ANALYSIS:THE HIGH death toll in Syria from Sunday's co-ordinated military operations against Hama, Deir al-Zor and Deraa reveals that neither side is prepared to shift from entrenched positions.
The government insists the Muslim Brotherhood, ultra-Orthodox Salafis and “armed gangs” with foreign funding are behind the revolt that began 4½ months ago. Their aim, government spokesmen argue, is to install an Islamic state in secular Syria, a country with a large Sunni majority and 17 vulnerable minorities.
The government admits, however, that the majority of protesters have genuine grievances that must be addressed through democratic reform.
Protesters say their ranks are not dominated by Muslim fundamentalists and that their aim is to transform Syria into a multiparty democracy once the regime headed by Bashar al-Assad is toppled.
They say too much blood has been spilt by the regime for it to remain in power, and insist they are using only peaceful means to achieve their end.
However, this is not entirely true: there are, among the protesters, armed fundamentalists and tribal elements who regularly clash with the army and security forces.
The actions of these elements have engendered fear of persecution among the country’s Alawite, Christian and Druze minorities.
The sides have reached stalemate. The government cannot quell the protesters. The protesters, for their part, cannot stand up to the superior might of the armed forces – or count on the high command to switch sides, as it did in Egypt, where Hosni Mubarak was ousted by a coup.
While there have been limited defections of some officers and men, these have not been significant. Protests continue but have not yet engulfed the country’s two largest cities, Damascus and Aleppo, or taken place simultaneously in many restive cities and towns.
The international community has expressed outrage against government repression and has imposed sanctions – but it is not prepared to take military action.
The government remains determined to stay in power and says it is prepared to carry out reforms once the violence ends.
However, weakened by disagreements over how to handle the crisis and economic collapse, the pro-reform camp in government may not be strong enough to impose its will on hardliners determined to crush the revolt whatever the cost to the country.
The opposition is more weak and divided even than the regime. Among the protesters are farmers ruined by drought, unemployed labourers, impoverished workers, human rights activists, veteran opposition figures, tribal and ethnic groups alienated by the regime, secularists, Muslim fundamentalists and exiles with no constituency at home.
Their sole common goal is the overthrow of the government.
While local co-ordinating committees organise demonstrations, no national leaders have emerged, and there is no agreed plan for a post-Assad era.
Indeed, given their very different ideas of the sort of state they want Syria to become, the opposition’s many factions are likely to have competing plans.
Many Syrians fear that if the opposition succeeds in bringing down the regime, their country could face sectarian, ethnic, communal and class conflict similar to the warfare Iraq experienced after the US toppled the secular Baathist regime in Baghdad.
Respected analysts believe the only peaceful option is serious dialogue between government and opposition and a step-by-step transformation of Syria from a family-dominated, one-party state to multiparty democracy.
The first step would be to initiate talks between credible interlocutors from the two sides but, given divisions in both camps, even this could be difficult.
