A mentally ill man serving life for murder, who was transferred from prison some years ago to the Central Mental Hospital (CMH), has lost his Supreme Court bid to be considered for conditional release having served some 14 years.
The man, who cannot be identified, accepted release might lead to his detention under the Mental Health Act in a psychiatric facility but said that was better than facing an indefinite life term in the CMH because of his mental illness.
The man, who had admitted murder, was transferred several times from prison to the CMH for treatment for schizophrenia. His condition appeared to regress each time he was returned to prison, for reasons including non-compliance with medication, and he has remained for several years now in the CMH.
His lawyers argued, under the current legal framework, he faced indefinite detention in the CMH with no prospect of being assessed by the Parole Board or considered for temporary release.
His detention is reviewed twice a year by the Mental Health (Criminal Law) Review Board and all reviews over the past eight years concluded he required in-patient treatment in the CMH and should not be returned to prison.
In a judgment on Tuesday, a five judge Supreme Court dismissed his appeal over the lawfulness of refusals by the Parole Board to assess him for parole and by the Minister for Justice to consider him for temporary release.
Ms Justice Iseult O’Malley said, while he remains transferred to the CMH, the relevant law means he cannot be considered for release.
The CMH is not a prison but rather a “designated centre” under the Criminal Law Insanity Act 2006, she said.
Section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1960, as amended, (empowering the Minister to make rules providing for temporary release of prisoners) was never intended to apply to prisoners transferred to the CMH, she said.
The problem here was not that the law relating to life sentences precludes the possibility of the man’s release, she said.
The “real difficulty” is that his state of mental health precludes his return to prison for assessment for parole and, to date, there has been no possibility under the relevant legislation he could be released for the purpose of being transferred to another psychiatric facility for ongoing treatment.
The CMH has been designated as a centre for detention and treatment of persons transferred there under the Act but, although the Minister for Health and Children can designate other psychiatric centres, no designation had been made when this appeal was heard, she said.
The court could not say whether the man’s situation will be affected by the Minister’s designation earlier this year of a facility in Portrane.
As matters stand, a life prisoner who develops a serious and chronic mental illness requiring in patient treatment could, as a result, “end up indefinitely” in the high-security CMH.
That may, unfortunately, be necessary in some cases and a review board had considered this man represents a significant risk of violence outside such a setting, she said.
The judge dismissed claims of breach of the man’s rights under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights which prohibits grossly disproportionate sentences. A “whole life” sentence, one that expressly sets the prisoner’s life as the term to be served, would breach Article 3 but Irish law does not provide for such a sentence, she said.
The difficulties that arose in this case were “not unique” to prisoners serving life sentences, she remarked.
They had also arisen in the case of a man made a ward of court solely for the purpose of seeking his continued detention in the CMH because there is no other psychiatric facility here that is sufficiently secure.
An argument might arise, in an appropriate case, that the current framework is unlawful because there is no prospect of release for a transferred prisoner who requires in-patient treatment and is not well enough to return to prison but who is not considered so dangerous they could not be accommodated in an appropriate hospital in the community, she said.
That issue, she stressed, did not arise in this case because it was argued purely as a basis of statutory interpretation.
