Israel:Israeli prime minister sees Annapolis as the beginning of a process rather than a ground-breaking event, writes Peter Hirschbergin Jerusalem
On the eve of his departure for today's summit in Annapolis, Maryland, Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert declared that maintaining the status quo with the Palestinians would endanger Israel.
What he meant, he explained, was that if the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate was not broken, it would ultimately sound the death knell for Palestinian moderates and would result in Hamas taking over the West Bank as well.
Olmert's apocalyptic warning, however, was not a signal that we should prepare ourselves for a dramatic breakthrough at the US-led Middle East summit.
With the sides struggling for months to agree on a joint declaration of principles - as of late last night they still hadn't - Olmert is viewing the summit as a way of beginning a process that will alter that status quo, rather than an event during which substantive decisions will be taken.
For months it has been clear that Israel would not agree to a detailed joint statement that outlined how all the thorny issues at the heart of the conflict, like borders, Jerusalem and refugees, would be resolved - as the Palestinians have wanted. But Olmert will want Annapolis to produce something more concrete than merely an extravagant photo-op.
He will be hoping that an agreement can be forged over what issues the two sides need to discuss and possibly that the sides can begin to put a mechanism in place for continuing negotiations once they have returned home.
These are modest goals, but after the collapse of the Camp David peace talks seven years ago, which were followed by the eruption of the second intifada, the Israeli leader is anxious not to create a similar dynamic following Annapolis.
Israelis often joke that their country "doesn't have a foreign policy, only domestic policy". This is a wry reference to the fractious nature of the country's political system and the fact that leaders who make foreign policy decisions without factoring in domestic political issues, do so at their peril.
Olmert's situation is no different to his predecessors. He knows that the Palestinians want a joint statement that more or less stipulates that Israel will return to 1967 borders.
He knows, also, that if a final peace agreement is ever reached, Israel will, in all likelihood, have to withdraw more or less to these lines.
But, even if he had wanted to, Olmert would almost certainly have restrained himself from making any bold pronouncements at Annapolis, for fear his ruling coalition might unravel.
Two of the rightist parties in his government have been making noises about bolting if the prime minister makes any remarks at Annapolis that they deem too conciliatory.
Olmert has another goal at Annapolis that goes beyond restarting talks with the Palestinians.
He is hoping that the summit, and his talks with President Bush, will boost efforts to thwart Iran's nuclear programme.
His aides said he would be discussing the issue with Bush, and Israel will be hoping that the decision of pro-Western Arab states to attend the summit will help to isolate Tehran.
The attendance of Arab states is certainly being viewed in Israel as a sign that they too fear the consequences of a nuclear Iran.
Olmert has said that Annapolis will be the start of a serious negotiating process, and he has expressed hope that a deal with the Palestinians can be hammered out in the year Bush has left in office.
For that to happen, the Israeli leader will have to be ready to make far-reaching concessions that will ultimately force him to put his political future on the line.