Here we go again. Another storm-tossed journey through a European referendum campaign gets under way, another journey, may I predict, through waters rich in red herring.
That we will make it through to Port Ratification looks likely enough, at this stage. A combination of this State's genuine enthusiasm for Europe and the latter's not unrelated generosity over the years - £20 billion since accession - makes the passage an altogether safer bet than that of the Danes who will travel the same route later in the spring.
Eurobarometer surveys show Irish voters among the most enthusiastic for European integration - consistently more than 75 per cent since 1994 have said EU membership is a good thing. And the last European referendum, Maastricht, in 1992 produced a Yes vote of 69 per cent.
As yet only Portugal, and possibly France, are also contemplating referendums, the former purely consultative. But, for the treaty to come into effect, every member-state must ratify it according to its individual constitutional requirements. And, as the Danes proved on Maastricht, and the French nearly did, such approval can never be taken for granted. All Europe will be watching little Ireland.
Things are not made easier for the Government by the McKenna judgment's constraints on the use of public funds. We will know later in the week how the Government intends to allocate money to each side of the argument, but the State has certainly honoured its obligation to impartiality in the 176-page White Paper.
It is a model of balance and clarity which sets the treaty and each article in its context - testimony indeed to the drafting skills of the author of much of the treaty, the former secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Noel Dorr.
But the news that the Government has been advised by its lawyers that it must seek distinct approval for both the treaty's explicit provisions and for future Irish opt-ins to unspecified optional co-operation with our fellow member-states will provide powerful ammunition for a No campaign. The electorate has shown itself in the past most discriminating when it comes to amending the Constitution.
As usual the question of defence and neutrality is likely to dominate the campaign, but the wording of the question may now even overshadow it. There are already No campaign claims of the Government asking for a blank cheque from the electorate.
And, if the obligation of the State to its European partners is only to ratify the treaty itself and no more, should the ratification and the possibility of later opt-ins not be put in separate questions to the voters?
The danger is that the former would be approved and the latter rejected, with the result that the Republic could be constitutionally debarred from availing of flexible provisions in the treaty without a further referendum each time. The alternative might be relegation semi-permanently to an outer tier of EU member-states and perceptions of the Republic as a non-team player.
A powerful argument will be made during the campaign that while the Government negotiators have succeeded in the treaty in protecting the Republic's - i.e., the Government's - right to say Yes or No to particular EU future projects, it has agreed to, or wishes to, dilute the Irish people's referendum rights in this regard.
That is so, arguably, both in the areas of flexible co-operation and defence, although in the latter case both this Government and the previous one gave strong political, as distinct from constitutional, guarantees that no change in the Republic's neutral status would ever be proposed without a referendum.
Central to the campaign will be whether or not this or future governments can be trusted to keep such a pledge, even though failure to do so would seem to invite electoral suicide.
Preliminary soundings among the Green and socialist groups likely to form the core of a No campaign suggest concerns will also be raised about the treaty's alleged erosion of national sovereignty, weakness on social exclusion and the environment, its dilution of member-states' obligations to asylum-seekers, and its failure to give MEPs sufficient say over justice and home affairs co-operation and Europol. . .
Yet the Irish debate will seem to have strange preoccupations from a European mainland perspective. Instead of perceptions of the treaty as a major leap forward, the main concern in most capitals is precisely its failure of ambition on that and other scores.
Will it meet the challenges to which it was supposed to be a response? Broadly speaking there were three most commonly articulated: preparing institutionally for enlargement; creating a new capacity for Europe to act on the world stage; and bringing the Union back to the citizen.
Preparing for enlargement: Germany's Chancellor Kohl at the last minute put the kibosh on hopes of the major extension of non-veto voting which most had seen as crucial to unblocking decision-making gridlock.
To the Republic's relief, however, the summit was also unable to agree to reduce the size of the Commission by ending the right of each country to a commissioner - that decision has been put back until after five new members join. And perhaps the most significant constitutional innovation of the treaty - flexibility - is seen by many, the Republic's negotiators included, as opening the door to the possible emergence of inner and outer tiers of EU membership.
The most one can say of the treaty's contribution to the enlargement process is, in the words of one Irish diplomat, that it was "sufficiently successful to allow enlargement talks to begin". To conclude them, the clear implication is, we will need another treaty.
Foreign and security policy: As has been observed, the security and defence component of the treaty, with its creation of a military capacity for the Union, is likely to prove the most controversial in the Republic.
The treaty attempts to circumvent the foreign policy veto by two means: a system of constructive abstention, and agreement to majority voting on the implementation of strategies agreed by unanimity. But the latter is likely to prove very cumbersome and, some predict, unusable in practice.
Bringing Europe back to the citizen: The welcome focus by politicians on jobs and crime tends to obscure the reality that much of the new text in this regard is merely a reiteration in treaty form of well-established political commitments which do not need a new legal base in the treaty.
Amsterdam's breadth disguises its thinness. It is no Maastricht, where the great single currency project was launched, or Single European Act, with its dramatic pooling of sovereignty. Amsterdam will be seen by history as a small, unambitious, step for a Europe preoccupied with its preparations for the euro.
And the red herrings?
Finally, it is worth pointing out what the Treaty of Amsterdam is not about. It is not about the principle of the single currency - agreed at Maastricht. Nor the rate at which we join - to be agreed on May 1st. Nor is it about farm or structural funds reform, part of the ongoing Agenda 2000 negotiations.