Juries have, by and large, not "gone mad" in relation to awards of damages in libel cases, the Supreme Court was told yesterday.
Mr Paul O'Higgins SC, for the former social welfare minister, Mr Proinsias de Rossa, said a £300,000 award of damages to his client for libel in an article written by Eamon Dunphy and published in the Sunday Independent on December 13th, 1992, reflected the view taken by the jury of Mr De Rossa's character.
He said the libel amounted, if true, to a clear statement that Mr De Rossa was not fit for the public office occupied by him or any public office. No libel could have been more serious.
The legislature had looked at the function of juries in fixing damages in libel cases in 1988 and had expressly decided it did not want to change the existing system.
The five-judge Supreme Court is hearing an appeal by Independent Newspapers against the £300,000 award to Mr De Rossa made by a High Court jury on July 31st, 1997.
The group claims the award was excessive and disproportionate to any damage done to Mr De Rossa's reputation. It is submitted on behalf of Mr De Rossa that there is no disproportion between the award and the "gross and persistent" libel committed against him.
The appeal is against the amount of the award only and not against the jury's finding of libel. Most of yesterday's hearing was taken up with submissions on behalf of Mr De Rossa by Mr O'Higgins.
Counsel said national law required proportionality in relation to awards. Over the years there had been repeated challenges to the capacity of juries to set particular awards.
The fundamental objection to a jury being given some guidance as to the manner of damages lay in it being the jury's function to set damages.
Juries were composed of intelligent, listening people who were entrusted with high responsibilities. While it was a jury's function to find the damages in a libel action, the legislature had last looked at the position in 1988 and decided on the present system.
Asked by the Chief Justice, Mr Justice Hamilton, whether it was being submitted that the award of £300,000 was manifestly reasonable and proportionate, Mr O'Higgins said he would be equally bound by a figure of £35,000.
The award would have reflected the view taken by the jury in all the circumstances and in relation to Mr De Rossa's character, counsel said.
It was unrealistic to compare the De Rossa case as it had been run in the High Court with any other libel case in this jurisdiction.
No libel could have been significantly more serious from the point of view of a senior politician or senior person in public life generally. No defence of libel could have aggravated the situation in a more serious way than had occurred.
Mr Kevin Feeney SC, for Independent Newspapers, said the central factor was the jury's findings on the meaning of the article. The defence had advanced a particular meaning and had lost.
The question had been raised as to whether some form of scale of damages could be drawn up for libel cases by which one could identify, for instance, a particular type of defamation which would attract damages of £30,000 or £40,000.
The largest award which had stood following an appeal to the Supreme Court in relation to defamation was £90,000, he added.