New evidence of the growing interest of the Labour government of Harold Wilson in the situation in Northern Ireland is revealed in this year's Stormont Cabinet releases. The British prime minister was especially concerned at the lack of "one man one vote" in local elections in the North and at the opposition of the 12 Unionist Westminster MPs to Labour policy in parliament. Mr Wilson hinted darkly at financial penalties if reforms were not forthcoming in Northern Ireland.
The matter was discussed at a meeting between representatives of the two governments at 10 Downing Street on January 12th, 1967. This was attended by Mr Wilson, the Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, and Alice Bacon, Minister of State at the Home Office with special responsibility for Northern Ireland affairs.
The Northern Ireland Cabinet was represented by the prime minister, Terence O'Neill, the Minister of Home Affairs, William Craig, and the Minister of Commerce, Brian Faulkner.
Mr Wilson opened by recalling the circumstances in which he had initiated the talks with Capt O'Neill the previous August. The Labour back bench had been restive about certain aspects of Northern Ireland affairs and had shown increasing unwillingness to accept the convention that these were matters which were the responsibility of the Northern Ireland government and could not be discussed at Westminster. Under mounting pressure he had made his suggestion of informal talks with Capt O'Neill.
At their August 1966 meeting, the Stormont prime minister had told him of the backlash operating in the aftermath of the 1916 celebrations and the brake this placed on further movement towards reform. Since then, the queen's speech in Northern Ireland had announced a number of reforms which he regarded as a move in the right direction.
Capt O'Neill said the autumn had been relatively free of "Paisleyite activities", largely because the leaders had been in jail. In this more settled atmosphere, his government intended to seek the independent and impartial advice of the Westminster Boundary Commission for Northern Ireland; at a later date a statutory boundary commission on Westminster lines to review all Stormont constituencies and the abolition of the business vote in parliamentary elections.
Mr Wilson asked what was intended on the local government franchise. Mr Craig replied that the entire local government structure in the North was under review and any consideration of the franchise issue must await the resulting rationalisation.
Mr Jenkins expressed the view that the local government franchise and the distribution of council seats would soon come under fire from Westminster members. Ms Bacon, for her part, referred to a report of discussions between a Northern Ireland Labour Party delegation and the Unionist government, which revealed a basic difference of opinion on the desirability of a universal franchise. Mr Wilson emphasised that the local government franchise was "coming under attack" and said this would raise questions regarding the conduct of the local authorities in Northern Ireland in such matters as housing and jobs. Capt O'Neill replied that there was a great tendency to exaggerate these aspects, which, in so far as they existed, stemmed from the much smaller size of local authority units in Northern Ireland. On housing, the problem had been largely rectified by the Northern Ireland Housing Trust.
However, the Home Secretary referred to the position in Derry and said that pressure was bound to grow for reform there. Mr Craig reiterated that any changes must await the outcome of local government reform. On the franchise issue, he did not necessarily accept that in local government the universal vote was better in principle.
Mr Wilson spoke of the pressures he was under at Westminster and of the deputations on Northern Ireland affairs which the Home Secretary had received. These were not just small pressure groups or composed of people with a professional Irish interest.
There were about 150 MPs actively involved on the Labour side but they had many sympathisers in the other two parties. The 1966 general election had brought into parliament a new irreverent generation who were challenging and questioning everything. For them nothing was sacrosanct, least of all because it was embedded in ancient custom.
Mr Wilson warned that these MPs would seek to exert pressure by querying the financial assistance given to Northern Ireland from the British Exchequer. He knew that the financial relationship was currently under intense scrutiny by some very able people. All this meant that it was impossible to stand pat on what had been settled in the past.
Mr Wilson then turned to the position of the Ulster Unionist MPs, whom he clearly saw as another source of irritation to the Labour backbenchers. While the Labour government, with a comfortable majority, was not concerned to raise this issue, he felt the new Labour MPs would press it forcefully.
The quality of Northern Ireland MPs, with a few exceptions, was not high. In the previous parliament the Labour government could have been defeated by the Ulster members voting with the opposition on the issue of Rachman slum landordism in London or on the Steel Bill - matters on which in Northern Ireland the local parliament had its own powers, with the UK parliament effectively debarred from any reciprocal right of discussion. This was manifestly unfair. If ever the Westminster parliament reverted to a marginal balance of parties, the position of the Ulster Unionist members could create a first-class political crisis.
Mr Faulkner denied that the Northern Ireland government could be accused of clinging to "doctrinal attitudes". The Housing Trust was the Stormont government's answer to any charge of discrimination in housing, he said.
The discussion returned to the issue of "one man one vote" with the British prime minister inquiring whether the present property franchise would still be thought right if it produced a different political result. The Labour "rebels" would ask why Northern Ireland should be subsidised by Britain to operate a franchise system which no British government would consider for any independent Commonwealth state.
The London meeting was discussed at a full meeting of the Stormont Cabinet on January 24th, 1967. Capt O'Neill observed that while the general atmosphere of the meeting had been friendly, there was an underlying sense of pressure. The Minister of Home Affairs, in particular, had been subjected to a very searching interrogation which he had handled with conspicuous success. The greatest surprise of the meeting was Mr Wilson's reiteration of the theme of the Ulster members.
Mr Faulkner argued that the activities of the Unionist MPs in relation to matters of no concern to Northern Ireland obviously represented a serious irritant to Mr Wilson and had been partly responsible for the growth of Labour backbench pressure on Northern Ireland. Mr Wilson had clearly threatened that, unless Ulster MPs were prepared to accept some measure of voluntary restraint, he might adopt a less generous financial attitude to the North. In these circumstances, the Westminster MPs must be asked to keep some sense of proportion.
At some stage it might be necessary for the Northern Ireland government to make it clear that it did not accept this principle. His one impression, however, was that if the critics of Northern Ireland could be satisfied about alleged discrimination in housing and employment, they might press less hard for this particular political principle.
Capt O'Neill agreed that the situation must be explained to the Unionist MPs. It would be unwise to rely too much on Conservative support. The Attorney-General, E.W. Jones, stressed the importance of the local government franchise. If they were forced to give way on this, they might ultimately be expected to follow Great Britain in granting votes at 18. This would be disastrous.