The jury in the trial of murder accused Joe O'Reilly has been sent to a hotel for the night after failing to reach a verdict.
It was the 20th day of the trial of Mr O'Reilly (35), Lambay View, Baldarragh, The Naul, Co Dublin, who has pleaded not guilty to murdering his 30-year-old wife Rachel O'Reilly, at the family home on October 4th, 2004.
The jury of nine men and two women began their deliberations at 3.15pm yesterday. They spent just over three hours considering their verdict before Mr Justice Barry White told them to stop for the night and asked them to return to commence their deliberations again today.
He emphasised the importance of not discussing the case after they had been told not to. He said juries often returned from a night in a hotel with a string of questions for him which suggested they had not ceased their deliberations as requested.
In his charge to the jury, Mr Justice White told them they must consider their verdict with "established legal principles", and they must accept these rules from him.
"I am infallible as far as you're concerned. You must accept the law from me whether you like it or not, whether you think the law is an ass. When it comes to the facts, they are your concern, and only you decide on the innocence of Mr O'Reilly."
He said the first principle of law which they must abide by was the "presumption of innocence". He explained that when a person was accused of a criminal offence, "he or she is presumed not to have committed that offence".
"That presumption is not a phrase or a motto to which you pay mere lip service," he said.
He told them they must treat the question of the guilt of the accused with "an air of disbelief". He said because Mr O'Reilly was presumed innocent, it logically followed that it was the responsibility of the prosecution to prove their case.
He said the onus of proof never rests with the defence.
For this reason, he said, juries were not allowed to draw any negative inference when an accused man did not give evidence.
Similarly, he said, juries were not allowed to draw any adverse meaning when an accused man did not answer any questions put to him by gardaí during interview.
He reminded the jury that Mr O'Reilly did give an account of his movements on the day of the murder to gardaí.
The judge went on to talk about the standard of proof that was required before they could convict Mr O'Reilly.
He said the criminal standard of "proof beyond all reasonable doubt" was much higher than the standard of proof in civil cases where the jury need only be certain of the guilt of the accused "on the balance of probabilities".
He told them that while this was "a very high standard", nothing was ever certain in human affairs.
There was no legal definition of "proof beyond all reasonable doubt," and this meant the guilt of the accused was a matter for them to decide.
He cited examples frequently used by judges in trying to explain this principle to juries and said that "a reasonable doubt" may be something which would cause them to think twice about moving house or sending a child to a certain school.
To explain what would not amount to a reasonable doubt, he said that if a husband told his wife not to bother laying the table for him for dinner because he might be run over by a bus, this would be an example of a doubt that was not reasonable.
However, he warned: "What satisfies one person may not satisfy another."
He added: "Proof is a matter of individual conscience for each member of the jury."
He said the example he often used to explain this concept to juries was one of "role reversal".
He asked the jury to forget they were sitting in judgment and imagine themselves as Joe O'Reilly.
He asked them to consider what Mr O'Reilly might think of being convicted.
While he said anyone who was convicted would not be happy about that, he suggested they consider whether Mr O'Reilly would think the prosecution had succeeded in proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that justice had been done.
He said proof beyond a reasonable doubt was not something "whimsical" or "fanciful", it was something that was based on reason.
It consequently followed that when two versions of an account were given and they found that the account given by the accused might reasonably be true, then they had to accept the version of events that was most favourable to the accused.
He said: "You must look to the evidence and you must analyse it and see whether or not the State satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, and if they haven't, then you must give the benefit of the doubt to the accused."