When waiting for traffic lights to change in Ankara one gets a subtly displayed message from the number plates of the cars in front.
A small blue rectangle on the left is identical in size to the one that in Ireland carries the letters IRL and the 12 stars of the EU. In Turkey the letters TR are displayed to indicate the car's Turkish origin and there is an empty space above ready and waiting for the insertion of the 12 stars.
The impression is created that EU membership for Turkey is imminent. In reality, matters are far more complicated and Turkey's differences with the member-states of the EU have never been so clearly illustrated as in the past week at the NATO headquarters in Brussels when Ankara used its veto to block the use of NATO resources by the proposed European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF).
As a member of NATO since 1952, Turkey believes it has a right to be involved not only in influencing the shape of Europe's defence policy but insists that it should have a positive role in the construction of the EU's new defence initiative.
To this end it has announced that it is prepared to commit 6,000 troops comprising a mechanised infantry brigade, an armoured battalion and a signal company as well as two squadrons of F 16 warplanes to the proposed European force.
At first sight this appears to be a far more significant contribution than the single mechanised infantry battalion along with headquarters and communications staff promised to the ERRF by Ireland.
Looking at the matter in more detail, however, it can be seen that Ireland has been involved more closely, over a much longer time and with considerably greater loss of the lives of its soldiers in international peacekeeping operations than any of the NATO countries. Since Ireland's initial involvement, after Belgium left its former Congo colony in a shambles in 1960, this country has maintained a 40-year presence in UN peacekeeping which, on a per capita basis, would have been the equivalent of Turkey rotating a force of 12,000 troops continuously over the same period.
Having discussed security matters with Turkish officials, diplomats and journalists in Ankara in the past week one came away with the distinct impression that the position of Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Austria - the EU neutrals - has rarely if ever been taken into account by Turkey.
The point was made time and again on the Turkish side that the main areas of instability in which the EU force might become involved lay in close proximity to Turkey in areas such as the Caucasus where Turkish bases would be vital to the success of any mission.
EU countries, on the other hand, would view intervention in the Caucasus, where Russia is fighting an internal war as a disastrous prospect. In one of his characteristically egotistical statements Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery criticised US policy in Vietnam as follows: "The US has broken the second rule of war. That is, don't go fighting with your land army on the mainland of Asia. Rule One is don't march on Moscow. I developed these two rules myself."
An EU involvement in the Caucasus would be the equivalent of a march on Moscow; a flagrant and reckless breach of Rule One. And despite its record in the Korean war in which it lost large amounts of troops, Prof Mim Kemal Oke of the Bosphorous University believes that in today's Turkey, with its largely conscript army, large scale casualties could engender large scale resentment.
While commitment to NATO and to European defence have been at the forefront of Turkey's public complaints at being left out of the European Defence Initiative, officials privately believe that they are being excluded from membership of the force as a signal that they will be kept out of the EU.
Officially Turkey has to meet the Copenhagen political criteria which require EU hopefuls to build Western-style democratic institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, individual rights, and the protection of minorities. The raids on prisons throughout Turkey during the week would indicate that a great deal still has to be achieved in this area.
But the suspicion remains that Turkey is being excluded for religious reasons. Western Europe, it is argued, can come to terms with Bosnia and Albania as neighbours and potential members of the club despite their mainly Muslim populations.
They are acceptable because they are small. Turkey on the other hand would bring with it a large Islamic population many of whom would be tempted to move to the West in search of employment. There may well be some justification for Turkey's misgivings in this sphere. Turkey may also have quite some time to apply its considerable diplomatic expertise in the political and military spheres. The current Turkish position may also be given added clout by its closeness to the views of the new administration in the United States.
Many Western military experts are now convinced that, for logistical reasons, the ERRF may not become an effective force for perhaps a decade. Turkey's EU membership is likely to come a lot later than that.
