CARLOS MARIGHELA would have understood Algeria. For a revolution to succeed, the Brazilian guerrilla leader once wrote, you have to create an atmosphere of terror which forces the state into repression and polarises the population. Blind violence by the authorities as well as by revolutionaries eliminates the "soft centre", forcing everyone to take sides.
This was the strategy of the National Liberation Front (FLN) when it fought the French, and it's now the philosophy of the Islamic fundamentalists fighting the Algerian government. The French called the FLN "terrorist" in the 1950s. Today, the Algerian authorities - many of them veterans of the war against France - refer to the Islamist guerrillas as "terrorist". Plus ca change.
For terrorised Algerians, the rights and wrongs of the conflict are as ill defined as the identity of their tormentors. Members of the security forces, in civilian clothing and driving civilian cars, often drag people from their homes.
Many disappear forever. Others are murdered at what they mistakenly believe to be police or army checkpoints, shot at close range or beheaded because their identity papers show them to be government employees. The fundamentalists wear uniforms stolen from the security forces or contributed by defectors.
Both camps have moderates and hardliners. Among the fundamentalists, the Djazarists (Algerianists) - led by the now imprisoned Abdel-Kader Hashani, Number 3 in the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) - stood in the 1991 parliamentary elections. The Djazarist group includes many scientists and mathematicians.
Until the government betrayed them by cancelling the elections, they believed that Islamists should come to power through democratic means. Their armed wing, the Islamic Salvation Army, is led by Mr Madani Merzag and operates far outside the Algiers region.
Sheikh Ali Belhadj, the second-in-command of the FIS now rumoured to be near death in prison, represents the Salafist (purist) trend which believes that "democracy is kofr" (infidel) and that true Muslims must revert to rule by a caliphate, the form of government started by the prophet Mohammed. When a group of opposition parties drew cup a peace proposal known as the Rome Platform in 1995, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the most radical faction in Algeria, offered to lay down its arms if ordered to do so by Sheik Belhadj. The emirs or leaders of the GIA
known for throat-slashing, beheading and the kidnapping and rape of women, are often veterans of the war in Afghanistan and are deeply entrenched in and around the capital. In the countryside, they wear Afghanistan dress. In the cities where the GIA carries out assassinations and bombings they blend with ordinary civilians and recognise one another through discreet signs such as silver rings.
The military is divided between proponents of dialogue with the Islamists - led by Gen Mohammed Betchine, a special adviser to President Liamine Zeroual - and "eradicators" who believe that fundamentalism can be wiped out by military force. The top "eradicator" is the chief-of-staff, Gen Mohammed Lamari. President Zeroual, himself a retired general, represents the middle ground. He has at least twice negotiated with imprisoned FIS leaders, only to declare total war on the Islamists when they refused to meet his conditions. At the moment, the hardliners in both camps hold sway. Both sides have a serious problem in assuring themselves of a popular base. The army last year regained control of the old FLN party, but the party is divided.
The army's natural middle class constituency is being impoverished by the war, and many have fled abroad. Likewise the guerrillas' ferocity has sickened even Algerians who hate the government.
From 1992 until the end of 1994, the fundamentalists appeared to be gaining ground. The guerrillas - believed to number around 10,000 - were organised in squadrons of about 150, and staged dramatic attacks on military barracks and convoys. By the time the army sent in re-enforcements, the rebels had scattered into the mountains.
The government reversed the trend by training and arming up to 50,000 militia men, known as "communal guards" to supplement the 120,000 armed forces. Many of the militia men are veterans of the 1958 to 1962 War of Independence. The military justifies their use on the grounds that they know the terrain where the guerrillas hide out, and it's true that the militias have prevented the rebels from regrouping
The military holds the political initiative. They decide when elections can be held, when to negotiate or when to break off talks. But they are years away from "eradicating" the fundamentalists, for whom millions of unemployed youths constitute a limitless pool of new recruits.
