The awkwardly named, but much discussed, "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) has not quite arrived.
A cluster of dramatic advances in weapons and information technology is said to constitute a revolution comparable to the introduction of gun-powder. It is now claimed that the new "precision" weapons (such as Cruise missiles and laser-guided bombs) are accurate enough; surveillance is sharp enough; communications and information technology are fast enough and the launchers are remote and invulnerable enough to collectively represent a radical shift in the way wars are waged.
The most recent war waged using these technologies, the US-British Operation Desert Fox against Iraq, provides a good opportunity to assess how far such a change has actually taken place. Despite a shortage of ground bases and active allies, "devastating attacks" were made on Iraq - with no Anglo-American casualties. But the regime survived.
Three hundred ship-launched and 90 air-launched Cruise/Tomahawk missiles plus 600 air-dropped bombs were used in Operation Desert Fox. Eighty-five per cent hit their targets. What did the other 15 per cent hit?
Initial damage claims were subsequently modified. Communications destruction, for instance, may have to be determined by "absence", when previously active links remain silent. This takes time.
Meanwhile, the civilian casualty figures are lost in the propaganda war.
The "military-academic" complex has been discussing the feasibility and implications of the RMA in recent years. Some prefer the term "Revolution in Strategic Affairs" (RSA).
Briefly, the RMA should enable an advanced country to strike fixed or moving targets from great distances with precision, using advance and "realtime" information. "Real-time information" means information about events as they are happening. Data about targets can be arriving as missiles are being launched and during their travel. Targeting alterations are possible en route.
Cruise/Tomahawk missiles can be launched from aircraft, ground sites, ships or submarines which are so distant that their crews cannot be attacked. Similarly, aircraft bombs can be "stood-off" (launched from a distance) and guided.
Thus power can be projected with minimal risk. But there is an acknowledged mismatch between the RMA and the low-intensity, guerrilla wars which it may provoke. Launching million dollar missiles at guerrillas would be absurd.
Information sources range from spies to satellites. That information can now be integrated and evaluated faster than ever before. It is claimed that target precision will save civilian lives. Missiles might be diverted or destroyed if civilians were seen in or near a target. Attacks could be diverted to hit a tank force unexpectedly emerging from cover. Wars will be shorter and more intense. The potential for reduced civilian and military casualties are undoubted advantages.
Military and diplomatic journals have been discussing the new unacceptability of even small casualty rates in what are sometimes called "high income, low birthrate societies". Even in countries "on the way to hegemony" - a phase in which casualties are historically acceptable this phenomenon is clear. Familial attitudes translate, at government level, into the political unacceptability of losses.
Some psychologists explain that, in two-child families, the loss of one son or daughter is more grievously felt than in six-child ones.
The RMA suits the new casualty attitudes and is clearly attractive for states with the technology. But the downside is that wars could become more likely because the aggressor would not be deterred by the prospect of casualties. The 1,000-bomber raids of the second World War ensured that targets were destroyed. A few back-up Cruise or Tomahawk missiles per target should now suffice. These need not be launched until failures are identified by early damage reconnaissance and assessment. It is also claimed that, because of the new weapons, smaller armed forces with less infantry will be needed in the future - a perennial dream. US logistics troops now outnumber combat troops by a ratio of two to one. However, holding ground requires infantry.
These cold calculations, like the RMA itself, apply to powerful countries and their client states. Misses will occur, with a human cost. The weak will die uncounted, as they always have, but overall casualties may diminish.
Information links may be a weakness of the RMA. They should be continuous, secure and "all-weather" in operation. Electronic interference and sophisticated hacking by hi-tech enemies are possibilities. Information interruptions may cause disorientation, as Prof Lawrence Freedman points out in his excellent Adelphi Paper 318 from the Institute for Strategic Studies. Distortions of "human intelligence" by interested parties are very possible. If the RMA has still not achieved its full potential, the term undoubtedly indicates the direction in which warfare is moving. The implications for the international community are clear, but technological advance does not relieve its members of political responsibility.
Certainly, for an orderly world, Security Council resolutions should be obeyed, and if not, be enforced. But further attempts at uneven enforcement, taking action on some resolutions and not others, will be counter-productive. It will also further undermine America's real potential for good in our world. The US may invoke Security Council vetoes and, perhaps, terrorism to justify its actions. But the best answer would be even-handedness.