Allied commanders in the Gulf will have mixed feelings about their progress in Iraq over the first five days of the campaign, writes Tom Clonan
Most of their casualties to date have been sustained through human error, equipment failure and fratricidal episodes. The gloom surrounding such "friendly fire" incidents will have been compounded by pictures of US prisoners of war on Iraqi television. On the other hand, relatively rapid progress has been made in the armoured advance on Baghdad.
Spearheaded by the US 3rd Infantry Mechanised Division, the armoured advance has moved deep into Iraqi territory. Having passed through the uninhabited desert region of Al Muthanna, the Americans have ground to a halt in the face of unexpected Iraqi opposition.
The advance has now reached what the military refer to as its limit of exploitation. Thus halted and busily securing river crossings over the Euphrates at Nasiriyah, the allies are consolidating further crossings at Najaf, approximately 100 miles short of Baghdad.
The securing of these strategic locations would allow for a widening of the armoured advance on Baghdad. The desert region to the rear of these flashpoints will now function as a massive form-up area, what the Pentagon terms "battle space" for the final assault on Baghdad.
With room to manoeuvre in this area, US armour, including the 3rd Division and the 7th Cavalry, will "shake out" into their order of battle and prepare to move beyond. To this end, they will most likely progress along three axes of advance towards the capital city.
Two thrusts will continue through Nassiriyah and Najaf respectively. This will take US troops through the Al Qadisiyah region between the Tigris and Euphrates, directly on to the southern suburbs of Baghdad.
A third thrust, slightly to the west, will likely drive through the Karbala region towards the capital. Allied commanders had hoped to prosecute this advance in the coming 36 to 48 hours, with some sources predicting the envelopment of Baghdad by Tuesday. Before this happens however, the Americans will be busy securing their relatively narrow and very long 300-mile advance into hostile territory.
In an enormous logistics effort, the US military will be busy ensuring the resupply of fuel, spare parts, ammunition, water and rations along their line of advance.
Despite its temporary halt, the rapid armoured advance into Iraq thus far represents a success story for the coalition under Gen Franks. However, the slower progress made on the right flank of this advance along the Al Faw peninsula and through Umm Qasr to Basra in southern Iraq bodes ill for the allies.
In spite of an unprecedented campaign of psychological operations and despite the application of overwhelming force, Iraqi resistance in these areas has been greater than anticipated.
Having made swift progress through open desert, the allies have had to dismount from their armour and engage in robust firefights in order to take urban centres. Debriefing sessions in the wake of combat at Umm Qasr and Basra will be progressing through the military chain of command, with the chilling assessment that resistance and urban warfare in Iraqi towns and cities is to be expected.
For politicians keen to avoid military and particularly civilian casualties, this will be bad news indeed.
This sense of foreboding is compounded by an assessment of the troops deployed in the defence of Baghdad. Ringing the outer suburbs of the city are several units of the Iraqi Republican Guard, loyal to Saddam Hussein.
The 2nd (Southern) Republican Guard Corps, including the Al Madina Armoured Division, Nebuchadnezzar Infantry Division and the Hammurabi Mechanised Division, are located to the south and west of the city. The 1st (Northern) Republican Guard Corps, consisting of the 1st Adnan Mechanised Division, the al Nida Armoured Division and the 2nd Baghdad Infantry Division, are located to the north and east of the city. The city centre itself is garrisoned by the Special Republican Guard Division.
In addition to these troops, the Iraqi Special Forces Command has withdrawn to the city centre. The presence of these troops will be of particular concern to the allies given their unit designation and association with "special weapons", including chemical and biological agents. The presence of these formations in the Iraqi capital, coupled with the ongoing survival of Saddam and his inner circle, verified or otherwise, will be a cause for grave concern among allied commanders planning the capture of Baghdad.
If, on surrounding the capital, the allies were to face the fanatical resistance suggested by the make-up of such a force, the consequences would be disastrous.
In order to maintain the military initiative, to deny the Iraqi regime the opportunity to consolidate its defence and to contain a humanitarian disaster, allied commanders would be forced to take swift action.
A series of helicopter-borne operations would immediately commence with the objective of rapidly inserting Special Forces troops tasked with the destruction of key objectives and personnel within the city. Such insertions would be accompanied by saturation covering fire and close air support for the suppression of enemy action and the neutralisation of surrounding buildings. In such circumstances, in such a densely populated city, military and civilian casualties would be high.
Such a scenario would be followed by a series of armoured incursions. If a desperate defence were to ensue, the US and British would be forced to pursue an incrementally brutal series of firefights and air strikes to secure their hold on the city. This is the end game to the invasion of Iraq that the US and British are desperate to avoid.
Since talk of war began some months ago, the key factor determining this nightmare scenario has been identified as Iraqi unit cohesion and motivation to fight. This has been the primary target of the US and British intensive psyops, propaganda and bombing campaign.
As Saddam faces his own mortality, he will be exhorting his troops to resist, to achieve martyrdom and to affirm his status as a latter-day Salahaddin. If this call to arms is obeyed, the men, women and children of Baghdad will pay with their lives.
For President Bush and Mr Blair, the cost would be counted to include civilian, military - and political lives.
Dr Tom Clonan is a retired Army officer with experience in the Middle East and former Yugoslavia. He is a fellow of the US-based Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. He currently lectures in the School of Media, DIT.