Irish banking sector and security firms must look to best practice abroad, writes Tom Clonan.
The banking sector in Ireland has grown accustomed to the notion that the taxpayer ought to bear primary responsibility for securing large cash deliveries within the Republic.
Irish people, unlike many of their European neighbours, have grown accustomed to soldiers and armed gardaí escorting cash to banks throughout the country. This situation evolved primarily to counter the fundraising activities of paramilitaries - through armed bank raids - during the Troubles.
Garda sources now believe the primary threat to Ireland's banking and cash-in-transit operations consists of the risk of armed robbery by "ordinary" criminals.
In recent years Ireland's criminal fraternity has kept remarkably up to date with the latest international trends in armed robbery and money-
laundering. Ireland's criminals have graduated from stand-alone, opportunistic bank heists with improvised weapons such as sawn-off shotguns to carefully planned operations incorporating surveillance and intelligence-gathering.
On a sinister note, criminal operations increasingly feature semi-automatic and automatic handguns.
Unfortunately, it would appear the Irish banking sector and security industry have not kept pace with international best practice in regard to the prevention and deterrence of such armed raids.
Following any escalation in armed robbery - such as that recently experienced - it would be considered an elementary step by international security standards to conduct a thorough risk-management assessment and safety audit of the storage and movement of cash.
Such an audit would identify vulnerable points in the cash-
supply chain and help prevent copycat attacks. Such an audit would appear to have been carried out in recent weeks.
However, this review was not carried out by the industry, but by criminal gangs who through simple surveillance and monitoring have been able to replicate several types of armed raid in recent weeks, including hostage-taking scenarios and the simple interception of unprotected cash in transit.
Wednesday morning's robbery was almost farcical in the manner in which it highlighted the substandard way in which the movement of cash is conducted in Ireland. Contrary to international standard operating procedures, the cash-laden van, having left Brinks Allied's Clonshaugh depot made an unauthorised stop - while still unescorted by the Garda and Army - for staff to buy coffee.
While this was an unauthorised stop, it would appear that such a stop was a regular feature in the schedules of various security vehicle crews, thus rendering the halt, in the language of the security industry itself, "time and location predictable".
Unorthodox workplace practices and unprofessional routines are evidence of poor training, morale and manage-
ment skills. In terms of physical infrastructure, Irish security vans lack the most basic countermeasures and electronic equipment designed to frustrate armed robbery.
Smoke and dye boxes - tamper-proof cash containers designed to destroy their contents if opened by unauthorised personnel - are not carried in many Irish security vehicles. Indeed, to further cut costs and reduce cash-packing times, many banks and security firms transfer cash in bags, a godsend for thieves.
In addition, most Irish security vans lack remotely monitored CCTV cameras within their cabins and cash compartments. Nor do the majority carry satellite route-monitoring equipment.
Such systems are considered consistent with the most basic of industry standards abroad.
Dr Tom Clonan is a retired Army officer and lectures in the School of Media at DIT