A plane crashes into Sellafield. A bomb explodes on a ferry. How well-prepared are we for the aftermath of a deadly accident or major terrorist attack, asks Tom Clonan
The potential risk of international terrorist extremists using chemical weapons in an Irish city such as Dublin, Limerick or Cork seems negligible. Despite the presence of the Shannon stopover for US troops bound for the Gulf, Garda and Army intelligence personnel do not believe that Ireland is a priority target for terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda.
Ireland lacks the type of confined public space - such as an underground system or metro network - where chemical weapons might be deployed to best effect. The other target of choice for chemical weapons - high-rise tower blocks with integrated air conditioning systems - are thin on the ground in Ireland.
However, given our proximity to Britain which, along with the United States ranks highest on the international terrorism hit list, there is consequently a low-level risk to Ireland posed by terrorist chemical weapons.
This risk would consist of a hypothetical scenario involving the transport of chemical agents by terrorist couriers through our territory, ports or airports to Britain.
In reality, the most likely risk to the Irish public involving a chemical agent would consist of a conventional industrial accident - a major chemical spill or chemical fire - at one of our industrial plants or dockland areas. Dublin Fire Brigade, along with the local authority fire services throughout the country, is well-equipped with protective equipment, breathing apparatus and decontamination units to deal with such emergencies.
In terms of the biological threat, the risk to Ireland is slightly raised. As with the chemical threat, the bioterrorism scenario with the greatest potential impact for Ireland would consist of a viral or bacteriological terrorist attack in Britain. One consequence of such an attack would involve the immediate closure of our ports and airports to travellers from affected areas. Air and sea passengers from such locations would have to be screened on entry to the State for signs and symptoms of infection.
Given the inevitable time lag between the launch of such an attack and its detection in Britain, it is certain that victims would begin to spread infection in Ireland prior to the alarm being raised. The risk of cross-channel infection would be especially heightened - almost inevitable - given the dozens of daily flights and sea-crossings between Ireland and Britain.
This factor, in addition to the emergency measures that would be required at our airports and ports, would mean that Irish accident and emergency units would have to immediately begin monitoring for symptoms of the suspected biological or viral infections. In the event of further spread being identified, the Irish health authorities along with An Garda Síochána - with likely assistance from the Defence Forces - would then have to initiate quarantine and isolation measures similar to those implemented in Britain.
By coincidence, the recent foot-and-mouth disease and Sars alerts of the past few years have provided Ireland with some experience of the screening, isolation and quarantine required in a bio-terror scenario.
These crises required a multiagency response and proved that Ireland's island status did not protect it.
The experience indicated in particular that biological weapons, if deployed in Britain would respect neither geographical or political boundaries. It also highlighted weaknesses in our screening and quarantine systems.
During the foot-and-mouth crisis along the Border, the continuity of the cordoning off and monitoring of affected areas between An Garda Síochána and the PSNI appeared fractured.
These experiences indicate the requirement for comprehensive, real-time, "boots on the ground" training exercises in Ireland on a multiagency basis, involving thousands of security forces and medical and emergency personnel along with volunteer "casualties", as carried out in Britain. The exercises scheduled for today and tomorrow in Youghal are a start.
The most serious mass casualty scenario that confronts Ireland is one involving a terrorist attack or industrial accident at the Sellafield or Wylfa nuclear plants in England and Wales.
A terrorist attack on a British nuclear plant might involve crashing a plane into it - just like 9/11. The Irish Defence Forces have no aircraft that could be used to intercept and disable or divert any unauthorised flight in Irish airspace. Nor do the Irish Defence Forces have primary radar systems capable of monitoring more than approximately 50 miles of airspace at any one time. They do not have a missile system capable of bringing down such an aircraft in mid-flight.
In short, in terms of air defence, Ireland has extremely limited capabilities and is not equipped to promulgate its sovereignty or authority in the skies over Ireland. Instead, we rely on Nato (the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation), the British and Americans for protection.
An industrial accident at Wylfa or Sellafield, or any one of its related processing plants is a much more likely, high-risk scenario. Given Sellafield's appalling safety record, its proven falsification of records and its current inability to fully account for its plutonium stocks, the risks posed to the Irish people by a potential slip-up are high.
In a catastrophic incident or accident at Sellafield, the entire east coast of Ireland, including Leinster and Ulster, would be at immediate risk of radioactive contamination - especially if the prevailing winds were from a northeast, or easterly direction.
According to the Department of the Environment's National Emergency Plan for Nuclear Accidents Information Leaflet, the advice in such an eventuality is to "go in, stay in and tune in". In other words, go indoors, remain calm and await instructions from the Government relayed via RTÉ.
