Iarnród Éireann’s failure to act on a number of key safety reviews stretching back to 1997 was a major factor in the collapse of the Malahide viaduct, a report has found.
The viaduct collapsed on August 21st, 2009 as an Iarnród Éireann passenger train crossed en route to Pearse Station from Balbriggan in Co Dublin.
The train driver reported a section of the viaduct beginning to collapse into Broadmeadow Estuary. Within minutes, one of the piers holding up the track had collapsed, leaving unsupported track hanging over the sea.
There were no fatalities or injuries.
The Railway Accident Investigation Unit (RAIU) is also critical of the Railway Safety Commission, which it said closed a key safety recommendation which called for a flood damage management plan a year before the incident.
According to the RAIU, Iarnród Éireann was told in a series of reports and recommendations for more than a decade of the importance of checking for "scouring", a form of erosion caused by tidal movements and flooding.
Noting the Malahide viaduct piers were built on a "grouted rock armour weir" with stone reinforcement, the report concluded "the immediate cause" was that the pier collapsed after the weir on which it stood was undermined by scouring.
The report said an inspection carried out on the viaduct three days before the incident did not identify the scouring defects, which it said were visible at the time. It also said a scour inspection undertaken in 2006 did not identify the viaduct as a high-risk structure.
In addition, Iarnród Éireann's "likely failure" to take any action after an independent inspection in 1997 identified that scouring had started at the base of the pier and that the rock armour weir was "too light for the job".
It said the maintenance regime for the discharge of stones along the viaduct appeared to have ceased in 1996, resulting in the deterioration of the weir protecting it.
In addition, the report found "contributory factors". These include the failure of Iarnród Éireann to develop a flood/scour management plan at the time of the accident, despite a recommendation from consultants IRMS in 2001, and another review from consultants AD Little Review in 2006. Both reviews recommended this plan be developed.
In a key criticism of the Railway Safety Commission, the report found it had "closed" or dispensed with this recommendation in 2008. Closure of a recommendation meant it was no longer deemed necessary, or was deemed to have been satisfactorily effected.
Detailing a litany of failures, the report found Iarnród Éireann engineers were "not appropriately trained for inspection duties". It said the inspections training course they completed was an abridged version of the intended format and there was no formal mentoring programme for engineers on completion of the course.
There was also a shortfall in structural inspection standards and an "unrealistic requirement" for staff to carry out annual checks for scour, as they did not have access or skills required.
As a result of the findings of the investigation, the RAIU made 15 safety recommendations, 13 to Iarnród Éireann, one to the Railway Safety Commission, and one joint recommendation to Iarnród Éireann and the Railway Safety Commission.
Minister for Transport Noel Dempsey said the report outlined a "detailed and worrying account of the inadequate maintenance and inspection regime in Iarnród Éireann". He said he had emphasised to the chairman of CIÉ the importance of implementing in full the 15 recommendations.
In a statement Irish Rail, said it accepted the findings and sincerely regretted the issues which led to the incident.
It said it began a programme of reform across all aspects of the safety management following the incident. "The implementation of this programme has ensured that all of the recommendations from the RAIU report and RSC audit are already actioned, with many complete."
