Tony Blair’s crucial judgment that Iraq had breached the terms of a United Nations Security Council resolution, providing legal justification for UK involvement in war, was delivered in a “perfunctory” note without discussion in cabinet and without a formal record of how it had been reached, Sir John Chilcot’s Inquiry has found.
The Iraq Inquiry found that the circumstances in which it was decided that there was a legal basis for war were “far from satisfactory”.
And it found that draft advice prepared by attorney general Lord Goldsmith in the run-up to war was withheld from cabinet ministers with direct responsibilities for the military action who should have seen it.
Following the adoption in November 2002 of UN Security Council resolution 1441, which gave Iraq a final opportunity to disarm or face “serious consequences”, Lord Goldsmith initially advised Mr Blair that a second resolution confirming Baghdad’s failure to comply would be required to provide a legal basis for military action.
Mr Blair ordered that this draft advice, in January 2003, should not be shared by ministerial colleagues without Number 10’s permission, and it was not discussed at cabinet or seen by then-foreign secretary Jack Straw or defence secretary Geoff Hoon, the report found.
Following discussions with US officials — who were insistent that no second resolution was needed — Lord Goldsmith told No 10 in February that “a reasonable case” could be made that resolution 1441 revived authorisation for military force contained in an earlier Security Council resolution adopted at the time of the 1990 Gulf War.
This argument was set out in formal written advice provided by Lord Goldsmith on March 7th. But the note concluded that “the safer route” continued to be a second resolution and warned that the attorney general could not be confident a court would back his view.
In order to justify the use of force, the government would need to demonstrate “hard evidence of non-compliance and non-cooperation” by Baghdad with UN weapons inspectors, the attorney general warned Mr Blair.
The views of Unmovic and IAEA inspectors would be “highly significant” in proving this.
At a meeting in Downing Street on March 11th, Mr Blair told ministerial colleagues that Lord Goldsmith had “made it clear that a reasonable case could be made” for military action on this basis, but added that a second resolution would be “preferable”.
But concerns were raised that the advice did not offer a clear indication that military action would be lawful, and Lord Goldsmith was asked by chief of defence staff admiral Sir Michael Boyce and the treasury solicitor Juliet Wheldon to provide “clear-cut” assurances that this was the case.
By the following day, Mr Blair and Mr Straw had concluded there was “no chance” of a second Security Council resolution, though there was no evidence that Lord Goldsmith was informed of this.
No resolution needed
On March 13th he provided an assurance that “the better view” was that no second resolution was needed, and on March 14th his legal secretary David Brummell wrote to Mr Blair asking for confirmation that it was “unequivocally his view” that Iraq had breached 1441 in a way that would allow the revival of the 1990 authorisation for force.
Mr Blair’s private secretary Matthew Rycroft responded in a brief note on March 15th that “it is indeed the Prime Minister’s unequivocal view that Iraq is in further material breach of its obligations”.
The Chilcot Report found it was “unclear what specific grounds Mr Blair relied upon in reaching his view” and noted that there was “no reference” to him seeking the views of weapons inspectors, adding: “The only view referred to was that of Mr Blair.
“Following receipt of Mr Brummell’s letter of March 14th, Mr Blair neither requested nor received considered advice addressing the evidence on which he expressed his ‘unequivocal view’.”
It added: “Apart from Number 10’s response to the letter of March 14th, sent the following day in terms that can only be described as perfunctory, no formal record was made of that decision and the precise grounds on which it was made remain unclear.”
The report found that the attorney’s request should have been considered by senior ministers in a cabinet committee or war cabinet on the basis of formal advice, before being endorsed by cabinet.
New written statement
In fact, cabinet was presented on March 17th with a new written statement from Lord Goldsmith setting out the government’s legal position, which stated that it was “plain” Iraq was in breach of resolution 1441 and that there was no need for a further resolution.
Cabinet was not informed of the exchange of letters or of the basis for Mr Blair’s view that Iraq was in breach. There was “little appetite” to question the Attorney and “no substantive discussion of the legal issues was recorded”, the report found.
Sir John found that cabinet “was not misled” in the key March 17th meeting at which ministers backed war, and that the exchange of letters did not constitute a “side deal” between Mr Blair and the Attorney General, as then international development secretary Clare Short has alleged.
But the report found: “Given the gravity of this decision, Cabinet should have been made aware of the legal uncertainties” and Lord Goldsmith should have been asked to provide written advice setting out in full the Government’s position and the risks of legal challenge.
Sir John noted that if the decision had been left to the Security Council, war might have been postponed or avoided altogether, adding: “In those circumstances, the UK’s actions undermined the authority of the Security Council.”
And he added: “The circumstances in which it was decided that there was a legal basis for UK military action were far from satisfactory.”
PA