A Makeshift Majority: The First Inter-Party Government, 1948-51 by David McCullagh Institute of Public Administration 340pp, £18
We have become so used to coalitions in the 1970s, '80s and '90s that it is hard to believe the country experienced its first one only fifty years ago. Indeed, David McCullagh argues that that government insisted on being called "inter-party" because the coalition concept was so abnormal to the Ireland of the time.
Described by Sean Lemass as "a makeshift majority", and by Eamon de Valera as "a fraud against democracy" (Fianna Fail did not relish letting go of power after sixteen years), the new government was not expected to last long. Only two members had previous ministerial experience. The number of parties involved (six) make the 1948-51 experiment unique in Irish political experience. What we have to some extent in Ireland today is government by Independents. After the 1948 election there were twelve independents in the Dail, a bloc of six of whom supported the new government.
No Taoiseach has since had to perform the juggling act John A. Costello had to manage. The difficulties he faced, as well as the virtues he possessed for the task, are particularly well presented by McCullagh. One cabinet colleague described Costello as a "saint", which was just as well, remarks McCullagh, "given all he had to put up with". He pursued a "cautious, consensual approach". For someone without any previous experience of the role, Costello displayed great skill. His one "serious error" was the grandiloquently named "Battle of Baltinglass", involving an attempted transfer of the running of the town's post office from a family who had control of it for seventy years to the 27-year-old son of a former Labour councillor.
Inevitably, there were tensions in such a variegated governmental arrangement, but what is interesting is that differences were often more significant within than between parties. However, the main clash was between Patrick McGilligan, Minister for Finance, and Sean MacBride, Minister for External Affairs, chiefly because MacBride insisted on having his say in matters relating to Finance. As well as Costello himself, the Labour Party leader, William Norton, played a vital role in keeping the government together.
The great irony of this government was that de Valera's Civil War opponents declared Ireland a republic. Costello was attacked for acting unilaterally while in Canada, without Cabinet approval, but McCullagh shows he did nothing of the sort. However, he did create a diplomatic problem for his government, and some of his colleagues did not welcome his action.
Attitudes to Irish membership of the Commonwealth (an issue of current relevance) were complex, even within Fine Gael, the so-called "Commonwealth Party". In fact, Fine Gael were largely responsible for the Republic of Ireland Act. Lord Rugby, the British representative in Dublin, was not impressed: he suggested that the party "had a sudden brainwave that they could steal the `Long Man's' clothes . . . They are all somewhat bewildered by their own sudden illogical iconoclasm and must now find high-sounding phrases to justify it." But McCullagh demonstrates well the logic to Fine Gael's position.
The great tragedy is that as Ireland formally became a republic - it had been one in all but name since de Valera's 1937 Constitution - India, a republic, opted to remain a full member of the Commonwealth. Had this been acceptable to the British in 1922, there would have been no civil war in Ireland and partition might have been very different.
"The Mother and Child crisis has now entered political legend, a legend dominated by the romantic figure of the idealistic Noel Browne, fearlessly battling against the power of the Catholic hierarchy and the cowardice of his own colleagues. The truth is a little different: much of the blame for the crisis must rest on Browne himself; the power of the doctors has been consistently underestimated in the popular imagination; and the strains within Clann na Poblachta and the government itself have been somewhat overlooked." Thus writes McCullagh, introducing his thorough and balanced treatment of the most controversial feature of this government.
All aspects of domestic and foreign policy are analysed in this comprehensive study. It is sprinkled with humorous and interesting nuggets, such as the following from J.J. McElligott, Secretary of the Department of Finance, to Patrick Lynch, economic adviser to the Taoiseach: "You are a young man, I want to give you one piece of advice. The more politicians know, the more dangerous they are."