Dermot Moran's new book does much to restore the sense of excitement and promise which followed the emergence of phenomenology as a philosophical style early in the twentieth century. Phenomenology rejects abstract and formalised approaches to philosophy in favour of the concrete, often ambiguous, evidence derived from human existence as historical.
The term may be somewhat off-putting for the lay-person or the philosophical initiate. However, what is at stake here is no more or, indeed, no less than the continuation of a philosophical project begun by thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle. The task of philosophy is seen as the depiction of essential meanings - the logos of phenomena - regarding human life and liberty, history and culture, values, politics, religion, etc.
Moran shows in his clearly written work, refreshingly free from philosophical jargon, how phenomenology has raised, and continues to pursue, a series of provocative questions which concern us all. The richness of phenomenological themes - including the nature of reason, the role of tradition, questions of authenticity, death, human relationships, etc. - is traced through accounts of the work of Brentano, Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, Arendt, Levinas, Sartre, MerleauPonty and Derrida. In this philosophical journey we witness major changes in phenomenological style and method: from the attempt to establish philosophy as a rigorous discipline which identifies permanent truths, to the view that "rigorous" philosophy may well contain deep prejudices. We are led to appreciate that philosophy as a critical practice must remain open to regular challenge and revision.
The book shows that the practice of phenomenology is open to various and often competing interpretations. For example, Husserl's rationalistic subject stands in sharp contrast to Levinas's account of subjectivity, where the subject is essentially vulnerable - to other people, to social and political institutions, to God.
A valuable feature of Moran's book is the biographical accounts of the philosophers represented in the volume. Here one is struck by the ironic contrast between their often epic questions and the fallible character of their own attitudes and actions. Heidegger's concern with major questions of the nature of reality and time sharply contrasts with his personal and political blind-spots: his meanness of spirit and action in regard to his mentor Husserl, and his naive and dangerous faith in National Socialism. The book is richly illuminating in showing that phenomenology is deeply implicated in the changing circumstances of history. It paints a subtle, but always intelligible, picture of philosophy's attempts at self-justification. It is regrettable, however, that Mikel Dufrenne's major contribution to phenomenological aesthetics is merely mentioned because of limitations of space. Likewise, Simone De Beauvoir's enormous contribution to phenomenology is barely acknowledged.
Such concerns apart, the book is an excellent introduction to phenomenology, which, in its constant struggle with basic philosophical questions, is shown to be in a vibrant and healthy state.
Tony O'Connor is president of the British Society for Phenomenology and lectures in Philosophy at University College Cork