The report by the Comptroller and Auditor General into DIRT tax uncovers a range of cases where the tax was not paid and raises a number of serious issues for the Revenue Commissioners and the financial institutions.
It also demonstrates that senior officials in the Department of Finance, the Revenue and the Central Bank were aware in general terms of the prevalence of bogus non-resident accounts - as were Government ministers - but they declined to act because of fears that doing so would lead to a flight of capital from the State.
The C&AG's report begins by outlining the background to the introduction of Deposit Interest Retention Tax in 1986.
The first substantial section of the report deals with what the Department of Finance, the Central Bank and the Revenue Commissioners knew about the bogus non-resident account issue and what they did about it.
The common theme running through this section is that officials in all these organisations were well aware of the widespread extent of the problem in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but lacked hard evidence.
However, they were afraid of doing anything to uncover information or compel banks and building societies to reveal more information for fear that this would lead to a flood of money leaving the State.
In relation to the Department of Finance, it says the issue had arisen on four occasions from 1983 to 1993. Department officials had "subjective or generalised" knowledge of bogus non-resident accounts, but initiated no investigations to study the matter.
As late as 1993, Department officials told the Minister in a memorandum that as much as £1 billion may have been invested in bogus non-resident accounts.
The Central Bank had responsibility for exchange control supervision and as far back as 1986 noted "unapproved holdings of external assets by residents".
It called for increased monitoring in the area. However, later that year the bank did not act on a Department of Finance note which said that people in financial institutions were helping people open bogus accounts.
The Bank's governor, Mr Maurice O'Connell, is quoted in the report commenting in detail of how Department and bank officials at the time were primarily concerned about the pound exchange rate. They feared a flood of capital from the State could undermine the pound and push up interest rates.
The Revenue Commissioners' attitude to collecting and enforcing the DIRT legislation is examined in detail. Its investigations into a number of cases in various bank branches are examined, but at no stage did the Revenue initiate a general examination of the issue or seek to examine non-resident declaration forms at the financial institutions. Following the revelations last year it went into all the institutions seeking details on their compliance.
The report then goes on to examine the DIRT compliance record in the 37 financial institutions which remit the tax. It confirms evidence of a widespread problem at AIB and recounts the differences in view between the Revenue and AIB on discussions in the early 1990s. It will now be up to the PAC to examine this discrepancy further.
It also finds evidence of bogus non-resident accounts in ACC Bank and NIB, as well as evidence relating to bogus accounts in earlier years in the Bank of Ireland and Ulster Bank.
The infamous Ansbacher deposits in Guinness & Mahon bank are also the subject of DIRT negotiations between the Revenue and the bank's current owners, Irish Life & Permanent.
In other institutions it finds evidence in many cases of the necessary documentation with non-resident forms not being correctly filled out and a number of institutions may now face some liability to the Revenue Commissioners.