In the immediate aftermath of such an incident, the Departments of Health, Justice and the Environment are collectively responsible for Ireland's so-called "Framework for a Co-Ordinated Response to a Major Emergency".
In the Leinster and Dublin region, the relevant bodies - the local authorities, the emergency services, An Garda Síochána and the Civil Defence - would initiate the nuclear incident component of the Major Emergency Plan. This would occur in tandem with the State's wider response consistent with the National Emergency Plan for Nuclear Accidents.
A full-blown exercise to test these plans is necessary. How would the authorities cope, for instance, with the chaos that would ensue in a real crisis?
There would be a mass exodus from the city: parents would be making panic-stricken journeys to schools and creches to get their children.
To curb such activity would probably involve the use of force at choke points and at sensitive junctions in Dublin's road and rail network. The traffic chaos would require the banning of "unnecessary" journeys.
In terms of planning for mass casualty incidents within Ireland, An Garda Síochána, along with emergency medical personnel, the fire services, the Civil Defence and the Coastguard, emerge as highly proactive agencies.
The Garda are particularly farsighted in this regard. In an exercise in January and February of 2003, the lessons learned from a joint Garda/PSNI exercise in a simulated passenger plane crash have been adopted by the European Commission as recommended best practice for emergency personnel in other EU states. The Garda plans to hold at least three such inter-divisional exercises throughout the Republic in 2005.
Ireland has come quite close to a number of spectacular mass casualty incidents. In 1985, Air India Flight 182 was brought down off the southwest coast of Ireland by terrorist action. In 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 was brought down over Lockerbie in Scotland by terrorist action.
If either flight had been in the air a little longer - by mere minutes in the case of Pan Am Flight 103 - or if either flight had been seriously disabled and attempted to land at the nearest airport, Dublin or Shannon, Ireland would have had first-hand experience of a catastrophic mass casualty.
Ireland also had a near-miss incident in 1998 when members of the Real IRA attempted to place a massive car bomb on a passenger ferry at Dún Laoghaire. To put such an incident in context, exercise "Sarex" was mounted by the Irish Coastguard in July of 2001, which simulated a modest incident aboard a passenger ferry in Dublin Bay. Through the logistical exercise of delivering volunteer casualties ashore, the exercise controllers and directing staff concluded that, in a real-life event, all of Dublin's accident and emergency departments would be filled to capacity within 20 minutes.
The remaining casualties in the simulation had to be concentrated and triaged in Seán Moore Park in Ringsend, with the prospect of later transportation by road to hospitals as far afield as Tullamore, Galway, Limerick and Belfast. This component of the exercise provided a sobering reminder of Ireland's inability to deal effectively with the most modest of incidents at the first point of call - accident and emergency.
One of the most valuable lessons of the Madrid bombing last year was that swift removal of victims to hospital saved hundreds of lives.
Ireland's emergency response planning in the event of a natural disaster, major industrial accident or terrorist attack is well-meaning, but poorly co-ordinated and confused.
A plethora of committees and working groups are working in parallel - and often in isolation - to deal with fundamental issues. For example the Departments of Health, Justice and Environment are tasked with co-ordinating the Framework for a Co-Ordinated Response to a Major Emergency. They are assisted by the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland.
In parallel with these agencies, there is a Government Taskforce on Emergency Planning which meets monthly, supported by the Department of Defence office for emergency planning.
The Minister for Defence, Willie O'Dea, chairs the Government task force that oversees the work of the Interdepartmental Working Group on Emergency Planning.
Despite this important role, the Minister for Defence does not have the statutory authority to initiate multiagency exercises, or to co-ordinate or impose "joined-up thinking" on all of the disparate stakeholders.
In the event of an actual disaster, the Minister for Defence is not even a member of the Committee of Ministers which, in conjunction with the Emergency Response Co-Ordination Committee, is supposed to take control of the situation. The existing labyrinth of committees, subcommittees and working groups does not fit well with the real-time swift response required in a disaster.
What is required in Ireland is a centralised command and control system for dealing with emergencies - along with the authority to co-ordinate realistic planning and to initiate regular multi-agency exercises to test real-time "boots on the ground" responses. Such an entity would also need the legislative and executive authority and leadership tools to manage a real-life disaster.
A model for Ireland probably consists of the powerful Cobra Committee established in Britain post-9/11, equipped with sweeping powers to act in the immediate aftermath of such a disaster.
A more evolved model consists of the US-based Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA steps in at the invitation of government in a time of disaster to command, co-ordinate and control the state's multiagency response to emergencies.
Without the type of "joined-up thinking" that informs international best practice on emergency planning, Ireland's current emergency response capability is a disaster in the making.
• Tom Clonan, a former officer in the Defence Forces, lectures in media in the Dublin Institute of Technology.