As is manifest in the boxes of official State papers just released, Dublin's political elite was taken by surprise by the outbreak of the Northern troubles in 1968-69. Many of them were veterans of the anti-partition crusade of the 1950s and had then changed gear with the arrival of Sean Lemass as Taoiseach and the rapprochement with Capt O'Neill's unionist administration. Now another gear-change was called for.
It happened promptly once the civil rights marchers challenged the O'Neill regime. The new mood in Dublin is nicely caught in the disappearance of the term "Northern Ireland" from official files and the restoration of "Six Counties".
The repercussions south of the Border, to what were euphemistically called the civil disturbances in 1969, were seismic. To some a civil war seemed possible. This contingency was certainly discussed by politicians and civil servants as is revealed in the public records just released.
These records are so voluminous - with many boxes of files in the Taoiseach's Department and in the Department of External Affairs [since renamed Foreign Affairs] - that it would be unwise to offer definitive conclusions following a two-day press preview in which only a fraction of the records can be assessed.
And some files listed in the department registries are still considered too sensitive to be opened, including: "Partition: statements, resolutions etc. by Northern Ireland groups and individuals, February 1968 to December 1969, (file withheld)."
Irish Cabinet minutes are disappointing. Indeed, they are not minutes at all. They leave no trace of the exchanges between ministers but merely record decisions taken. It is the departmental papers circulated to the Cabinet which give a detailed indication of what ministers may be discussing; and the original files at department level provide a guide to the day-to-day formulation of policy. But the cut and thrust of the Cabinet exchanges remain unrecorded.
This omission is especially felt during the crisis of August 1969, when the Battle of the Bogside raged in Derry, to be followed by the catastrophic all-night rioting of August 14th, with deaths recorded on August 15th numbering seven, four of them victims of the RUC, including nine-year-old Patrick Rooney, shot in his home in Divis Flats.
An Iveagh House summary gives some indication of how the South read these events. "Protestant extremists, encadred by B-Specials, with perhaps the tacit connivance of the RUC, set about burning out the Falls Road area."
The Cabinet met on a daily basis during this crisis. On Wednesday, August 13th, it agreed the television address by the Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, in which he had stated that his government could "no longer stand by and see innocent people injured and perhaps worse".
The minutes for August 14th show the Cabinet as having agreed to engage in a diplomatic offensive; to send troops to the Border for field hospitals; and to set up a Cabinet committee of Michael Moran (Justice), Paddy Hillery (External Affairs), Jim Gibbons (Defence) and Kevin Boland (Local Government).
The first version of these minutes made available on the opening day of the press preview showed one blank space where a paragraph had been censored under Section 8 (4) of the National Archives Act. Under this section, material may remain secret if it is considered to be contrary to the public interest or if it might cause distress or danger to living persons.
However, on the second day of the press preview, the decision to omit this paragraph was reversed and the restored paragraph was revealed: "That the Minister for Justice should expand the intelligence service maintained by the Garda Siochana in the Six Counties".
All of this was on the eve of the catastrophic events of the night of August 14th-15th which was what triggered the consideration of civil war as a possibility. The Cabinet met again on the morning of August 15th and agreed to send Hillery to London for urgent talks that afternoon.
He was to inform the British government that Dublin had called up its first-line reserves in anticipation of London's approval for a joint Irish-British force to secure peace within Northern Ireland. Failing that, Dublin favoured a UN peacekeeping force.
Most British ministers were out of London - it was mid-August - and Hillery [who on August 1st had met the Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart] now met the two available British ministers, Lord Chalfont and Lord Stonham, from the Foreign and Home Offices.
The Irish note of this meeting reveals an angry Hillery blaming the British for permitting the Apprentice Boys march to proceed in Derry - "sheer madness". He had no confidence in the security forces: the RUC were "at their best, not an impartial force"; the B-Specials were "a partisan, armed mob, such as is found only in dictatorships". Hillery then suggested the joint Irish-British force or a UN peacekeeping force.
