Russia’s deployment of military advisers, tanks, armoured personnel carriers and advanced aircraft at an air base near Syria’s port city of Latakia is belated but opportune.
Moscow has bolstered its presence at a time when Syrian armed forces are overstretched; it comes more than six months after US allies Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey increased funds, fighters and arms for Islamic State, al-Qaeda's Jabhat al-Nusra and other jihadi groups. This boost enabled them to seize territory in Idlib, Deir al-Zor and Homs provinces and move into areas south and east of Damascus.
Russia intends to strengthen government defences in the coastal enclave and Aleppo, around Damascus, and along the Lebanese border, rather than roll back the jihadis.
Above all, Russia is determined to preserve Syrian state and military institutions to prevent the collapse of the state, as happened in Iraq after the 2003 US occupation.
On the domestic front, Moscow is deeply concerned about the rise of IS in Syria and Iraq. IS has recruited 2,000 fighters from Muslim Russian federation states and the cult is making a major effort to proselytise in these restive republics, with 20 million Muslim citizens out of a total population of 140 million.
President Vladimir Putin is eager to show Russians their country is a major power and cannot be sidelined in a region where Moscow wielded influence for decades.
Vacuum
On the foreign front, Moscow has the right to intervene because it was invited to do so by Damascus. Russia fears the collapse of the Syrian government could produce a power vacuum that would be exploited by IS, Nusra and similar groups and would fragment the country into warring jihadi fiefdoms.
Russia is determined to hang on to its fuelling and support facility for its Black Sea Fleet, at Tartus, the only Russian military installation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and operate a second facility from which it can project power.
While the US has protested against Russia’s deepening involvement, Moscow has carefully calculated its move by dispatching military advisers rather than ground troops, a few tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and helicopters, and four advanced SU-30SM Flanker warplanes.
This deployment hardly challenges the huge US presence at the Nato base, in Incirlik, in Turkey, or other facilities in Iraq and the Gulf. However, Russian aircraft could check US and Israeli air interventions against Syrian government forces and provide cover for their operations against IS, Nusra and other jihadi factions.
Little wonder the Saudi-sponsored Islamic Army fired missiles at the Russian base on the weekend. Riyadh’s priority is to topple Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, and it employs jihadis for this purpose regardless of risks.
Grip
Like Riyadh,
Washington
has, since 2011, called for Assad to stand down, but the US seems, belatedly, to be considering consultation with Russia and
Iran
– Damascus’s other traditional ally – as IS tightens its grip on Syrian and Iraqi territory and hundreds of thousands of Syrians and Iraqis migrate to Europe.
Rolling back IS and stemming the tide of refugees require not only concerted US-Russian-Iranian efforts on the ground but also western pressure on Riyadh, Doha and Ankara to cease support for IS and Nusra in exchange for a pledge from Russia and Iran to back free elections at the end of Syria’s political transition.