WE CAN expect further simplification and demonisation of Iran's position in the world from the US following the Republican Party convention in San Diego this week.
Given US power and influence, and the steps already taken by President Clinton to implement Republican inspired extra territorial legislation against Iran, Libya and Cuba, the stage is set for a turbulent period in US/EU relations during Ireland's current presidency and the American election campaign season.
It looks as if Mr Clinton's Irish policy could also become a campaign issue following Mr James Baker's complaint that it has led to the worst deterioration in relations with Britain, "our oldest ally", since the Boston Tea Party.
The unmistakable signs were there in Mr Dole's acceptance speech: "He [Clinton defends giving a green light to a terrorist state, Iran, to expand its influence in Europe and relies on the United Nations to punish Libyan terrorists who murder American citizens. I will not.
It is not clear precisely what Mr Dole has in mind in accusing Mr Clinton of giving a green light to Iranian designs on Europe. Is he referring to the determination of EU states, without exception (and including Britain), to reject this legislation in favour of keeping open diplomatic dialogue, trade and investment with Iran?
Does Mr Dole attribute this to a weakness of US resolve in enforcing its will on the Europeans? If so, what does this tell us about future US EU relations under a Republican presidency, which began to look somewhat more likely after this week's convention?
Given the steps he has already taken it must be expected that Mr Clinton will reinforce these positions in coming weeks and months. Already the EU has prepared contingency plans to counteract the US legislation, with an unwonted dispatch and a flurry of sharp rebuttals of the American point of view and defences of the perceptions and interests involved in the alternative European approach.
On Thursday, for example, the German Foreign Minister, Mr Klaus Kinkel, defended the landmark $23 billion gas agreement reached between Turkey and Iran. It was signed by the new Islamist Prime Minister, Mr Erbakan, on a visit to Tehran, one of five Islamic states he visited this week.
Mr Kinkel said the deal was "part of normal diplomatic relations that are none of our business and that Europeans "must do everything to show Turkey that it is part of Europe, an important link with the Islamic and Asian world. That "is why we should not isolate it.
Mr Kinkel concluded by saying that "we cannot let ourselves be told who we can do business with." Washington should ponder hard on his comments, for they express very well an emergent conflict of policy that could become more and more significant in future transatlantic relations.
Iran is becoming a defining issue for US foreign policy after the collapse of communism. In the orthodox US account it combines revolutionary zeal, a populist and Janus faced duplicity about the use of terrorist techniques and an over arching Islamist ideology that has been oversimplified and increasingly demonised by Washington's official categorisation of the country as a "terrorist state".
The framework is reminiscent of the ideological Other represented by communism during the Cold War; and it is significant that the extra territorial arguments go straight back to the rows about oil and gas pipelines between Europe and the Soviet Union in the early 1980s.
This is why the Turkish Iran deal is a real test of the US approach, irrespective of whether it is classified as trade or investment. Too simplified a model of Islamic fundamentalism will leave US policy incapable of distinguishing between the great varieties of fundamentalist movements in the Middle East, to say nothing of their complex historical, sociological, political and cultural roots.
The fact that Mr Erbakan has come to power in Turkey is a perfect illustration of this point and serves to underline how inadequate the US model is for an understanding of the real complexities of the situation. What of future governments in Algeria or Lebanon? What of the demonstrable emergence of political factionalism in Iran itself?
The different factions are tending to crystallise into political parties certainly into well defined political currents - according to expert analysts and diplomatic and media reports that inform European policies. These political developments have been clearly evident in the Iranian media since at least 1994, and were quite in the open during the elections to the Majlis earlier this year.
There are at least four major trends:
. the conservative religious right, with an extensive rural and small town base and associated with the speaker of the parliament, Mr Al Akbar Nateq Nuri, remains powerful but lost substantial ground in the election.
. the Hizbullah, combining religious zeal and a concern for social justice, based in the lowermiddle and lower urban classes, which has lost influence and is increasingly marginalised.
. the pragmatists, grouped around President Hashemi Rafsanjani and the Foreign Minister, Mr Velayati, who are open to European and western influence and are most aware of the need to keep Iran's trade open. Their social base is in the urban middle class in alliance with clergy and the group stresses the importance of economic reconstruction.
. the left associated with which take a determinedly "anti imperialist" approach towards the US.
There is a real struggle between these factions for control of the state and public policy, and real disagreements between them about the use of terrorism. European governments believe the best course of action is to engage the Iranian government in political and commercial dialogue.
For the US this is, only to lend credibility to what it presents as an integrated "terrorist state", in which such factionalism disguises a real subversive agenda. Iran should therefore be contained and isolated.
This agenda coincides with that of Israel and may become all the more attractive as Washington endeavours to manage the Netanyahu government. But it seems bound to pitch US and EU policy against each other, especially if Mr Dole wins in November.