The British held to the line that Northern Ireland remained an internal matter and that there could be no discussion of policy with Dublin, still less any involvement of Irish or UN troops. Chalfont advised: "What is needed now is studied moderation and not reflection of irrational feelings." Stonham recorded John Hume's telephoned warning: "We must have troops in Belfast, otherwise there will be slaughter."
Hillery did not accept the rebuff. The Irish government, he insisted, had "assumed that you must accept a combined force". He saw "a real danger of a total blow-up which could involve us as well". He feared an upsurge of emotion on the issue, "There is a strong fear in all Irish people - the fear of a minority being shot in their beds."
Hillery reported on this meeting to the Cabinet the following morning where it was decided that he should proceed to the UN to press for a UN peacekeeping force and to have the situation debated at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly.
It was also decided - and this decision was to lead to the arms crisis of May 1970 and the subsequent arms trial - "that a sum of money - the amount and the channel of disbursement of which would be determined by the Minister for Finance [Charles Haughey] - should be made available from the Exchequer to provide aid for the victims of the current unrest in the Six Counties".
The change in Dublin's mood can be measured by contrasting these responses in mid-August to the pride with which six months earlier Irish diplomats had recorded the US State Department's verdict of "sweet reasonableness" on Dublin's policy on the North just six months before.
On September 10th the Department of External Affairs secretary, Hugh McCann, invited all senior Irish diplomats, throughout the world, for their personal views on what government policy should be in the new situation. "The aim proposed should be attainable and acceptable both at home and in Northern Ireland and abroad." Key diplomats in Iveagh House were also encouraged to add their analysis and prescription.
The most prolific writer in this vein was the indefatigable Eamonn Gallagher, Dublin's most significant gatherer of Northern intelligence. He believed that the Dublin government had "a distinct, definitive and vitally important role to play".
It was his opinion that until a year before, the minority had "by and large, acquiesced in their condition, as we did. They do so no longer."
Gallagher suggested that moderate unionists were occupying what he termed "a steadily more untenable dead-end" and believed that in time they would recognise that their "only credible alternative" was to seek an accommodation with Dublin.
Sean Ronan in forwarding a summary of all proposals received to McCann, summarised some guiding principles which should underpin policy. Foremost amongst these was that unity should be sought by consent: "The use of force, emotionalism and opportunism must be proscribed. Our approach must be sincere, realistic, logical, pragmatic and unrelenting at all times."
The long-term policy should be based on a federal solution: this had existed since 1921, wrote Ronan, but its expression over the years "can hardly be regarded as statements of policy but rather as assertions".
By November, McCann had formulated a draft policy to meet the changed situation. Its basic approach was boldly stated: that the unity of Ireland should be sought by peaceful means "through co-operation, agreement and consent" and that the use of force "should be dismissed publicly as frequently as may appear necessary". Dublin should "maximise discreet contact with Whitehall" towards this end, "under cover of other activities if necessary".
Meanwhile, functional co-operation with the North should be encouraged. Bearing in mind that a united Ireland would be a pluralist society, McCann suggested that the liberal agenda - although he did not so term it - should be addressed in the Republic, advice which had been given by many of the diplomats consulted. The campaign for unity should "be in the nature of a `soft sell', avoiding exaggerated or emotion-laden claims". And Southern opinion should be educated "on the hard realities of the situation".
Finally, he suggested the setting up of a special section in the department to oversee and co-ordinate the policy, including the task of studying "in depth possible long-term solutions e.g. federal solution".
This memorandum marked a turning point in Dublin's policy towards the Northern question. Henceforth, the issue got top priority in terms of resources, not least intellectual. The old anti-partitionist rhetoric was replaced by a more pragmatic, realistic and constructive policy.
Whatever the vicissitudes in the 30 years of the Troubles which lay ahead, there would be an informed cadre of professional civil servants in Dublin, both in Iveagh House and in the Taoiseach's Department, whose speciality would be Northern policy.
And the politician whom they would learn to trust most in the North had already established himself as the most influential adviser throughout these files for 1969. He was John Hume.
Dr John Bowman is a broadcaster and historian