During the nine-day wrangle at the Wye Plantation Middle East summit, the Palestinian side oft lamented: "The Israelis want the maximum from us, but want to give us the minimum."
However, elements of the deal brokered by the US reveal that the Palestinians have come away from Maryland much richer in land than the meagre city-size enclaves they held at the beginning of this round of negotiations as well as credible gains on other issues.
The Palestinians are due to receive, in stages over a period of 12 weeks, 1 per cent of the West Bank now totally controlled by Israel as well as another 14 per cent which is to be transferred from shared control to full Palestinian control. This will raise the area of land fully controlled by the Palestine Authority to 18 rather than 3 per cent.
Moreover, an additional 12 per cent will come under Palestinian administration and Israeli security control, of which 3 per cent will be designated as a "nature reserve" where the Palestinians will not be allowed to settle or build. These areas will, ultimately, be transferred to full Palestinian control, giving the Palestinians self-rule in 40 per cent of the West Bank instead of the 27 per cent they now hold.
While these percentages sound like an elementary school arithmetic problem, they represent the core commodity at dispute between the Palestinians and Israel, land. One amazed commentator quipped: "It's just a land deal". If the accord is implemented, the Palestinians emerge in full control of 1,044 instead of 174 sq km.
Ahead of the final settlement, they should receive at least 2,320 out of the 5,800 sq km of West Bank land. Although this is far less than the 90 per cent or 5,220 sq km they expected at the time Oslo was signed, this "land deal" offers them much more territory than they now hold and reduces the land under full Israeli control from 73 to 60 per cent.
However, Palestinian holdings still consist of islands surrounded by Israeli-held land, making it impossible to establish a viable Palestinian state, a major Israeli objective.
The Palestinians have also made a major gain on the crucial diplomatic front. Because they had accepted the US plan for advancing the peace process while Israel had not, the US was compelled to negotiate with Israel on the basis of agreements between Washington and Gaza, a dramatic departure from Washington's traditional pro-Israel advocacy.
The Palestinians have secured key Israeli concessions on these key issues:
The Palestine Authority agreed to detain, under CIA supervision, 30 Palestinians wanted in Israel for "terrorism", but not to extradite 36 suspects to Israel, including the Palestinian police chief in the West Bank, Commander Ghazi Jubali, accused of involvement in violence. His handover had become a cause celebre for right-wing Israelis.
The Palestine Authority pledged to call a popular congress, not the Palestine National Council (PNC), the PLO's parliament-in-exile, to redraft the National Charter from which references calling for the destruction of Israel were excised in 1996. Israel had demanded the recall of the 700-member PNC, which would not ratify a new version of the Charter.
The Palestinians secured the CIA to monitor compliance on the collection of illegal arms and dismantling the militant wings of Palestinian opposition groups without destroying essential welfare and educational facilities established by the populist Islamic Hamas movement.
The issue of a third Israeli redeployment from the West Bank, which Israel sought to cancel, remains on the table.
Among long overdue "confidence-building measures", three are due for implementation: the release of 400 out of 3,500 Palestinian prisoners; the opening of the operational Palestinian airport in Gaza; and the inauguration of two "safe passages" for Palestinians to travel between the West Bank and Gaza.
These gains do not, however, impress most Arabs. An authoritative source told The Irish Times: "As far as the Arab public is concerned, the peace process is long since dead. [The Palestine President, Mr Yasser Arafat is finished. . . . The old animosities remain."
Arab mistrust might be overcome if the new accord is implemented faithfully, which has not been the case with the six major agreements reached under the Oslo Accords.