Can the Iraqi government deliver for President Bush? Michael Jansenthinks it unlikely
Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-Maliki is likely to find it difficult to deliver on the list of US demands during the coming military campaign to end the blood-letting in Iraq.
On the military plane, Mr Maliki cannot produce effective, non-political and non-sectarian combat troops and police capable of cracking down on both Sunni insurgents and Shia death squads in Baghdad.
The bulk of the troops he plans to deploy belong to units that have tried and failed to deal with the violence. They are to be bolstered by Kurds from the north and Shias from the south. All Iraq's security forces are deeply politicised and unreliable.
During previous US-led offensives against insurgents the army has faltered and even refused to fight. Forty to 50 per cent of troops have not turned up for combat duty and some units have refused to serve outside their home districts.
Since 80 per cent of soldiers are Shias, many of them members of Shia militias who owe loyalty to their faction chiefs. They may be ready to battle insurgents but not to fight fellow militiamen.
Although Mr Maliki has warned the al-Mahdi army militia, seen by the US as the greatest threat to Iraq's stability, that it must disarm or face US attack. Analysts suggest Mr Maliki is, in fact, telling Moqtada al-Sadr, commander of this force, to hand over some weapons, halt assaults on Sunnis and keep a low profile until the US deals with the insurgents.
A frontal assault on the Sadrists in the south and on the Sadr City district of Baghdad, with 2.5 million inhabitants, is the last thing Mr Maliki wants. He depends on the Sadrists, the only Shia party with popular roots, to keep him in office.
There is also an ideological connection between the premier and the cleric. Mr Maliki's Dawa party, founded by an uncle of Mr Sadr and sustained by his father, is part of the greater Sadrist movement.
While Washington's focus has been on the Sadrist militia, Mr Maliki will also have to tackle its rival, the Badr Corps militia of the pro-Iranian Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which is strongly represented in the army and police and deploys death squads against Sunnis.
Failure to deal with this militia could mean the ascendancy of the pro-Iranian faction headed by Abdel Aziz al-Hakim.
On the political plane, Mr Maliki's compliance with US demands means reversing the core policies adopted by the Shia fundamentalist coalition and Kurdish bloc when they took power after the January 2005 election.
They drew up a federal constitution that gave autonomy to ethnic Kurdish and Shia majority regions; provided that revenues from oil should be spent in northern and southern regions where fields are located; and barred former Baathists from governance.
Sunnis want a strong central administration, a just share of oil revenues and jobs for ex-Baathists.
But the Shias, having tasted power, are unwilling to concede Sunni demands. Their determination to hang on to power is supported by the highly revered supreme Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.
Mr Maliki is also expected to invest $10 billion (€7.7bn) of unspent Iraqi revenues on reconstruction and job creation projects benefiting all communities, but he has been reluctant to commit to projects in Sunni areas and, therefore, has not invested elsewhere.
If Mr Maliki fails to honour his pledges, he is aware that he could lose Washington's support. Since this could bring about his downfall, analysts say he could carry out half or cosmetic measures in the hope he will survive.