IRAQ: US and British military commanders are putting the final touches to their battle plans. Tom Clonan examines the likely strategy
The initial phase of any assault on Iraq will consist of an intense series of air attacks on Iraqi military infrastructure. The use of Tomahawk missiles and precision-guided bombs during this phase of war will be influenced by previous operations, including NATO's air assault on Serbia in the late 1990s and the more recent air war in Afghanistan. In this short time-frame, the use of so-called dumb, or free-fall bombs by the US and British forces has decreased dramatically.
Of the total of 6,303 tons of bombs dropped by the US and British on Serbia in 1999, 35 per cent were so-called smart weapons. The number of precision-guided weapons deployed during the war in Afghanistan grew to 60 per cent of the total tonnage.
This represents a shift in US and British tactical doctrine towards a more surgical conduct of operations. It contrasts with the saturation or carpet bombing of target areas with dumb bombs - with an accuracy rate of just 2 per cent - as seen in Vietnam and previous conflicts. This shift towards guided weapon systems is in part informed by the requirement to limit collateral damage and civilian casualties in order to preserve the political will to prosecute war.
Once air superiority has been established, the coalition forces will deploy US and British AWACs (Airborne Warning and Control Systems) and JSTARs (Joint Surveillance Target Acquisition Radars) over Iraq. These consist of computerised target acquisition systems aboard customised Boeing 707/320 aircraft.
Unaffected by the background clutter associated with land or sea-based radar systems, AWACs aircraft, availing of in-flight refuelling, will provide an uninterrupted flow of battlefield intelligence 24 hours a day. The systems carried on these aircraft are capable of identifying the infra-red, acoustic, electromagnetic and radar signatures of the entire inventory of weapons and equipment the Iraqis possess.
Once detected and profiled, these signatures are fed in digital form to a central processing unit. They are then passed on to a fire control system. The only human interface required by the system is the prioritisation of targets by military commanders.
The precise co-ordinates of all targets are then fed to the on-board computers and weapon systems of friendly aircraft and missile batteries. In this way, the entire air war can be conducted in a remote fashion. Many defence intellectuals describe this form of warfare as sanitised combat operations.
This contrasts a great deal with the second phase of operations, or the ground war. It is likely that the ground war in Iraq will consist of advance to contact operations conducted by armour supported by mechanised and airborne infantry units. This is reflected by the range of units being deployed for front-line action in Iraq.
These include the British 7th Armoured Brigade and US armoured formations now based in Kuwait. If, after the air war, the surviving Iraqi military choose to offer resistance, allied troops will probably be forced to fight in the urban environs of cities such as Basra and Baghdad.
This would pit US and British troops equipped with M1A1/2 Abrams and Challenger 2 main battle tanks against Iraqi T-72 tanks dug-in in a network of city street strong-points. Coalition commanders will be mindful of the fact that the main armament of the former Warsaw Pact produced T-72 tank - a 125mm cannon - can penetrate the armour of the US Abrams tank at ranges of up to 1,000 metres. They will also be mindful of the risk to US and British tank crews posed by the use of depleted uranium as a material in both armour and armour- piercing weapons.
The US main battle tank, the Abrams, is made of steel-encased depleted uranium. A by-product of nuclear fuel enrichment, depleted uranium is 1.7 times denser than lead and an ideal material for use in the hulls of armoured fighting vehicles. Depleted uranium is also used in the warheads of HEAT (High Explosive Anti Tank) rounds and in many airborne missile systems.
The main disadvantage of this material is in the risk it poses to military personnel and civilians on detonation. Simply speaking, depleted uranium penetrators hulls on impact, forming an aerosol of radioactive dust. This dust, if inhaled or ingested, poses a serious health risk. According to experts, the presence of one particle of depleted uranium dust in the lungs would expose the victim to the radiation equivalent of one X-ray per day for the rest of their lives.
Depleted uranium dust is a persistent contaminant and remains in burnt-out vehicles, buildings and their surrounds for many years. Civilians who live in close proximity to the battlefield are often most at risk from such contamination. These will include children who are often tempted to explore bomb sites and tank hulls.
Exposure to depleted uranium dust is believed to be a causal factor in Gulf War Syndrome. Given that NATO fired over 10,000 depleted uranium rounds in Bosnia and over 31,000 in Kosovo during the 1990s, it is likely that they will be used in the coming conflict.
Therefore, the ground war in Iraq may be far dirtier than the surgical air campaign. This likelihood will be multiplied exponentially if Mr Saddam's troops deploy even a fraction of the chemical and biological weapons they are believed to possess.
Dr Tom Clonan is a retired army officer with experience in the Middle East and former Yugoslavia. He is a fellow of the US-based Inter University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. He currently lectures in the School of Media, DIT.
