act as a Grande Nation"*.
It is a Janus-faced approach, never more so than under a Gaullist president. But this is relatively well-known to France's EU partners, however intrigued they are by how President Chirac will handle the various contradictory policy stances that have characterised his eventful nine months in office.
His government has stuck manfully this week to its commitment to monetary union, despite a difficult budgetary position and the possibility of another round of social conflict about it. Most commentators agree that such tensions are continually resolved by France's over-riding need to preserve its strategic partnership with Germany.
Another well-known writer on international affairs and an acute observer of the French scene, William Pfaff, argues that there is a similar enigmatic quality about France's recent decision to rejoin Nato's military command**.
Far from being an admission that de Gaulle was wrong to withdraw from it 30 years ago, he says "it is not a new policy. It is France's old policy in disguise". He cautions American policy-makers against misinterpreting it. The US initiative in Bosnia has convinced the French that Nato has at last found a post-Cold War role, in which France needs to claim an equal role in order to strengthen an independent
European defence by building up the neglected European pillar of the alliance.
If Pfaff is correct, we can expect more continuity in French policy than might have been expected. Mr Chirac's call in Washington for a new transatlantic security charter, and his remark that "the reform of Nato can facilitate its enlargement" should be seen in this light.
From the Irish perspective it is a reminder of the need to pay much closer attention to international security affairs as the IGC negotiations and the Irish EU presidency come squarely into view. A referendum on the outcome of the IGC may well coincide with, or follow, the elections due in 1997 assuming the coalition lasts that long.
