The British believed that they were beginning to have significant success against the Provisional IRA in 1977, newly-released state papers at the National Archives in London reveal.
Despite the concerns of the SDLP, British officials did not believe that there was any evidence that the local political power vacuum had increased the strength of the paramilitaries on either side. If anything, it was argued that the events of 1977 suggested otherwise.
The year began with a security briefing revealing "good intelligence that the IRA intended to step up the violence" over the next few weeks.
There was also evidence that the Provisionals had hatched a plan to set up "flying columns" of gunmen to ambush army patrols in rural areas.
A series of murders followed, including murderous assaults on members of the business community.
Nonetheless, by March the Cabinet Committee on Northern Ireland concluded that "there was no doubt that the security situation had improved substantially during the past nine months", with fewer casualties and a higher level of prosecutions.
In the first months of 1977, British estimates suggested that deaths and injuries were down to nearly half the level they had been in the first four months of the previous year.
Before the visit of Jack Lynch to Downing Street on September 23th, prime minister James Callaghan was advised that there had been "a consistent improvement in the overall security scene during the past 12 months", as demonstrated by a reduction "in all the main indicators of violence".
Indeed, September 1977 was the first month since 1968 in which no civilians were killed as a result of the Troubles.
There was no doubt that the IRA had "maintained their capacity to inflict damage to commercial targets by incendiary attacks".
However, the scene was "altogether quieter than a year ago", and the "attrition of terrorists" had been "accelerated" under Roy Mason.
The arena of conflict was also changing.
By September, officials in the Northern Ireland Office observed that the IRA was being forced to concentrate its operations around the Border rather than Belfast or Derry, a trend which was likely to continue as "the inroads of police successes and the growing loss of public support may make life difficult for them in urban areas".
"We are now faced with a relatively small number of terrorists", confirmed another briefing, "who are becoming increasingly isolated from the community in whose interests they claim to act."
Rigorous analysis of the public statements made by the Provisionals throughout 1977 also led the British government to conclude that the IRA was beginning to face strategic difficulties and internal divisions.
After an interview given by suspected IRA chief-of-staff Séamus Twomey to a magazine in April 1977, analysts detected a "slight defensive note in Twomey's protestations that all PIRA activities are fully co-ordinated and that the movement is united behind the present strategy".
It was felt that the IRA was eager to "refute recent reports of war-weariness", divisions within the Army Council over the truce of the previous year and a "lack of co-ordination and a shortage of volunteers".
Jimmy Drumm's speech at Wolfe Tone's grave in the summer of 1977 was also seen as significant.
It seemed to confirm that there were tensions between the northern and southern portions of the movement, and that the Provisionals had, under the cover of "New Left" rhetoric, moved away from the "one last heave" policy of previous years.
Further briefings from senior Provisionals to the press seemed to confirm that the IRA was coming round to the realisation that it was going to be a "long, long war".
While it was felt that some progress had been made, the ambitions of the security forces nevertheless remained modest.
At a meeting of senior army officers, which took place outside Belfast in August 1977, it was agreed that "although no level of violence can be called 'acceptable', there would always be some violence in Northern Ireland which we should perhaps call 'normal'."