The Supreme Court yesterday ruled a High Court judge was wrong to discharge a jury in a libel action by a District Court judge against Independent Newspapers last year.
The Chief Justice, Mr Justice Keane, said he was satisfied the decision of the High Court judge to discharge the jury in the action taken by Judge Joseph Mangan against the Sunday Independent was a disproportionate response to the situation.
Independent Newspapers was awarded costs of yesterday's Supreme Court appeal.
Judge Mangan brought the action arising out of an article by journalist Mr Gene Kerrigan on the front page of the Sunday Independent on March 22nd, 1998.
When the matter was before the High Court last November, the jury was discharged by Mr Justice Barr after he told them a difficulty had arisen in connection to a statement made by counsel for the newspaper when opening the defence.
Giving the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court yesterday, the Chief Justice said the discharge of a jury was a very serious matter and a course which should not be undertaken unless there was no alternative. It was beneficial to neither party, it added to the expense of a case, prolonged its resolution, and was not conducive to the administration of justice.
The Chief Justice said he was satisfied the High Court judge had erred in the exercise of his discretion and he would accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the order for costs made by the High Court judge.
On November 8th last, counsel for Independent Newspapers said, before he called his evidence, he wanted to explain the defence of fair comment. He did so by referring to a well-known legal text book, Gatleys, and from a Law Reform Commission consultation paper.
Counsel for Judge Mangan then called for the jury to be discharged. It was argued counsel for the defence was not permitted to refer to textbooks in the manner he had and the only option was for the jury to be discharged and allow the case to go back for a new trial.
Yesterday, the Chief Justice said it had been perfectly within the competence of the trial judge to address the situation arising from what defence counsel had done.
What would have been appropriate was to remind the jury they had heard a statement of law advanced by defence counsel which the plaintiff's side contended was incomplete and partial and that they should bear that criticism in mind when they heard the evidence.