Patrice Lumumba, the democratically elected president of the Congo, was, along with two of his political associates, murdered in the breakaway province of Katanga on January 17th, 1960. Ludo de Witte's book, first published in 1999 in Dutch as De Moord op Lumumba, received worldwide publicity for its revelations of skulduggery by western powers and accusations of complicity by the United Nations. It has now been published in English for the first time.
There were many who wanted Lumumba dead. The United States regarded him as an African Castro and the CIA planned to kill him. Belgium saw him as a threat to its financial interests and also plotted his death. In a memorandum, Belgium's Minister for African Affairs, Count d'Aspremont Lynden, stated that the main aim to pursue in the interests of the Congo, Katanga and Belgium was Lumumba's "Θlimination dΘfinitive".
In the period leading up to the murder, the former Belgian Congo was in a state of political chaos. Mo∩se Tshombe had set up a secessionist, Belgian-supported puppet-government in Katanga. President Kasavubu had announced the dismissal of Prime Minister Lumumba, who had retaliated by announcing the dismissal of Kasavubu.
In September, 1960, the army chief, Colonel Mobutu (later president of Zaire), had proclaimed military rule. The United Nations had been present since July at the Congo's request following a mutiny by Congolese troops against Belgian officers, rioting and an illegal despatch of troops by Belgium in support of the secession of mineral-rich Katanga.
The UN, and especially its Secretary General, Dag Hammarskj÷ld, comes under severe criticism from de Witte over Lumumba's murder and it is in this area that many of the book's weaknesses are exposed.
Hammarskj÷ld, de Witte writes, was afraid that African and Asian UN soldiers would sympathise with Lumumba and tried to ensure that a strong western component was involved in Katanga. For this reason, he writes, "Irish, Swedes, Moroccans, Ethiopians and Malays (sic)" were sent to the breakaway province.
The Irish are singled out for their friendliness with Tshombe. De Witte writes that Irish officers visited the Katangese president to wish him a happy new year on January 1st, 1961, and says the actions and declarations of UN officers, including Col Harry Byrne from Ireland, "spoke for themselves".
None of these alleged "actions or declarations" is described by de Witte. Neither does he report that Tshombe, on at least one occasion, threatened Byrne's life with the words "you will leave your head in Katanga". One gets the impression that information is used selectively to pursue a specific agenda in this and other parts of the book.
From an Irish point of view it is remarkable to see the Army singled out long after the event as being favourably disposed to Tshombe when at the time Irish UN troops were subjected to vicious attacks by the Belgian, British and other western media and politicians for opposing Tshombe's regime.
De Witte writes of Hammarskj÷ld: "To stop the nationalist (Lumumba) offensive at the end of 1960 and the beginning of 1961, he would need more extreme measures: sowing genocidal terror in the rebel regions and murdering nationalist leaders." This allegation is not supported by concrete evidence.
After Lumumba had left UN protection in LΘopoldville (now Kinshasa), he headed by car towards Stanleyville (Kisangani) and, on orders from their military superiors, Ghanaian UN troops did not prevent him from being arrested by troops loyal to Mobutu.
Lumumba, with Belgian connivance, was despatched to Elizabethville (Lubumbashi) into the hands of Tshombe's regime and certain death. Plans for his murder by the United States and Belgium were shelved. After violent beatings both in transit and after his arrival, Lumumba and his colleagues were murdered. De Witte makes much of the overnight delay by the UN political representative, Ian Berendsen, in Elizabethville in contacting Tshombe after Lumumba's arrival in Katanga.
Having correctly described Berendsen as a New Zealander, he goes on just a few paragraphs later to call him "a Belgo-Katangan in UN uniform". Whether this is a mistake or simply an exercise in name-calling, it does little for de Witte's credentials as a disinterested researcher.
SΘamus Martin is International Editor of The Irish Times
