France's role heightens dangers of Chad mission

FRANCE: Irish troops are getting involved in a tangled, dangerous conflict, writes Lara Marlowe in Paris

FRANCE:Irish troops are getting involved in a tangled, dangerous conflict, writes Lara Marlowein Paris

European foreign ministers will formally launch the European Force (EUfor) for Chad and the Republic of Central Africa in Brussels today with a UN mandate to provide security for some 200,000 refugees in eastern Chad. Four hundred of the 3,700 troops will be Irish, and Irish Lieut Gen Pat Nash is to be overall commander of the operation, based at Mont Valérien fort, outside Paris. The force commander on the ground in Chad will be French Maj Gen Jean-Philippe Ganascia.

Despite its European trappings, EUfor remains very much a French operation, the main reason many EU members, including Britain and Germany, did not want to participate. "They fear being manipulated by France," explains Antoine Glaser, the director of the African newsletter La Lettre du Continent. "They're afraid it's an operation with a little European flag and a big French tricolour flapping in the wind."

France originally intended to contribute 1,500 troops to EUfor, but raised that to 2,000 for want of sufficient EU troops. Under Opération Epervier (sparrowhawk), 1,200 French troops have been stationed in Chad for the past 22 years. So by the time EUfor reaches full strength in June, there will be 3,200 French troops in Chad, compared with 1,700 from elsewhere in the EU.

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Epervier was originally deployed to stop Libya grabbing territory in Chad. But Tripoli recognised a 1994 decision by the International Court of Justice which gave the disputed Aouzou Strip to Chad. For the past 14 years, says Roland Marchal, an expert on Africa at the Centre for International Studies and Research (CERI), the French presence in Chad has had no legal raison d'être.

So why have the French stayed in Chad? "To support the regime, and because it's a sandbox for the French military," says Marchal. "There are a whole series of reasons that don't add up to a grand political vision, but explain why the French are still there. [The president of Gabon Omar] Bongo and others tell the Élysée that French influence is at stake, that if they lose [ the capital] N'Djamena, the Chinese, Americans or Sudanese will take over."

A promised shift in French policy towards Africa has turned into a muddle. During his election campaign President Nicolas Sarkozy repeated that he would demand respect for human rights in Africa, that the era of neo-colonial policies known as La Francafrique was over, that Africans must take charge of their own destiny.

At the same time, he and the man who would become his foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, took up appeals by French intellectuals to "do something" for Darfur.

France's need for a European veneer to its African policy is in part motivated by "deep anti-French feeling," says Glaser. "African youth reject France, which they still accuse of neo-colonialism and of supporting the least democratic and most corrupt leaders on the continent."

The Chadian president, Idriss Déby, came to power in a coup 17 years ago. Without French support, experts agree, he could not remain in power. The French are not blind to Déby's shortcomings, but continue to provide his bodyguards, and train and equip his army. They have scolded him over the recruitment of child soldiers and the fact that he hoards all power and privilege for his Zagawa tribe, which represents 2-3 per cent of the population. "It's a predator regime," says Marchal.

Déby staged flawed elections in 1996 and again in 2001. Fraud was so blatant in the last poll that he promised to carry out a "mandate of reconciliation and preparation for a real transition" and never to stand for re-election. But in 2003, Déby changed the constitution so he could stay in power.

"A lot of Chadians concluded the ballot box didn't work, so they'd have to use weapons," notes Marchal.

In the meantime, the rebellion started in the neighbouring Sudanese province of Darfur in February 2003. Déby had maintained good relations with Khartoum, but after rebels attacked al-Fasher airport in Darfur in 2005, Gen Omar el-Bashir's regime realised the leaders of the attack were Zagawa from across the border in Chad, some of whom had been officers in Déby's army. Henceforward, Déby was their enemy.

Khartoum gives weapons and sanctuary to at least three rebel groups that are trying to overthrow Déby, while Déby provides the same to Sudanese rebels who are fighting for Darfur. These intertwined conflicts are taking place against a background of superpower rivalry. China is pumping half a million barrels of oil each day in Sudan, while the US extracts 200,000 barrels per day in Chad, notes Glaser.

Unless two conditions are met, EUfor's one-year mission will change nothing, predicts Marchal. "There is no such thing as a purely humanitarian intervention. There must be a political objective," he says. Déby has failed to implement the powersharing agreement he made under French and European pressure last August, and as a result fighting worsened in November and December. The other condition is that progress must be made at the same time in Darfur, because "you cannot solve the Chad problem independently of Darfur, and vice-versa," says Marchal.

So far, Déby in Chad and el-Bashir in Sudan have been allowed to dictate the conditions of EU and UN intervention. More pressure must be brought to bear on them, Marchal adds.

"Under no circumstances must Chad be allowed to continue playing the role it's playing in Darfur. Idriss Déby is using groups from Darfur, who are Sudanese, as his proxy militias to fight rebels inside Chad. Then they cross into Darfur and fight Khartoum."

Several thousand European peacekeepers are about to venture into this tangled war. Glaser describes as "total illusion" the idea that Chadian rebels will distinguish between non-French European peacekeepers and President Déby's French saviours.

"Try to explain to a Chadian that the man he sees in fatigues and a beret is Irish, not French, that he's different from the other fellow he sees in fatigues and a beret who's with the Epervier mission. The Irishman can always pull his UN mandate out of his pocket, but if you're a Chadian rebel, you don't see the difference." The real danger will come if EUfor is attacked by Chadian rebels and Opération Epervier steps in to protect them, says Glaser. "France has delivered sophisticated weapons, including Milan [ anti-tank] missiles to Idriss Déby to use against the rebels.

"It could all turn into a messy confusion between France, which shares intelligence and surveillance with the Chadian army, and EUfor. Idriss Déby and EUfor will both be under the protection of the French army."