Opposite the discreet Berkeley Street entrance to the Mayfair Inter-Continental hotel in London, a small line of protesters chanted Buddhist laments and denounced "Indonesia's role in the continuing slaughter of East Timorese".
They handed out leaflets saying "while tens of thousands of East Timorese, displaced by Indonesian-backed militias, are on the brink of famine" the embassy "has displayed its extraordinary insensitivity by inviting you to a luncheon at one of London's plushest hotels."
In an interview after the subdued (and, as it happened, lunchless) bash, the Indonesian Ambassador, Mr Nana S. Sutresna, said that it was perhaps ironic that Indonesia was celebrating the anniversary of the proclamation of its own independence from the Netherlands in 1945 at a time when Indonesians were feeling "shame" at events in East Timor, particularly its recent resounding vote for independence from Indonesia.
He was hoping that "things are on the right track, now" that his president had taken "the bold decision" to invite in UN peace keepers. The President, Mr B.J. Habibie, could even be said to have saved the country.
Mr Sutresna must have said six times in an interview how sorry and personally very moved by the crisis he felt. His essential message was that Indonesia was not a pariah. Just "give us a chance".
The ambassador said the UN-managed ballot as "fairly fair and free", but a military spokesman in Jakarta was denounced it as fraudulent.
There had been some irregularities, especially in the eyes of the losing side. But "we were true to what we said, that we will accept, welcome and respect the position of the majority." He was representing one side of a busy debate in Indonesia, where politics are "still very fluid".
As his analysis proceeded, credibility receded. It transpired that the trauma and shame he said were felt by Indonesians was as much about losing the territory as about the attendant violence.
He denied persistent reports that many among an estimated 180,000 displaced East Timorese in West Timor had been forced out in army and militia lorries.
This was "a misrepresentation". The refugees had asked to leave the trouble spots. "This [accusation] is really hurting us because we are not an uncivilised people. We know they are in a dire situation. So far from forcing them, on the contrary, we have been trying to help them."
Though departing little from Jakarta's line over the years he did put a new spin on why Indonesia invaded the former Portuguese colony in 1975.
The Americans, under the then president, Mr Gerald Ford, and Dr Henry Kissinger, and the British had approached a reluctant President Suharto to "please intervene, please intervene" to prevent a new Cold War domino falling after Vietnam. "Of course some generals were keen to do that [invade] but Suharto himself was against it."
Mr Sutresna (66), a veteran of Indonesia's diplomatic struggle to keep East Timor, recalled a meeting he attended with the Portuguese to persuade them to come back and finish decolonisation. "They refused to do that."
But in all the complexities of the whole experience, "we can categorise it as a minus on our part . . . There was a lack of firmness on our part - in the field and otherwise."
Did he mean the anti-independence militias, I asked.
He did not. "No, even earlier than that before the establishment of the militias. In the beginning, in the 1970s, when many people had been suggesting to the army, `Why can't you finish this problem once and for all?' they said, `No we do not want to see bloodshed in East Timor'. That's why they said, `We want to win the hearts and minds of the people'. That was their motto from the very beginning."
The ambassador was speaking of the period of maximum killing in the mountain war against FALINTIL guerrillas and the people.
With 200,000 deaths behind us, surely "winning hearts and minds" was not quite the right phrase.
"You know what happened, David, come on!", he said, warming to a hard-line Indonesian version of history that the August 30th defeat at the polls has not altered.
The Portuguese, who had overthrown dictatorship at home the year before Indonesia's (illegal) invasion, left and gave the weapons to the independence movement, which was then small, according to the ambassador.
It was "speculation" - a disservice to Irish Times readers even - to say that a group of generals was behind the pro-Indonesian militias.
If they had plotted in that way "they would have been applying double standards" because "we have a professional army and once the commander-in-chief says that you have to do something they will obey - and this democratisation [the UN ballot] is the thing that is irreversible, and they know that."
There were "some elements" of the army with "emotional ties" to the militias but it was over- simplification to say that the militias had been orchestrated by a group of officers.
The ambassador wanted to talk about the UN Mission to East Timor (Unamet). How come its compound in Dili was "on the whole" guarded?
"The decision to leave was not made by us," he said referring to last week's Unamet exodus because of militia violence.
The army had tried "by persuasion" months ago to get militias and FALINTIL guerrillas into cantonment areas.
But the militias didn't keep their side of that bargain, I said.
"At first they obeyed." He went on to blame the mayhem that overtook the Timorese capital in the days before and after the vote on "a rather minor incident initiated by stone throwing" and on "a long enmity, a culture of vengeance among Timorese".
Mr Sutresna hoped protests in Jakarta would not last. Protesters were "not seeing things in the whole context of the problem."
Mr Sutresna would not accept that the game stopped when President Clinton strongly signalled danger to investment in Indonesia. "I don't think that was what motivated Habibie." As pointed out by his president's adviser, such leverage "would only unleash ultra-national feeling not only in Indonesia but in the Asian region."
In fact, President Habibie had put his own November re-election prospects in jeopardy by doing the right thing. But in these uncertain times he had a good word, too, for Gen Wiranto, the army chief and Defence Minister, "who was the first one thinking of getting the UN more involved."
The ambassador was unsure, however, of his government's mind following the declared intention of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mrs Mary Robinson, to get the UN involved in the issue of war crimes.